History of Psychoanalysis

Papers on Psycho-Analysis · Part I: General papers

The Psychopathology of Everyday Life

Ernest JonesChapter IV of XLPrinted pages 40–103About 2 hr 21 min

Forgetting, slips, misprints, misplaced objects, and other ordinary errors become material for psychological interpretation.

Type size
Chapter IV
p. 40 notes
Introduction—Forgetting—Lapsus Lingue—Lapsus Calami—Misprints— False Visual Recognition—Mislaying of Objects—Erroneously-carried-out Actions—Symptomatic Acts—General Observations—Summary.

I. Introduction

UNDER this title Freud has written an interesting volume? dealing with a number of mental processes which previously had received little or no attention from psychologists. The material of this kind that lends itself to study, like that of dreams, is very extensive, and is accessible to everyone; it is therefore of value to those who wish to test Freud’s general psychological conclusions, and who have not the opportunity of investigating the more obscure problems of the psycho-neuroses. Freud’s study of the mental processes in question is of especial interest as shewing that mechanisms similar to those observable in the abnormal also occur in the normal; indeed, from a psychological point of view these processes may be termed ‘symptoms,’ although they occur in perfect health. They may be further likened to neurotic symptoms in that they represent flaws in the normal functioning of the mind. Freud’s principal thesis in this connection may be thus stated: Certain inadequacies of our mental functioning, and certain apparently purposeless performances, can be shewn by means of psycho-analysis to have been determined by motives of which we were not at the time aware. The occurrences in question have the following characteristics in common: They belong to what may be called normal behaviour. They p. 41 notes THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE Al

are only temporary disturbances of a function which at another moment would be correctly performed. Their incorrectness is at once recognised as soon as attention is drawn to them. We can trace no motive for them at first, but always tend to attribute them to ‘ inattention,’ to ‘chance,’ and so on.

It will be seen from this that, according to Freud, our mental processes are more rigorously determined than is commonly believed, and that many of them generally thought to be causeless have in fact a very precise and definable cause. The same remark applies to those mental processes where we believe we have a perfectly free choice. A typical instance of this is afforded by the children’s game ‘think of a number.’ Whereas at first sight it would appear that we are free to choose any possible number, careful analysis shews, as was first pointed out by Adler! a few years ago, that the number actually chosen is always connected with some mental process of considerable personal significance, though this may never have been realised by the subject, and that the choice has been determined by definite preceding mental constellations. I may relate an example of this, obtained from an unbelieving acquaintance. He produced the number 986, and defied me to connect it with anything of especial interest in his mind. Using the free-association method he first recalled a memory, which had not previously been present in his mind, to the following effect: Six years ago, on the hottest day he could remember, he had seen a joke in an evening newspaper, which stated that the thermometer had stood at 986° F., evidently an exaggeration of 98°6° F. We were at the time seated in front of a very hot fire, from which he had just drawn back, and he remarked, probably quite correctly, that the heat had aroused this dormant memory. However, I was curious to know why this memory had persisted with such vividness as to be so readily brought out, for with most people it surely would have been forgotten beyond recall, unless it had become associated with some other mental experience of more signifi-

. cance. He told me that on reading the joke he had laughed uproariously, and that on many subsequent occasions he had recalled it with great relish. As the joke was obviously of a very tenuous nature, this strengthened my expectation that more lay behind. His next thought was the general reflection p. 42 notes that the conception of heat had always greatly impressed him; that heat was the most important thing in the universe, the source of all life, and so on. This remarkable attitude of a quite prosaic young man certainly needed some explanation, so I asked him to continue his free associations. The next thought was of a factory-stack which he could see from his bedroom window. He often stood of an evening watching the flame and smoke issuing out of it, and reflecting on this deplorable waste of energy. Heat, flame, the source of life, the waste of vital energy issuing from an upright, hollow tube—it was not hard to divine from such associations that the ideas of heat and fire were unconsciously linked in his mind with the idea of love, as is so frequent in symbolic thinking, and that there was a strong masturbation complex present, a conclusion which he presently confirmed. We had just before been talking of sexual topics, a fact which no doubt had unconsciously influenced his choice. His choice of the number was therefore far from being a free one, being, in fact, dictated by a very significant personal constellation.

II. Forgetting

One of Freud’s most notable contributions to psychology, and a conception fundamental in his study of the present group of mental processes, was his discovery that, in addition to the other causes of forgetting, ‘repression’! (Verdrdngung) plays a most important part. Others before Freud had realised. the existence of this, but it was reserved for him to demonstrate the extent to which it is operative in both normal and abnormal mental life.

Freud regards repression as a biological ian mechanism, the function of which is to guard the mind from painful experiences. He holds that there is in the mind of everyone a tendency to forget the things that the person does not like to be reminded of—in other words, painful or disagreeable memories. It is true that we often remember against our will matters that we would rather forget, but there are two explanations for this. In the first place, such disagreeable haunting memories are frequently themselves only the replace- p. 43 notes ments of buried and still more disagreeable ones with which they are associated, an occurrence allied to that concerned in the genesis of true obsessions. In the second place, the capacity to forget painful experiences is only of a certain strength, which differs greatly in different people, and it is not always _ successful in achieving its aim. It is but rarely that one can forget the death of a dear relative, however desirable that might be, for the associative links to other conscious memories are too well formed. In such cases, what happens is that trivial memories, which by association might serve unnecessarily to remind us of the painful event, are apt to get forgotten— the name of the medical attendant, details as to the fatal malady, and so on; the tide of amnesia covers the base of the hill, but cannot reach the summit. By this means an economy is effected in the number of times that the painful memory is recalled to consciousness. Further, it must be remarked that, for reasons which cannot here be gone into, repression acts much more extensively in causing forgetfulness of internal, extremely intimate, and personal mental processes, than of

- what may be called ‘external memories’ known to the world, such as failure, grief, and so on. As is well known, Freud has applied his conception of repression to a number of other fields, notably to the explanation of infantile and hysterical amnesias, which do not here concern us.

A good instance of the recognition of the part played in everyday life by repression has been furnished by Darwin in a passage that does equal credit to his scientific honesty and his psychological acumen! He writes in his autobiography:

‘Il had, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones.’ Pick? quotes a number of authors who more or less clearly recognise that a defensive striving against painful memories can lead to their becoming forgotten; but, as Freud remarks, no one has so exhaustively and at the same time so incisively described both the process itself and the psycho- p. 44 notes logical basis of it as has Nietzsche in his ‘ Jenseits von Gut und Bése’: ‘Das habe ich getan, sagt mein Gedachtnis. Das kann ich nicht getan haben, sagt mein Stolz und bleibt unerbittlich. Endlich—gibt das Gediachtnis nach.’ [‘I have done that, says my memory. I cannot have done that, says my pride, and _remains inexorable.- Finally—memory yields.’]

The class of forgotten thoughts in everyday life to which this mechanism mainly applies is, of course, that where the other causes of forgetting do not provide adequate explanations; in other words, it principally concerns matters that we should normally expect to remember. For instance, one would expect some hidden reason in the case of the name of a near relative or friend being forgotten much more readily than in the case of that of a casual acquaintance. The examples of the mechanism may conveniently be divided into two groups: (1) Forgetting to carry out some intended purpose (Vergessen von Vorsdizen), and (2) forgetting a given memory.

(1) Forgetting to carry out an intention. A field in which some counter-will frequently leads to forgetting is that regarding the making or keeping of appointments. A man unwillingly feels that he should invite a given acquaintance to a social function he is giving in the near future. He says to him, ‘You will be sure to come, won’t you? I am not absolutely certain of the date at this moment, but I will send you a written invitation and let you know.’ He forgets, until it is too late, and his excessive self-reproach betrays his unconscious culpability and shews that the forgetting was not altogether an accident. Maeder?* relates the case of a lady who forgot to keep her appointment with the dressmaker to try on her bridal gown the day before the wedding, recollecting it only at eight in the evening. One must suppose that her whole heart was not in the marriage, and, in fact, she has since been divorced. In my own life I have noted numerous instances of a purposeful forgetting of appointments, particularly with patients. If a given patient is tedious and uninteresting, I am apt to forget that I have to see him at a certain hour, and if a doctor telephones to ask me whether I can see an interesting case at that hour, I am as likely as not to tell him that I shall be free then. Indeed, I can recall several annoying quandaries that this habit has led me into. p. 45 One is perhaps worth repeating, as shewing how complete can be the divorce between two memories when an: ‘unpleasantness’ motive is in action. Some years ago, when in a junior position at a certain hospital, I was asked by my chief to visit his patients on Friday, as he wished to attend an important luncheon at the time. It was an exceptional request, for the rule was that approbation of the committee had to be obtained before a substitute was allowed to act, and I gladly consented, quite forgetting that I already had at the same time an appointment, which I was very desirous of keeping, and which would have been particularly inconvenient to postpone. On several occasions during the week, while going over my future engagements, I thought of both these, but never together; the thought would come, ‘Let me see, at one on Friday I have to be at suchand-such a place,’ and a few hours later a similar thought would come concerning the other place. The two intentions, both of which I was anxious not to forget, were kept distinct from each other, as if in water-tight compartments. When the time came I forgot the hospital appointment, and to my intense chagrin heard that my chief was very annoyed at being called away from his luncheon on account of my apparent unpardonable remissness. At the present time my memory chiefly fails in this respect in regard to visiting patients in nursing-homes, a duty I find irksome on account of the time consumed. Often when I am busy I conveniently forget, and once I left a patient without her daily visit for nearly a week. The self-reproach one feels on recollecting the forgotten duty on these and similar occasions is indicative of the true significance of the occurrence. This significance is intuitively realised in the case of lovers. A man who has failed to appear at a rendezvous will seek in vain to be forgiven on the plea that he had forgotten about it—will, indeed, with this plea only increase the lady’s resentment. Even if he falls back on the customary psychological explanations, and describes how urgent business had filled his mind, he will only hear in reply: ‘How curious that such things didn’t happen last year! It only means that you think less of me.’ Similarly, when a man begins to be forgetful about paying accustomed attentions to his wife, overlooks her birthday, and so on, she correctly interprets it as a sign of a change in their relations.

Another field where forgetting occurs to an untoward extent is in giving—a fact that indicates a more widespread p. 46 objection to giving than is agreeable to our altruistic conceptions. Most of those who have filled secretarial positions have been astonished to find the difficulty there is in collecting subscriptions as they fall due, and the ease with which people with otherwise good memories ‘overlook’ such matters. It is far from rare for them even to falsify their memory, and to assert firmly that they have already paid. A few, dimly conscious of their weakness, compensate for it by forming the habit of promptly paying every bill the moment it arrives. In general, however, there is a striking difference between the ease with which one remembers to send to the bank incoming cheques, and that with which one forgets to pay incoming bills. The same tendency is the explanation of the constant ‘forgetting ’ to return borrowed books that seems to afflict so many people, a habit which must have distressed most of us who have a good library. This observation will be confirmed by any one who has tried to establish a permanent library in an institution where many coming and going students have ready access to it.

Almost as common is the habit of forgetting to post letters. Here, also, unconscious motives can sometimes be detected in individual instances. Sometimes one leaves a letter on one’s desk for several days, forgetting each time to take it with one; in such cases it may be counted on that there is some secret opposition to sending the given letter. In one instance of the kind I ultimately posted the letter, but forgot to address the envelope. It was returned to me through the Dead Letter Office; I addressed it and again posted it, but this’ time without a stamp. I was then forced to recognise that there was in me an unconscious opposition to the sending of the letter, one of which I had previously been unaware, but which manifested itself in external inhibitions. One does not forget to post a letter that one’s mind is in full harmony about sending —for instance, a love-letter. One is more apt to forget to send a letter containing a cheque than one containing an account. Often the resistance is of a general order. Thus a busy man forgets to post letters entrusted to him—to his slight annoyance —by his wife, just as he may ‘forget’ to carry out her shopping orders. Inhibitions of this kind sometimes betray a. veiled antagonism towards the person whose behests we forget to fulfil. They constitute a way of depreciating the importance of the other person for ourselves, and when pronounced in p. 47 notes general they indicate a lack of consideration for others, based on an excessive self-absorption or abnormally high self-esteem.

George Meredith, in his ‘Celt and Saxon,’ gives a pretty instance of the forgetting of an intention being determined by a counter-will, one which also well illustrates the mechanism of rationalisation described in the second chapter. There are two brothers, one of whom, Phillip, is suffering under the mortification of having been jilted by his fiancée, Adiante. His brother Patrick, who is very fond of him, determines to visit the lady and try to influence her in his brother’s favour. He stays as a guest in her father’s house, where he finds that she has eloped with another man. In her home is a miniature of the lady; Patrick is greatly struck by its beauty, becomes fascinated by it, and persuades the father to give it him to take to his brother. On reaching home he shews it to his brother, and then says good-night. I now quote from Meredith: ‘Phillip checked the departing Patrick. ‘‘ You can leave that.’”’ He made a sign for the miniature to be left on the table. Patrick laid it there. His brother had not touched it, and he could have defended himself for having forgotten to leave it, on the plea that it might prevent his brother from having his proper share of sleep; and also, that Phillip had no great pleasure in the possession of it. The two pleas, however, did not make one harmonious apology, and he went straight to the door in an odd silence, with the step of a decorous office-clerk, keeping his shoulders turned on Phillip to conceal his look of destitution.’

In examples similar to those preceding, the counter-impulse that inhibits the memory is as a rule directed immediately against the conscious intention. In a more complicated series of cases, which the Germans term Fehlleistungen, it is directed against some other mental process, which, however, stands in associative relation to the conscious intention; this mental process is, so to speak, symbolised in the latter. The following are two examples of the kind: Maeder? relates the case of a hospital interne who had an important business appointment in the town, but who was not allowed to leave the hospital until his chief, who was out for the evening, returned. He decided to leave his post, nevertheless, and on getting back late in the p. 48 evening, was astonished to find he had left the light burning in his room, a thing he had never done before during his two years of service, He at once perceived the reason for his omission; his chief always passed by the window on his way to his own house, would see the light burning, and conclude that the assistant was at home. The cause for the inhibition having passed, the subject readily apprehended it. A patient of mine on a number of occasions made the remarkable omission of forgetting to shave the right side of his face. It was always the same side, and it was the one that was turned towards me during the treatment. Analysis of the occurrence shewed that it was determined by a number of unconscious processes, of which the following was one: The idea of hair was connected with various sexual ideas, and the non-shaving of the side turned to me symbolised a disinclination to lay bare his sexual life, the occurrence always synchronising in fact with an outburst of resistance against the treatment.

(2) Forgetting a given memory. We are concerned mainly with striking lapses in memory— namely, regarding matters that as a rule we can easily recall. An instance, which is hard to credit, though I can vouch for the accuracy of it, was related to me by a medical friend. His wife was seriously ill with some obscure abdominal malady, which might well have been tubercular, and, while anxiously pondering over the possible nature of it, he remarked to her, ‘It is comforting to think that there has beén no tuberculosis in your family.’ She turned to him very astonished, and said, ‘Have you forgotten that my mother died of tuberculosis, and that my sister recovered from it only after having been given up by the doctors?’ His anxiety lest the obscure symptoms should prove to be tubercular had made him forget a piece of knowledge that was thoroughly familiar to him. Those accustomed to psycho-analysis will surmise that there is more to be said about the matter, but the example will serve to illustrate the influence affective processes have in connection with forgetting.

A lapse of memory that caused a good deal of stir at the time refers to the occasion on which Cardinal Newman (then Dr. Newman) called the Infallibilists ‘an insolent and aggressive faction.’ When the words were made public, Dr. Newman vehemently denied ever having used them, but some time after he remembered that he had, and admitted it.

p. 49 notes It is with proper names that one observes the most striking instances of this process. In the majority of cases the counterwill that prevents a familiar name from being recalled is directed against some mental process that is associated with the one to be recalled, rather than against thisitself. On account of some disagreeable experience, we would rather not recall a given name; we may actually succeed in forgetting it, but more often the tendency is shewn indirectly in our being unable to recall other names resembling it, and which might bring the undesired one to our mind. In other words, we have to think of the undesired name at times, but we guard ourselves against doing so more often than is necessary.

A hospital interne got to know a nurse, whom he of course addressed by her surname, and in his work saw her daily for about a year. They later got more intimate, and he now experienced great difficulty in recalling her surname so as to address envelopes to her. On one occasion he was unable to write to her for three weeks; recourse to her letters was of no use, for she always signed only her Christian name in them. Investigation of the matter brought to light the fact that her Christian name was the same as that of a girl he had previously jilted, and also of another girl he had been passionately in love with throughout his boyhood. This name he could not forget. What had happened was that he had successively transferred his affections from one girl to the other, the three being unconsciously identified in his mind. He was thus always true to his love, and did not wish to recall any fact, such as the different surname, that would tend to remind him of his faithlessness. The surnames in no way resembled one another. Brill? relates the following example from his own experience: When working at Zurich, he wished to recall the name of an old patient of his, on whose case he had specially worked for some months, but was totally unable to do so. He had painstakingly prepared an account of the case for publication, but at the last moment his chief intervened, and decided to report it before a local society. He was unexpectedly prevented from doing so, and Brill was sent to read the paper at the meeting, this being credited to the chief. In trying to recall his patient’s name, the name of another patient, Appenzeller, who was suffering from the same disease, persistently pre- p. 50 sented itself. In the lengthy psycho-analysis undertaken, one apparently irrelevant memory kept recurring over and over again. ‘This was an actual scene, in which the chief in question had aimed with a shot-gun at a rabbit, and had missed, to the amusement of Brill and the bystanders. The sought-for name ultimately flashed up—JLapin (rabbit), the patient being a French-Canadian. The example is instructive in illustrating the associative replacement-formations that come to the mind instead of the proper memory. The sound of the first part of Appenzeller’s name resembles the French pronunciation of Lapin, and the scene that kept recurring, the failure of the chief to bag the rabbit, symbolised the whole incident that was the cause of the inhibition.

The following instance is rather more complex, but shews how fine are the threads.connecting unconscious mental processes: A lady was unable to recall the Christian name of a near friend. The full name was Isabell Brown, but she could only recall the surname; instead of the other, the name Isidore presented itself, to be at once rejected as incorrect. Thus the failure in memory consisted only in the replacement of the syllable ‘bell’ by ‘dore.’ I asked her to associate to the word Brown, and the two names ‘Owlie’ and ‘Leen’ at once came to her mind. It will be noticed that the first two letters of the first word and the last one of the second word are contained in Brown; the only foreign ones in each case form the syllable ‘ly’ in pronunciation—a fact to be borne in mind. The two words were pet names of two common friends, who used to live together with the subject, and it was only in their company that she used to see Miss Brown. Concerning the > first one, she said that she was at present pregnant for the

first time, and that she was anxious as to the outcome, because certain characteristics in her figure had led her to suspect that pelvic narrowing might give rise to difficulties in the confinement. She also mentioned another friend, Dora D., who had similar characteristics, and Isidora D., a famous classical dancer, whom she knew personally, and whose perfect figure she much admired. The name Isidore, which it will be remembered was the replacement-memory, reminded her of the poem by Edgar Allan Poe, ‘Beautiful Isidore Lee’ (ly). I told her that the correct name of the poem was ‘Beautiful Annabel Lee,’ so that she had committed another falsification of memory; some inhibition was therefore acting against the syllables p. 51 ‘Anna’ and ‘Bell.’ Thought of the name Annabel brought to her mind the name of Owlie’s sister, Annie Sybil, which is a sound-contraction of Anna Isabell, and at once Miss Brown’s proper name Isabell, which I personally did not know, came to her mind. The subject had recently had a painful quarrel with Annie Sybil, in which also the latter’s sister had unfortunately become involved; she had always thought it a pity that the sister she disliked had a better figure, and was more suited for matrimony, than the one she was so fond of. There were thus two painful thoughts at the bottom of the amnesia—one the anxiety about Owlie’s confinement, and the other that in this respect the disliked sister was more favourably situated. So far the analysis. I will now venture on the following reconstruction of the mistake. The names first recalled by the subject—namely, Isidore Brown—one incorrect, the other correct, were both directly associated to the syllable ‘ly,’ the former via the poem, the latter via the pet names of the two friends. The suppressed syllable was ‘bell.’ In view of the fact that the word ‘belly’ summarised the whole situation, succinctly symbolising the discomforting idea about the friend’s confinement, it is difficult to avoid the inference that the amnesia for the syllable ‘bell’ had thus proceeded: One must suppose that the thought of Miss Isabell Brown had unconsciously reminded the patient of their common friend and her sister; the diphthong in the surname, further, 1s identical with that in the former’s name, Owlie, and the Christian name resembles the second part of the latter’s name, Annie Sybil. The first part of the latter name, Annie, reminded her of ‘ Beautiful Annabel Lee’ making the word ‘belly,’ which symbolised the painful thoughts in question. These thoughts, nevertheless, came to expression in the false replacement-memory. First the accent was shifted from the first syllable, ‘bell,’ of the objectionable word to the second, ‘ly,’ which was also the second syllable of Owlie’s name. This, however, was unsuitable for forming a name by being added to the remembered part ‘Isi,’ so that a further shifting took place, in which it was replaced by ‘dore.’ Dora was the name of a friend with similar characteristics to Owlie’s, but, in combination with ‘Isi,’ it was the name of another person, Isidora D., who was strikingly free from them. The subject, therefore, invests her friend with the beautiful and healthy attributes of the famous dancer. One might even go farther, and surmise that the reason why p. 52 notes Dore had appeared rather than Dora was because the word ‘door,’ which is constantly used symbolically for any exit (for instance, of the body, as in the Song of Songs), was better adapted to symbolise the suppressed complex than the word Dora is. An adjuvant reason for the choice of the masculine form Isidore rather than the feminine one Isidora was probably the fact that her attitude towards her friend was a distinctly masculine and protective one. It is fairly evident that the subject was transferring on to her friend emotions—e.g., solicitude about the confinement—that really referred to herself. She had a dread of the same event, and to an expert there are clues in the falsified memory to the particular infantile origin of this. Her identifying herself with the friend was facilitated by two circumstances—first, that she greatly admired the latter’s husband (and was thus unconsciously putting herself in her place); and, secondly, that she was devotedly fond of the friend herself+ Of especial interest is the fact that the repressed complex, which was responsible for the forgetting, betrayed itself in the replacement-memory, which was, as is always the case, a compromise-formation. To many readers this reconstruction will probably appear as too fine-spun. In my opinion, however, they underestimate the combination of delicacy and rigour with which unconscious and preconscious processes are determined, a conclusion which can readily be confirmed by a painstaking study of similar material.

A simple illustration of the way in which a strong affect will cleave to a name, and be transferred to any other person bearing the same or similar name, is afforded by Shakspere in ‘Julius Cesar’ (Act III., Scene i11.):

p. 53 notes The same thing happened during the French Revolution. Some confusion had arisen owing to two people bearing the name of Biron. One was known to be guilty, but there was little time for proper investigation. ‘Bring them both,’ said Fouquier; ‘they will pass through it.’ They both passed through it—to the scaffold—on the following day

_A field in which significance is apt to be intuitively attributed to the forgetting of names is that where our own are forgotten. Few people can avoid feeling a twinge of resentment when they find that their name has been forgotten, particularly if it is by some one with whom they had hoped or expected it would be remembered. They instinctively realise that if they had made a greater impression on the person’s mind he would certainly have remembered them again, for the name is an integral part of the personality. Similarly, few things are more flattering to most people than to find

- themselves addressed by name by a great personage where

they could hardly have anticipated it. Napoleon, like most leaders of men, was a master of this art. In the midst of the disastrous campaign of France in 1814, he gave an amazing proof of his memory in this direction. When in a town near Craonne, he recollected that he had met the mayor, De Bussy, over twenty years ago in the La Fére Regiment. The delighted De Bussy at once threw himself into his service with extraordinary zeal. Conversely there is no surer way of affronting someone than by pretending to forget his name; the insinuation is thus conveyed that the person is so unimportant in our p. 54 notes eyes that we cannot be bothered to remember his name. This device is often exploited in literature. In Turgenev’s ‘Smoke ’ (p. 255) the following passage occurs: ‘‘‘ So you still find Baden entertaining, M’sieu—Litvinov.” Ratmirov always uttered Litvinov’s surname with hesitation, every time, as though he had forgotten it, and could not at once recall it. In this way, as well as by the lofty flourish of his hat in saluting him, he meant to insult his pride.’ The same author, in his ‘Fathers and Children’ (p. 107), writes: ‘The Governor invited Kirsanov and Bazarov to his ball, and within a few minutes invited them a second time, regarding them as brothers, and calling them Kisarov.’ Here the forgetting that he had spoken to them, the mistake in the names, and the inability to distinguish between the two young men, constitute a culmination of disparagement Falsification of a name has the same signification as forgetting it; it is only a step towards complete amnesia. The word-contamination in this instance shews a _ striking psychological intuition of the process termed by Freud ‘ identification’; it indicated that in the Governor’s eyes the distinguishing characteristics of the young men were so little marked, and the men so unimportant, that he did not think it worth while to make the effort of differentiating one from the other. Turgenev seems to be very familiar with the mechanism in question. In his ‘Virgin Soil’ there is an example where it is

still more frankly expressed. A rather forlorn and unprepossessing man called Paklin has just brought some bad news to Sipyagin, a nobleman. The latter tells his wife, who asks him how he knows; to which he replies (in Paklin’s presence) “Mr, \...... Mrs 2.4... what's his. “name? Mieiconopade brought this news.’ A little later he is giving various orders, and runs on thus: ‘Eh? I fancy you spoke, Mr. Konopatin.

I’ll take you with me to-morrow, Mr. Konopatin. What do you say? I don’t hear. You will take some vodka, I dare say? Some vodka for Mr. Konopatin! No! You don’t drink it? In that case, Fyodor, show the gentleman to the green-room.’ ‘Good-night, Mr. Kono ’ Paklin lost all patience at last. ‘ Paklin!’ he roared; ‘my name is Paklin!’ ‘Yes, yes; well, that’s much the same. It’s not unlike, you p. 55 notes know.’ When they meet the next morning Sipyagin greets him as follows: ‘‘ Mr. Paklin! you will come with me, Mr. Paklin! Put Mr. Paklin’s bag on the box! Iam taking Mr. Paklin!” he said, with an emphasis on the word Paklin, and an accent on the letter a, as though he would say, ‘‘ You’ve a name like that, and presume to feel insulted when people change it for you! There you are, then! Take plenty of it! I’ll give you as much as you want! Mr. Paklin! Paklin!” The unlucky name kept resounding on the keen morning air.’ One more example from literature, this time from Meredith’s ‘ The Ordeal of Richard Feverel.’ Mrs. Mount, in talking to Richard, refers to his friend Ripton thus: ‘‘‘ How’s that Mr. Ripson, Pipson, Nipson?—it’s not complimentary, but I can’t remember names of that sort. Why do you have friends of that sort? He’s not a gentleman.’’’

_ Sensitiveness about the correct spelling of one’s name is extremely frequent; we all know the profound difference that members of Scottish clans see between ‘Mc’ and ‘Mac,’ and a practical psychologist realises the importance of being sound on the matter every time he writes sucha name. I had thought personally that I was free from sensitiveness of this kind, until a little occurrence some time ago taught me the contrary. An article of mine had been published in a German journal; only my surname was printed, with the letters ‘M.D.’ (which are not used professionally in Germany) attached, as if they were the initials. The same morning I had occasion to fill up a lunacy certificate, and was surprised at the secretary laughing when IJ handed it in; I had signed it with my Christian name only, thus compensating for the omission in the article. This sensitiveness has sometimes deeper roots than mere personal self-esteem; Stekel! has traced it to infantile complexes relating to the giver of the name—the father.

The following two instances within my own experience are similar to those quoted from Turgenev. The first relates to Mr. Mayo Robson, the eminent gastro-intestinal surgeon, after whom was named a bobbin he had invented for the operation of entero-anastomosis. Another surgeon, almost equally eminent in the same field of work, and living in the p. 56 notes same town, remarked one day in a lofty and contemptuous manner: ‘This patient had previously been unsuccessfully operated on by a man called Rayo Bobson, or Bayo Robbins, or some such name.’ His motive was evident, and of course quite conscious. In the second instance the mistake in the name was quite unconsciously made as the result of a falsification of memory, but the significance was very similar. It was at a university graduation ceremony, where a number of visitors were present arrayed in multi-coloured and imposing robes. Those so attired formed a procession in double file. A friend of mine, a foreigner, remarked, as Professor Titchener passed, ‘Let me see, who is that? Isn’t it Kitchener?’ Many would be inclined to see no significance in the mistake, although my friend knew the names of Lord Kitchener and Professor Titchener fairly well. I have, however, to add these two additional facts: A few minutes before, while talking about experimental psychologists in general, he had allowed himself to make the scurrilous remark that in his opinion they should be called the pantry-cooks of psychology, on account of their menial field of work; the passage from ‘cook’ to ‘kitchen’ is obvious. Secondly, he had also commented on the martial appearance of this dazzling procession, and I can readily imagine his being especially struck by Professor Titchener’s soldierly bearing. It is difficult to avoid the inference that these two trends of thought, present in his mind so recently, played their part in the falsification of the name, which thus betrayed his private opinion of the field of work in which Professor Titchener? is sO eminent.

Many people have a strikingly bad memory for names, even when their memory is otherwise good. This is generally explained by saying that proper names are among the latest acquired knowledge, so that our memory of them is especially fragile; in accordance with the law of dissolution, these memories are among the first to be lost, a process that constitutes one of the most characteristic signs of approaching senility. This explanation is difficult to harmonise with two facts—first, that in many cases the memory is weak in this p. 57 notes connection when it is notably good in regard to other more complex, and later acquired matters, such as scientific formule and so on; and, secondly, that the characteristic in question 1s much more pronounced with some people than with others, and even when they are young. When the opportunity of making a psycho-analysis with some one of this type presents itself, two other matters are brought to light with considerable constancy—namely, that for various reasons the person’s own name has acquired an unusual psychical significance, so that it becomes invested with the feeling-tone of the whole personality, and that there is a strong ego-complex present. It would seem, therefore, that the general inability to bear other people’s names in mind is an expression of an excessively high estimation of the importance of one’s own name and of oneself in general, with a corresponding indifference to, or depreciation of, other people. In my experience I have most often found this characteristic with people having either an extremely common or an extremely rare name, both contingencies leading to undue sensitiveness in the matter, but I cannot put this forward as being a general rule. It further seems to me probable that the increasing difficulty of retaining names that is such a frequent accompaniment of advancing years may, in part at least, be attributed to the growing self-esteem brought by success and by cessation from the turmoils and conflicts of youth. | Falsification of memory, as was indicated above, is closely related to forgetting, and is influenced by the same motive. A common instance is the mistakes made with regard to the day of the week. Some one who is eagerly anticipating an event at the end of the week is very apt to think it is Wednesday when it is only Tuesday, and so on; their impatience at the slowness with which the week is passing manifests itself as an error—in the desired direction—as to the present date.

Not only unconscious falsification of memory, but also deliberate or half-deliberate falsification—i.e., lying—may be dictated by similar influences. Many cases of purposeless and apparently unintelligible lying in particular are often of this nature; Riklin has recently published a full analysis of one of this kind+*

Other mental operations, besides recollecting, may be falsified in the same way, a process designated by Freud as an p. 58 notes Irrtum. Several examples related elsewhere in this paper might be classified in this group, so that one here will suffice. I was buying some flowers, and put two dollars, the exact price of them, on the counter. While they were being got ready, I changed my mind about one bunch, and told the woman serving me to leave it out; it should be said that she was the owner of the shop. On taking the money a few moments later, she said: ‘That bunch cost forty cents, so that will make two dollars forty.’ Her wish that I were making the order larger instead of smaller was probably concerned in the mistake.

A few concluding remarks may be added on this mechanism of forgetting. The main points may be summarised in the statements that forgetting is often determined by a painful mental process (Unlust) of which the subject is unaware, either at the time only or permanently; that this inhibiting mental process may be a counter-will to recollecting the matter in question, or may be associated with this in a more complex way; and that a false memory presenting itself in the place of the true is a symbolic substitute of this, standing in associative connection with it. Two general considerations indicate that acts of forgetting of the type illustrated above, are not, as is commonly supposed, accidental or due to chance. First is the fact that the same one tends to be repeated. If we forget to carry out a given intention, or are unable to recall a given name, the failure is apt to recur, thus suggesting that it has a

_ specific cause. Secondly, is the fact that in at least two spheres of life it is universally recognised that remembering is under control of the will, so that a failure to remember is regarded as synonymous with a not wanting to remember. Freud? writes: ‘Frauendienst wie Militardienst erheben den Anspruch, dass alles zu ihnen Gehdrige dem Vergessen entriickt sein miisse, und erwecken so die Meinung, Vergessen sei zulassig bei unwichtigen Dingen, wahrend es bei wichtigen Dingen ein Anzeichen davon sei, dass man sie wie unwichtige behandeln wolle, ihnen also die Wichtigkeit abspreche.’ [‘Both the service of ladies and military service exact that nothing relating to them must be subject to forgetting, suggesting thus that forgetting is permissible with unimportant matters, while its occurrence in regard to important ones is an indication that they are being treated like unimportant ones—+t.e., that their p. 59 importance is being discounted.’] A soldier who forgets to perform a given duty is punished regardless of the excuse. He is not allowed to forget, and whether his not wanting to perform the duty is openly expressed, or indirectly, as by his forgetting, is considered by his officer as comparatively irrelevant. The standard set by women is equally severe; a lover who forgets his lady’s wishes is treated as though he openly declared them unimportant to him.

III. Lapsus Linguae

The everyday occurrence of the defect in psychophysical functioning popularly known as a slip of the tongue has not received much attention from psychologists. The attempts made, by Meringer and Mayer and others, to explain on phonetic grounds the particular mistake made have signally failed, for on the one hand many cases are to be observed where no phonetic factors are in operation, and on the other hand careful study shews that such factors are at the most accessory or adjuvant in nature, and are never the essential cause.

According to Freud, the word said in mistake is a manifestation of a second suppressed thought, and thus arises outside the train of thought that the speaker is intending to express. It may be a word or phrase entirely foreign to this train of thought, being taken in its entirety from the outlying thought, or it may be a compromise formation, in which both come to expression. In the latter case the false word may be a neolo- | gism; a common example of this is where a speaker, intending to use the word ‘aggravating,’ says, ‘How very aggravoking!’ the word ‘ provoking’ having intruded itself; many malapropisms are formed in this way, being the result. uncertainty as to which is the more appropriate word.

The secondary thought that thus obtrudes itself on fie intended speech may, like the motives of repressive forgetting, be of two kinds: (1) A general counter-impulse (Gerais) directed immediately against the speech, or (2) another thought accidentally aroused by it. In the latter case it can represent either a continuation of a theme previously in the speaker’s mind, or a thought aroused, through a superficial association, by the theme that is intended to be spoken; even when it represents a continuation of a previous theme it will generally, if not always, be found that there is some association between p. 60 notes this and the theme of the speech. It will readily be understood that in many cases the disturbing thought is not evident, but can be revealed only by investigation, sometimes a searching psycho-analysis being necessary.

Cases where the disturbing thought is a direct counterimpulse are usually easy to interpret. One instance will suffice. A President of the Austrian Reichstag once finished his introductory remarks by declaring the session closed, instead of opened; as the particular session promised nothing but fruitless wrangles, one can sympathise with his wish that it were already - at an end.

Some cases where the disturbing thought is nearly related to the intended theme are equally simple. A French governess engaged on afternoon work in Dr. Stekel’s family} asked his wife that she might retain her testimonials, saying: ‘Je cherche encore pour les aprés-midis, pardon, pour les avant-midis.’ The slip betrayed her feeling of dissatisfaction with the afternoon engagement and her intention to look for another situation for the afternoons as well as the mornings, an intention she proceeded to carry out.

A friend of mine was driving his motor-car slowly and cautiously one day, when a cyclist, who was riding with his head down, furiously, and on the wrong side of the street, ran into him and damaged the bicycle. He sent in a bill for $50.00, and, as my friend refused to pay, he sued him in Court. When I inquired as to the result of the action, my friend said, ‘The judge reprimanded the prisoner for careless riding.’ I corrected him, ‘You mean the plaintiff, not the prisoner.’ ‘Well,’ he replied, ‘I think the fellow should have been arrested for. furious riding.’

A lady, when speaking of Bernard Shaw’s works, said to me, ‘I think very highly of all my writings,’ instead of ‘ all his writings.’ She was an amateur writer of short stories. An unmarried man, a patient, remarked, ‘My father was devoted to my wife.’ He meant to say either ‘his wife’ or ‘my mother.’ This is a typical instance of a lapsus that wou'd pass as being entirely accidental and devoid of significance. I must add, however, that one of the main causes of the patient’s neurosis was an unconscious incestuous attachment to his mother, so that his unsuppressed thoughts on the subject of the remark would run in full, ‘My attitude towards my mother p. 61 notes is the same as that of my father.’ No alteration is too slight to have a meaning. The instance narrated above, in which the first letter only of Titchener’s name was replaced by a ‘K,’} belongs to the subject of lapsus lingue equally as much as to that of forgetting. | Such self-betrayals as those just related sometimes afford valuable insight into character and motive. I was present at the International Congress of Neurology in Amsterdam, when the following curious episode occurred: There was a heated discussion regarding Freud’s theory of hysteria. One of the most violent opponents, who is noted as having worked long and fruitlessly on the subject of hysteria, was grudgingly admitting the value of the earlier work of Breuer and Freud —the conclusions of whom he had himself confirmed the truth of—as a prelude to a vehement denunciation of the ‘dangerous’ tendencies of Freud’s later work. During his speech he twice said, ‘Breuer und ich haben bekanntlich nachgewiesen,’ [‘As is well known, Breuer and J have demonstrated’], thus replacing

Freud’s name by his own, and revealing his envy of Freud’s originality.

_ The following example is more complicated: In talking of the financial standards so prevalent in modern civilisation, - I said: ‘In yesterday’s newspaper there were the headings, “Ten million dollar fire in Halifax; six lives lost.’’’ It was at once pointed out to me that I had said Halifax instead of Bangor, Maine. Analysis of the mistake brought the following free associations: Until a few years ago I was disgracefully ignorant of the existence of Bangor, Maine, and I remember in college days being puzzled by the reference to Maine in the well-: known student song, ‘Riding down from Bangor,’ as in my ignorance I supposed that this related to Bangor, the university town of Carnarvonshire, Wales. The name Bangor essentially — stands in my mind for the original Bangor. It brought up a memory of the recent controversy as to whether the new National Welsh Library should be established at Bangor, at Swansea (my home), or at Cardiff (the university town where Istudied). This reminded me of interests I have in the contents of this library, in Celtic mythology, which naturally carried me p. 62 to the valuable library of mythological books that I possess myself. Then I remembered that what had especially struck me in reading about the recent fire was the fact that a valuable collection of books had been destroyed in it, and that this had made me enter a note not to forget to renew my fire insurance, which had recently lapsed, before leaving in the coming week for a fortnight’s visit to the United States.

The meaning of my Japsus is beginning to emerge. A library fire at Bangor was too near home for my peace of mind, and my unconscious had consolingly relegated it to some other spot. The next problem is to discover the motive for the replacement of Bangor by Halifax, a process that was greatly ‘over-determined.’ Maine is, from its geographical position, closely associated in my mind with the Maritime Provinces of Canada, and only on the preceding day a Canadian had been demonstrating to me ona map, for the uth time, how Maine should rightfully have formed part of these Provinces. Still, that does not explain why I selected Halifax rather than St. John, the other town I know the name of in the Maritime Provinces. One reason, doubtless, was the fact that at-the time I was treating a patient from Halifax, Nova Scotia, who had recently been telling me that the houses there were mostly built of wood, and therefore were exposed to the danger of fire. The name Halifax, however, is more familiar to me as an English euphemism for Hell, as in the expression, ‘Go to Hal-ifax.’ This called up the memory of half-forgotten childhood fears, for, like most Welsh children,.I was carefully nurtured with a proper dread of what was called ‘the burning fire’; as I grew up I was cheered to learn the groundlessness of this particular dread. My slip of the tongue, therefore, registered my desire that any library fire should be in some other place than in my home, and if possible in a non-existent locality.

An example for which I am indebted to Dr. A. A. Brill is peculiar in that the slip of the tongue represented a resolution in opposition to the conscious intention. A man, who on account of homosexual practices was in constant fear of coming into conflict with the law, invited two lady friends to spend an evening at the theatre. They expressed a wish to see a play called ‘Alias Jimmy Valentine,’ which dealt largely with convicts and prisons. He was far from comfortable at the idea of spending an evening with such thoughts, but could not p. 63 notes well avoid it. On getting into the cab to drive to the theatre, however, he accidentally gave the driver the name of another theatre, and did not notice the mistake until they arrived there, when it was too late to rectify it. At this theatre the play was about the cleverness with which a daughter” outwitted her selfish old father. It was not without significance that the subject’s attitude towards his own father was one of pronounced hostility, so that his slip of the tongue had the effect of exchanging an evening with a painful topic for one with a topic that he greatly enjoyed.

Several non-scientific writers before Freud had noted the psychological significance of accidental slips of the tongue. Freud? quotes examples of this from, for instance, Brantéme and Wallenstein. Shakspere himself furnishes a beautiful one: in the ‘Merchant of Venice’ (Act III., Scene ii.), It occurs in the scene where Portia is expressing her anxiety lest the favoured suitor should fare as badly as the distasteful ones in the hazard set for them by her father. She wants to tell Bassanio that in the event of his failure she would nevertheless belong to him, but is prevented from doing so by her promise to her father. In this mental discord she speaks: p. 64 diesen Kunstgriff die unertragliche Ungewissheit des Liebenden sowie die gleichgestimmte Spannung des Zuhorers iiber den Ausgang der Wahl zu beruhigen.’ [‘Just that which she would like to hint to him gently, because really she should not speak of it—namely, that even before the choice she loves him and is wholly his—the poet with wonderful psychological delicacy allows to leak through in the lapsus lingue, and manages by this device to allay the intolerable uncertainty of the lover as well as the like tension of the hearer.’

One of our greatest novelists, George Meredith, in his masterpiece, ‘The Egoist,’ shews an even finer understanding of the mechanism. The plot of the novel is, shortly, as follows: Sir Willoughby Patterne, an aristocrat greatly admired by his circle, becomes engaged to a Miss Constantia Durham. She discovers in him an intense egoism, which he skilfully conceals from the world, and to escape the marriage she elopes with a Captain Oxford. Some years later Patterne becomes engaged to a Miss Clara Middleton, and most of the book is taken up with a detailed description of the conflict that arises in her mind on also discovering his egoism. External circumstances, and her conception of honour, hold her to her pledge, while he becomes more and more distasteful in her eyes. She partly confides in his cousin and secretary, Vernon Whitford, the man whom she ultimately marries, but, from a mixture of motives, he stands aloof.

In a soliloquy Clara speaks as follows: ‘“If some noble gentleman could see me as I am and not disdain to aid me! Oh! to be caught out of this prison of thorns and brambles. I cannot tear my own way out. I am acoward. A beckoning of a finger would change me, I believe. I could fly bleeding and through hootings to a comrade.... Constantia met a soldier. Perhaps she prayed and her prayer was answered. She did ill. But, oh, how I love her for it! His name was Harry Oxford.... She did not waver, she cut the links, she signed herself over. Oh, brave girl, what do you think of me? But I have no Harry Whitford; I am alone”’... the sudden consciousness that she had put another name for Oxford, struck her a buffet, drowning her in crimson.’

The fact that both men’s names end in ‘ford’ evidently renders the confounding of them more easy, and would by many be regarded as an adequate cause for this, but the real underlying motive for it is plainly indicated: by the author. p. 65 notes In another passage the same /apsus occurs, and is followed by the hesitation and change of subject that one is familiar with in psycho-analysis when a half-conscious complex is touched. Sir Willoughby patronisingly says of Whitford: ‘ ‘False alarm. The resolution to do anything unaccustomed is quite beyond poor old Vernon.’ Clara replies: ‘ ‘‘But if Mr. Oxford—Whitford... your swans, coming sailing up the lake, how beautiful they look when they are indignant!!_ I was going to ask you, surely men witnessing a marked admiration for someone else will naturally be discouraged?’’ Sir Willoughby stiffened with sudden enlightenment.’

In still another passage, Clara by another /apsus betrays her secret wish that she was on a more intimate footing with Vernon Whitford. Speaking to a boy friend, she ye cae GL Mr. Vernon—tell Mr. Whitford.” ’

In relation to these two literary passages I made a personal slip of the tongue that illustrates the probity of the unconscious mind as contrasted with the duplicity of the conscious one. Expounding the subject of lapsus lingue to some one, I said that I had come across two interesting literary examples— in Meredith’s ‘Egoist,’ and Shakspere’s ‘Love’s Labour’s Lost’; when detailing the second I noticed that I had named the wrong play. Analysis of the mistake brought the following memories. On the preceding day, while talking of the sources of Shakspere’s plots, I had made the remark that the only one he had not taken from previous authors was that contained in ‘Love’s Labour’s Lost.’ Some six months before, Professor Freud had told me that he had heard from Dr. Otto Rank that there was in the ‘Merchant of Venice’ an example of lapsus lingu@ he attributed to the disturbing influence of a suppressed thought, but he could not tell me where it occurred. On looking back I realise that I felt just a touch of pique, though I did not pay any attention to it at the time, at not having observed it myself, and I took the first opportunity to re-read the play, when, of course, I came across the example. The one in the ‘Egoist’ I had really observed myself. My statement that I had discovered the two examples in question was therefore only three-fourths true. The fact, which I had p. 66 notes suppressed? that Dr. Rank deserved some credit, leaked through to external expression in my error of naming the wrong play, substituting Shakspere’s only original one. An interesting feature of the example is the fact that a few minutes before I had been relating how a man not over-scrupulous in the matter of priority had betrayed his dishonesty in a treacherous slip of the tongue. No doubt deeper factors than interest in mere scientific priority were also operative in my own case, such as rivalry and an ‘English’ complex, both of which are matters that play a quite subordinate part in my conscious mental life.

IV. Lapsus Calami

The introductory remarks made on the subject of slips of the tongue apply almost literally to slips of the pen. One principal difference is that the delay interposed by the mechanical acts of writing enables disturbances of co-ordination to occur with especial readiness, as can be illustrated by a glance over any author’s manuscript. The necessity for numerous corrections indicates that, whether owing to the intricacy of the subject-matter or to a lack of clearness in the author’s mind, a harmonious flow is far from being attained. General perplexities mirror themselves in half-conscious hesitations, to the choice of individual words. Thus, a correspondent, who couldn’t decide as to the advisability of a given proposal, wrote to me that it might turn out to be ‘umpracticle,’ evidently a contamination of ‘impracticable’ and ‘unpractical.’

A field of frequent errors is that of dates. Many people continue to write the date of the previous year throughout a great part of January. Some recent figures were given in the Press in which it was stated that in the first week of the New Year one in every forty cheques was dated the previous year; in a fortnight’s time the average sank to one in sixty. Not all such mistakes are due to the fixation of habit, as 1s readily assumed; sometimes they signify a disinclination to accept the fact that yet another bygone year has brought them nearer to old age, a reflection that is apt to be prevalent at the turn of the year. Regrets that such and such a date is already past, or impatience that it has not yet arrived, are common p. 67 motives of such unconscious mistakes. A student dated a letter to me April 11, 1911, instead of April 22. An examination was due in the first week of May for which he was very unprepared, and I attributed his slip to the wish that there was twice as much time ahead of him in which to get ready. That the date he actually wrote was the 11th was no doubt influenced by the presence of these integers at the end of 1911, but it is to be noted even in this connection that his mistake consisted in writing them earlier than he should—+ e., in putting the date earlier. As with the phonetic factors entering into slips of the tongue, the fact that the part wrongly written occurs elsewhere in the same line only predisposes to the mistake. Such factors do not cause the mistake; they only make it easier to assume that particular form.

A lady once told me that an old friend in writing to her had closed the letter with the curious sentence, ‘I hope you are well and unhappy.’ He had formerly entertained hopes of marrying her himself, and the slip of the pen was evidently determined by his dislike at the thought of her being happy with some one else. She had recently married. In a paper on the subject of suggestion I formulated as one of the conclusions the sentence: ‘Suggestion plays the principal part in all psychotherapeutic methods except the psycho-analytic one.’ In abstracting the article for a neurological journal, a reviewer, who strongly disagrees with the theses I maintained, allowed himself to quote this as follows, ‘La suggestion joue le rdle principal dans toutes les méthodes psycho-analytiques,’ thus completely reversing my meaning.

| In the 1887 edition of Baedeker’s ‘London’ I happened to notice the following curious slip. The full passage may be quoted: ‘Die Sonntagsfeier ist in England bekanntlich streng; alle Geschafte, Laden, Sehenswiirdigkeiten und die City Restaurants sind den ganzen Tag, andere Speisehauser nur von 1 bis 3 und von 6 bis 11 Uhr gedffnet. Viele Geschafte schliessen schon Samstag Mittag. Man geht daher Sonntags am besten aufs Land.’ [‘As is well known, the Sabbath in ‘England is kept very strictly; all the offices, shops, sights, and city restaurants are open the whole day, and other eatinghouses only from 1 to 3 and 6 to 11. Many places of business close already at noon on Saturday. It is thus better to spend Sunday in the country.’] The last sentence shews that the writer, like most foreign visitors, had suffered much discomfort p. 68 notes from the London Sabbath, and in the mistake of writing ‘open,’ instead of ‘closed,’ it is plain that the wish was father to the thought.

For the following example I am indebted to Dr. A. A. Brill. A patient wrote to him on the subject of his sufferings, which he tried to attribute to worry about his financial affairs induced by a cotton crisis: ‘My trouble is all due to that d d frigid wave;! there isn’t even any seed.’ What he really wrote,

_ however, was not ‘wave,’ but ‘wife.’ In the bottom of his heart he cherished half-avowed reproaches against his wife on account of her sexual anesthesia and childlessness, and he dimly realised, with right, that his life of enforced abstinence played a considerable part in the genesis of his symptoms.

As with slips of the tongue, no mistake is too slight to be significant. The following four are instances, selected from

a considerable number of similar ones, in which it consisted only in the replacement of one letter by another:

A correspondent of mine had published a scientific paper on a sexual subject, and was writing to me about a virulent criticism of it that had appeared; the critic had used such passionately denunciatory language as to make it evident that the topic of the paper had aroused some strong personal complex. My correspondent’s first sentence was, ‘ Have you seen X’s satyrical criticism of my paper?’ plainly indicating by his unconscious substitution of ‘y’ for ‘1’ his estimate of the nature of the criticism.

Some few years ago I was writing to an old friend, whom I had always called by his surname. On account of family ties it became more appropriate to address him by his Christian name, and, after a momentary embarrassment natural under the circumstances, I took up my pen and began, ‘Dear Fred.’ To my amazement, however, I saw that I had slipped in a ‘u’ before the final letter of the name. This may seem a very trivial mistake, due simply to the similarity of the two words, but a psycho-analytic conscience tends to be more unsparing in the criticism of its owner, as it is more sparing in that of others. Two memories at once rushed to my mind. One was of a dream I had had two years before, at a time when I was debating with myself whether it would be politic openly to defend the Freudian principles, the truth of which my experience had made me accept. In the dream I was in a swiftly p. 69 notes moving motor-omnibus, the driver of which was a ‘composite figure’,? bearing mostly the lineaments of my friend in question. An angry crowd surrounded us, and threatened the driver for ‘going so fast.’ It became necessary for me to decide whether to stand aloof or to side with the driver, and I did the latter. I need not give the other details of the dream, but the analysis shewed it to be a presentation of my waking dilemma, the driver being a replacement-figure for Professor Freud. I had recently been taken for a long motor ride by my friend, who, by the way, has a German surname, and, though at first I had quaims as to the recklessness of his driving, I soon perceived, to my relief, that this was only apparent, and that he was really an exceedingly skilful and reliable driver. Before the incident of the /apsus calami, therefore, he had long been unconsciously associated in my mind with Professor Freud. The second memory was of a letter I had recently written to a - Canadian professor of a subject allied to my own. On coming to Canada, I had felt very awkward and constrained at the American custom of formally prefacing a man’s title to his name when addressing him, and it was a long time before I got accustomed to being spoken to by both younger and older colleagues as Dr. Jones or as Doctor. It embarrassed me to have to speak to even fairly intimate friends in this way, and, in the case of the gentleman in question, I frankly told him, in the letter referred to above, that my English prejudices would not let me do it with any degree of comfort. As he was some fifteen years older than myself, I wondered afterwards whether he might resent a younger man taking the initiative of addressing him simply by his surname. The slip of the pen now began to take on a different aspect, and I was obliged to recognise in it the manifestation of a conceited wish that I was on terms of sufficient equality with Professor Freud to allow such a familiar mode of address. 1 feel certain that no thought of the kind had ever entered my consciousness, to which it is quite strange, though my reaction of shame convinced me of the reality of its existence. The circumstances of the slip of the pen were extraordinarily favourable to its occurrence— the similarity in the names, the previous identification of the

' men, the occasion of the letter following so soon after the other one, andsoon. If it were not for this, I hardly think that such a deeply repressed wish could have come to expression—at least, not so flagrantly.

p. 70 notes I am indebted to Dr. A. A. Brill for the following personal example: Although by custom a strict teetotaller, he yielded to a friend’s importunity one evening, in order to avoid offending him, and took a little wine. During the next morning an exacerbation of an eye-strain headache gave him cause to regret this slight indulgence, and his reflections on the subject found expression in the following slip of the pen. Having occasion to write the name of a girl mentioned by a patient, he wrote not Ethel, but Ethyl! It happened that the girl in question was rather too fond of drink, and in Dr. Brill’s? mood at the time this characteristic of hers stood out with conspicuous significance.

Some three years ago I was writing to a friend in England, and gave the letter to a member of my family to post. Fortunately she noticed I had made a mistake in the address, having written as the street number 19 instead of 55. The two numbers do not even resemble each other, so that the customary explanations are here more than ever in default. I will relate a few of the associations as they occurred. The name of the street, Gordon Street, brought ‘Gordon Highlanders—the Highlands. —the thought that my friend is an ardent mountaineer—the thought that Professor Freud is very fond of the mountains— Berg (=Mountain)—Berggasse, the street in Vienna in which Professor Freud lives—the number of his house, 19.’ The friend’s name, Maurice, brought ‘morris-dancers—maypole— phallus—sex—Professor Freud’s works on sexual subjects.’ In desperation I started again with Gordon, which now brought ‘the regiment called the Gay Gordons—gay women (a London euphemism for prostitutes)—the German equivalent, Freudenmadchen—a cheap joke I had heard in Germany in this connection on Professor Freud’s name’; as a matter of fact, I had on the previous evening read a passage in his ‘Traumdeutung’ where he refers to jokes on names. Turn which way I would, I arrived at the same end-point, and I began to suspect p. 71 notes that this was not chance. It might be said that for some reason or other, whether from the number coinciding with that in the Berggasse or what not, thoughts relating to Professor Freud were at the time occupying my mind to the exclusion of all else, in reply to which I have to say that I do not find this so in other analyses, and that in my experience, whenever free, unforced associations constantly lead in the same direction there is some good reason for it; in such cases there is invariably some essential, significant connection between the startingpoint and the end reached. Further, the more far-fetched and strained the associations appear, as in this example—in other words, the more superficial they are—the more important is the underlying essential connection found to be. This conclusion, clearly demonstrated in Jung’s experimental work, was fully confirmed in the present instance. Although I could see no possible connection between my friend and Professor Freud, of whom he knew nothing, I was led to investigate the contents of the letter I had sent him. To my astonishment I found that the main feature of it could be applied to Professor Freud in the same sense, and that I must unknowingly have harboured a wish to send it to him; in the slip in writing I had expressed my unconscious wish to send the letter to another man by addressing the envelope partly to him and partly to the one I consciously intended it to go to. There can be no question as to the intense personal significance of the complex covered by the superficial associations of the analysis, for wild horses would not tear from me the contents of that letter.

Mistakes in addressing envelopes, as in the example just mentioned, are generally manifestations of some disturbing thought that the writer does not mean to express. A young lady was secretly engaged to a medical man, whom we will call Arthur X. She addressed a letter one day not to Dr. Arthur X, but to Dear Arthur X, thus expressing her desire to let all the world know of their relationship.

Not long ago I was treating a case of exceptional interest in a patient who lived some sixty miles from Toronto. On account of the distance, the patient, who could not leave his work, was able to visit me only twice a week. I found it impossible to treat him on these conditions, and wrote to tell him so. Instead of writing the name of his town on the envelope, however, I wrote Toronto, displaying my wish that he werejmore conveniently situated.

p. 72 notes

V. Misprints

Misprints may, of course, arise from errors made by the writer, the editor, the proof-reader, or the printer. From time to time the Press records amusing instances of a disagreeable truth unintentionally leaking out in the form of a misprint; in Freud’s book several examples of this are related. Unlike the other kinds of failure under discussion, one here is rarely in a position to obtain an objective verification of a given interpretation, but sometimes this in itself reaches a high grade of probability. At all events, general principles indicate that the mistake made must be determined by personal constellations of whoever made it, and cannot be altogether accidental.

In a number of the Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse,? the title of a book of Gross’s was wrongly given as ‘Das Freud’sche Ideogenitatsmonument,’ instead of ‘Ideogenitatsmoment.’ As both the writer of the article and the editorial staff (Drs. Adler and Stekel) regarded the conception as a monumental one, it is possible that the overlooking of the mistake is to be correlated with this fact.

In a paper of my own on nightmare, I wrote the sentence, ‘The association in general between the sex instinct and the emotions of fear and dread is a very intimate one.’ This was correctly rendered in the proof, but on the second occasion of reading it the proof-reader was shocked to think that I could make such an obviously outrageous mistake, and altered the word ‘intimate’ to ‘distant,’ in which form it appeared in print.

In a brochure of mine that appeared as a German translation, a mistake was made of a less unfortunate kind. One of my main theses was that the conception of Hamlet represented a projection of the most intimate part of Shakspere’s personality, and so thoroughly did the translator absorb my view of the identity of the two that, when he came to a passage on the death of Shakspere’s father, he unconsciously substituted the name Hamlet for Shakspere, and rendered the passage as referring to ‘the death of Hamlet’s father in 1601.’ The substitution was overlooked in the proof by two other readers thoroughly familiar with the subject.

The following misprint occurred last year in the Scotsman p. 73 notes inreporting a speech: ‘He had not the wealth of the Plantagenets, nor did he derive any income from American trusts. (Loud daughter).’ Punch unkindly comments on this replacement of one letter for another (d for /), ‘We knew what was meant without the explanatory parenthesis.’

In the notorious ‘Wicked Bible,’ issued in 1631, the word ‘not’ was omitted from the Seventh Commandment, so that this read, ‘Thou shalt commit adultery.’ The possibility is not to be excluded that the editor had a personal interest in the subject of the commandment. At all events, he was heavily fined, it being empirically recognised that whether his purpose was conscious or unconscious he was equally responsible for it, and that he had no right, even ‘accidentally,’ to impute such commandments to Jahveh.

Perhaps a similar theme was running through the mind of whoever composed this passage, which referred to the proposal to tax bachelors: ‘Unmarried people usually have just as good reason to be unmarried as those who are married.’ The words ‘have to be married’ have evidently been omitted from the end of a rather clumsy sentence.

A highly interesting misprint of historic importance is detailed by Dattner1 At the time when Austria and Hungary were separated, in 1867, special arrangements were made for regulating their common National Debt and their future financial relations. In the Hungarian law on the subject a single word ‘effectiv’ was accidentally omitted, the consequence of which will be to cost Austria between eleven and fifty-two million crowns. The desire of the Hungarian law-makers to come as well as possible out of the transaction unconsciously overcame their probity.

Typewriting, being a form of writing, is subject to the same influences as this. Mistakes made may be due to either a lapsus calami or a misreading, in any case being determined

~ by the previous mental constellations of the typist. Thus my typist, having worked long in a lawyer’s office, is fond of replacing ‘illogical’ by ‘illegal,’ and, being of a very proper turn of mind, makes such mistakes as changing ‘a vulgar word’ to ‘a regular word.’ I have found that distinctness of handwriting is powerless to prevent such mistakes. Prudishness was presumably also the reason why the typist of a Medical p. 74 notes Officer of Health substituted ‘anti-naval’ for ‘ante-natal’ in a letter he had dictated to her (evidently a case of mishearing, for the former word could have no meaning in England in 1917).

One. practical aspect of this matter is generally appreciated —namely, that accuracy in correcting proofs can be attained only by getting some one else to do it for one. A mistake once made in the manuscript, and then copied, is very apt to get. overlooked by the person who made it. The affective blindness that enabled him to make the mistake, or, more strictly, that enabled an unconscious impulse to come to expression, will very likely continue its action by preventing him from recognising it.

VI. False Visual Recognition

In visual perception the same mistakes of affective origin that were discussed in connection with memory are frequently to be observed, and here also they are of two kinds—a failure to see something that for various reasons we do not want to see, and a falsification of perception in the sense of personal wish-complexes. Examples of the former kind are very common in connection with reading the newspaper. Thus, just when a relative was crossing the Atlantic last year, I saw in the news-headings that a serious accident had happened to a liner, but I had the greatest difficulty in finding the account of it in the paper, overlooking it again and again.

Perhaps the commonest example of false perception is the catching sight of one’s name where it really doesn’t occur. As a rule, the word that has attracted one’s attention is very. similar to one’s name, containing perhaps the same letters differently arranged. Professor Bleuler! relates an example where this was not so, and where, therefore, the essential cause of the mistake must have been of a greater affective intensity; the word was really ‘Blutkérperehen,’ only the first two letters being common to the two words:: He explained it thus: ‘In diesem Falle less sich aber der Beziehungswahn und die Illusion sehr leicht begrinden: Was ich gerade las, war das Ende einer Bemerkung iiber eine, Art schlechten Stiles von wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, von dertich-mich nicht frei fihlte.’ {‘In this case, however, the aaonter relation and the illusion were easily to be traced to their origin: What I was just reading p. 75 notes was the end of a remark on a certain kind of bad style in the writing of scientific works from which I felt myself to be by no means free.’]

Freud? quotes an example from Lichtenberg: ‘He always mistook ‘‘angenommen”’ for ‘‘Agamemnon,”’ so thoroughly had he read his Homer.’ In searching an American newspaper for English political news at the time of the Navy scare in 1910, my attention was caught by the heading ‘German Danger’; on looking nearer I saw that it was ‘General Danger.’ On another occasion I read the heading, ‘Future of the Insurance scheme,’ as ‘ Failure of the Insurance Scheme’; it is easy to discern my sympathy with my medical colleagues in the attack they were at the time conducting on the scheme. Another personal example, with an even grosser mistake, was the following: I was searching the literature to find the earliest instance of a certain superstitious act, and, although I had only been able to trace it to the ninth century, I suspected that it might have occurred still earlier. One day I found in an old French book an account of it quoted from an earlier © writer, the reference to whose work contained the words ‘6¢ livre.’ I read this as’‘6° siécle,’ and entered it in my notes as such; it was only some time after, on checking the reference, -that I discovered the error.

Similar observations can be made in regard to the perception of other objects than written matter, and especially with the recognising of other people. False recognition is quite commonly due to a pervading desire to meet the person in question; a lover who has a rendezvous with his mistress fancies he sees her coming many times over, when really the women he mistakes for her may bear only the faintest resemblance to her.

The failure to greet friends or acquaintances in the street is not always due to not seeing them, and one knows how gradual are the shades between a direct ‘cut,’ where one person consciously pretends he. does not see the other, and a not seeing that is due to a not wanting to see.*, Women intuitively feel that the difference between the two is unimportant, and are as much offended by the one as»by the other; some one who thinks highly of them has no right not to see them when they pass.

A striking instance of this affective blindness occurred to p. 76 notes me not long ago: It was part of my routine duty to check the invoices for laboratory apparatus as they came in, and hand them over to the assistant superintendent to see that they got paid. On one occasion I had neglected to do this until a small number collected. I then went through them, and took them with me into the assistant superintendent’s office. I was very pressed for time, and hoped he would not be there, so that I could simply deposit them on his desk; especially so, as there was a small error in one of them that I had to point out to him, and I realised that his over-conscientiousness would mean a tedious investigation of the error. I felt, however, that I ought to try to find him, and explain the point to him. On going into his office, I saw several men there, went up to one of them who had his back to me, and said, ‘Do you know where Dr. X is?’ To my astonishment he replied, ‘Why, I am Dr. X.’ My not recognising him was facilitated by the fact of his having an unfamiliar hat on, but the actual cause of it I knew well enough.

The phenomenon of fausse reconnaissance, or déja vu, which has perplexed so many psychologists, is closely allied to the Same category. Freud has finally solved this riddle} but, as the explanation of it is of a more complex order than with the other occurrences under consideration, I shall not go into it here. 3 It will be noticed that in this group, as in the other allied ones, the operative feeling-complex manifests itself in two ways—in causing the suppression of one mental process and the prominence of another; it determines what one does see (falsely) as well as what one doesn’t see. In some cases the negative of these two effects is more striking, in others the positive. A further group of occurrences may now be mentioned, in which, although strictly speaking there is no false perception, the positive phenomenon in question is seen at its acme; it is where one’s attention is attracted in an unusual way to a given object that would have passed unnoticed were it not for the presence of a certain feeling-complex with which the idea is associated. A simple instance will best explain what is meant: An English lady who had recently come to Canada, and who had not yet got acclimatised to the strange life, was paying a society call. She had to wait a few moments for her hostess, and on the latter’s entry was discovered deeply en- p. 77 notes grossed in Pierre Loti’s ‘L’Exilée,’ which she had unearthed from an unobtrusive corner of a pile of other books. She had never read anything of Loti’s before, and it was purely the title that had attracted her interest. Brill! mentions the case of a New York embezzler who was discovered by detectives in a Philadelphia library looking at a book entitled ‘Will I ever go back?’ Pursuance of this theme, which is obviously impossible here, would lead us into the psychology of attention and interest, and the importance played in these processes by feeling; it all be seen, however, that psycho-analysis has a very considerable bearing on these problems.

VII. Mislaying of Objects

It is probable that objects are never accidentally mislaid. The underlying motive manifests itself in two ways—in the act of mislaying the object, and in the subsequent amnesia; in other words, a Verlegen is a composite of a Vergreifen and a Vergessen, the latter being the main feature. As before, the motive may be a counter-impulse directed against the use of the object, or against an idea associated with the use of it. Instances of both will be given, first of the former.

We are all more apt to mislay bills rather than cheques, and in general objects that we don’t want to see rather than those we do. Apparent exceptions to this rule, such as the mislaying of valuable objects, come under the second category, where our objection is not to the thing itself, but to what it can remind us of.

A common experience, which has often occurred to me ‘personally, is the following: Whenever I suffer from the effects of over-smoking, I notice that it is much harder to find my ‘pipe; it has got put behind ornaments or books, and in all sorts -of unusual places that it normally does not occupy.

A patient of mine was recently very put out at having lost ‘an important bunch of keys. He told me that he urgently wanted them that afternoon to open the lock of a minute-book -at a meeting with his auditor and solicitor. I inquired as to the purpose of the meeting. It appeared that an important ‘resolution had been passed at an annual directors’ meeting, and that he had omitted to enter it in the minute-book. He was ‘the managing director, and it became a question legally whether p. 78 a certain action could be taken without the formal consent of the other directors, or whether possibly the minute could be subsequently added by private arrangement with them. At all events, it was an annoying situation, and I felt sure that his dislike of having to face it was connected with the loss of the key. Further inquiry shewed that he had used the keys only once that morning to open his office desk; after doing this it was his custom immediately to replace them in his pocket, the desk being provided with an automatic closing lock. He had missed the keys as soon as he got into the street-car to come to see me, and had telephoned a message for a clerk to search the short distance between his private office and the car-line. The surmise was near that he must have flung the bunch into his desk behind some papers, later closing it in the usual way; on telephoning to have the desk forcibly opened, this was found to be correct.

The following example is a little more complicated: A lady had lost the key of a box containing phonograph records, and had thoroughly ransacked her rooms for it many times during six weeks, but all in vain. The records belonged to a correspondence college, and were a means of learning French pronunciation. They had been put away early in the summer, and now, in the autumn, she wanted them for the purpose of renewing her French studies. Her whole heart was not in these, however, for it happened that she was fond of singing, and hoped to get accepted in an orchestral choir, the rehearsals of which would leave her no time for other studies. As time went on she despaired more and more of being accepted, and

fell back on the French as the next best way of occupying her winter evenings. Soon after her definite rejection by the choir she discovered the lost key, which had been carefully stowed away in the corner of an attic. She recollected locking the box in the early summer and thinking that she would not need it again for a long time, but had no memory of putting the key away. She was extremely proud of her voice, and had built on her application being successful. Taking up the French studies denoted failure of her hopes. Her inability to find the key thus symbolised her loathness to believe that her vocal reputation would be slighted.

To lose or misplace a present, especially if it happens more than once, is not generally considered a compliment to the giver, and with right, for it often is an unconscious expression p. 79 notes of disdain, disregard, or indifference! When a wife repeatedly mislays her wedding-ring during the honeymoon, it does not augur well for the future happiness of the marriage. Freud? relates an example of misplacing where the motive was of this kind, and which, like the last-mentioned example, is interesting in regard to the circumstances under which the object was again found. It concerned a married couple who lived rather aloof lives from each other, any marks of tenderness being of a distinctly lukewarm nature; the fault, according to the husband, lay in the emotional apathy of his wife. One day she made him a present of a book that would interest him. He thanked her for the attention, promised to read it, put it aside, and couldn’t find it again. In the next six months he made several vain attempts to find it. At the end of this time his mother, to whom he was devoted, got seriously ill, and was very tenderly nursed by his wife. His affection for his wife rapidly increased, and one evening, coming home from the sick bed with his heart filled with gratitude towards her, he went to his desk, and, without any conscious purpose, unhesitatingly opened a drawer and took out the lost book.

Leaving things behind one is a common type of mislaying. To do so in the street or in a public conveyance has a very different significance from doing so in the house of a friend. In the latter case it often expresses the person’s attachment, the difficulty he has in tearing himself away, and the desire or willingness he has to come back. One can almost measure the success with which a physician is practising psychotherapy, for instance, by the size of the collection of umbrellas, handkerchiefs, purses, and so on, that he could make in a month.

VIII. Erroneously-Carried-Out Actions

A secondary suppressed tendency may manifest itself in the disturbance not only of writing, but also of any other conscious motor act, an occurrence Freud terms a Vergretfen. The intended action is not carried out, or only incorrectly, being entirely or partly replaced by an action corresponding with the suppressed impulse that breaks through. As in the former p. 80 cases, this secondary tendency is associated either directly or indirectly with the conscious intention, and the faulty action is customarily explained as being due to ‘chance,’ ‘accident,’ or ‘carelessness.’

A trite example will perhaps best illustrate the type of occurrence. On starting to open a fresh tin of tobacco, I economically reflected that I should first finish the rather dry remains of the previous one. A few minutes later, however, while engrossed in reading, I wanted to refill my pipe, and to my surprise detected myself in the act of opening the new tin, although I had pushed it farther away from me than the other. My checked wish to enjoy the fresh tobacco had taken advantage of my distraction, and so interfered with my conscious intention of filling the pipe from the old tin.

An equally simple example is the following: It is my custom to put scientific journals, as they arrive, on a stool in the corner of my study. On reading them I write on the back the page number of any articles I wish to enter in my reference books; the journals not so marked are put on top of the files to be bound at the end of the year, while the others are placed on a pile at one side of my desk. Once a week or so I go through this pile and enter the references, but, whenever I have neglected. this for so long that the pile begins to assume formidable dimensions, I find I have a pronounced tendency to put no more there, and to put on the files any fresh journal I read, whether it has articles that should be entered or not. The motive is obvious—to save myself the trouble of having to enter more than I already have to.

A lady went to post some letters which had come for her brother, and which had to be re-addressed and forwarded on account of his absence. When she got home she found the letters still in her handbag, and realised that she must have posted two letters, addressed to herself, which she had opened that morning; they duly arrived on the next day. At the time another younger brother was at home seriously ill with typhoid fever, and she had just written to the elder brother begging him to come home as soon as possible. She knew, however, that on account of urgent business he would not be able to leave immediately, but her posting letters addressed to the

home, under the impression that she was sending them to her brother, indicated her keen anxiety that he was already there.

A patient came up from the country to get advice about p. 81 various obsessing ideas that greatly distressed him. He had been recommended to consult two physicians, another one and myself. The other physician told him ‘not to think about the ideas,’ and advised him to take a course of physical exercise at a special gymnasium that he kept for the purpose. I, of course, advised psycho-analytic treatment, which has since cured him. He promised us both that he would think the matter over, and let us know what he decided. That night, on getting home, he wrote to each of us—to the other physician that he couldn’t yet make up his mind, and to me that he would like to make an appointment to begin the treatment as soon as possible. He put the letters into the wrong envelopes. During the subsequent psycho-analysis it became evident that this ‘accidental’ mistake was unconsciously determined by the spiteful desire to let the other physician know what he thought of his advice.

The use of keys is a fertile source of occurrences of this kind, of which two examples may be given. If I am disturbed in the midst of some engrossing work at home by having to go to the hospital to carry out some routine work, I am very apt to find myself trying to open the door of my laboratory there with the key of my desk at home, although the two keys are quite unlike each other. The mistake unconsciously demonstrates where I would rather be at the moment.

Some years ago I was acting in a subordinate position at a certain institution, the front-door of which was kept locked, so that it was necessary to ring for admission. On several occasions I found myself making serious attempts to open the door with my house-key. Each one of the permanent visiting staff, of which I aspired to be a member, was provided with a key to avoid the trouble of having to wait at the door. My mistakes thus expressed my desire to be on a similar footing, and to be quite ‘at home’ there.

Two other everyday sets of occurrences may briefly be mentioned where unconscious disturbances of otherwise intended actions are very frequent. The one is the matter of paying out money, and particularly of giving change. It would be an interesting experiment to establish statistically the percentage of such mistakes that are in favour of the person making them, in comparison with that of the opposite sort.

The second is the sphere of domestic breakages. It can p. 82 notes be observed that after a servant has been reprimanded, especially when the reprimand is more than usually unjust in her eyes, is a favourite time for crockery to ‘ come to pieces in her hand.’ Careless breakage of valuable china, an event that often perplexes the owner-as much as it incenses her, may be the product of a number of factors in the mind of the transgressor, class-envy of valuable property, ignorant lack of appreciation for objects of art, resentment at having to devote so much labour to the care of what appear to be senseless objects of enthusiasm, personal hostility towards the owner, and so on.

IX. Symptomatic Acts

Under the name of Symptomhandlungen Freud discusses a series of unconsciously performed actions that differ from the last-mentioned ones in being independent activities, and not grafted on to another conscious one. They are done ‘without thinking’ or ‘by chance,’ and no significance is seen in them. Analysis of them, however, shews that they are the symbolic expression of some suppressed tendency, usually a wish. In many instances the action is a complicated one, and performed on only one occasion; in others it is a constant habit that often is characteristic of the person. The mannerisms of dress, of fingering the moustache or clothes-buttons, the playing with coins in the pocket, and so on, are examples of this kind; they all have their logical meaning, though this needs to be read before becoming evident.

Different ways of occupying the hands often betray thoughts that the person does not wish to express or even does not know of. It is related of Eleanora Duse that in a divorce play, while in a soliloquy following a wrangle with the husband, she kept playing with her wedding-ring, taking it off, replacing it, and finally taking it off again; she is now ready for the seducer. The action illustrates the profundity of the great actress’s character studies.

Maeder? tells the following story of a Zurich colleague who had a free day, and was hesitating between making an agreeable holiday of it and paying a distasteful duty-call on some people in Lucerne. He ultimately decided on the latter, and dolefully set out. MHalf-way to Lucerne he had to change p. 83 notes trains; he did this mechanically, and settled down in the other train to continue his reading of the morning papers. When the ticket-collector came round, he discovered that he had taken a train back to Zurich. His wish to spend the day there and not in Lucerne had proved too strong for his good intentions.

In most of the examples previously mentioned in this paper, and of those encountered in real life, it is possible to discover a motive for the given occurrence that logically accounts for this, but which does not lie particularly deep in the person’s mind. In other words, it is,in Freud’s language, preconscious,! and the subject has no particular difficulty in recognising it as an integral part of his personality. The problem, however, is far from exhausted at this point. It is next necessary to discover the origin of the motive or tendency in question, or to explain why it needs to be expressed at all. In this investigation one reaches the realm of the unconscious proper, and here it often turns out that the error which is being analysed has a deeper meaning—that it symbolises more than the pre-conscious motive, and expresses tendencies of much greater personal significance; this may be the case, however trivial the error in itself. In some of the preceding examples the preconscious motive disclosed appears trite, and it seems unlikely that such a trifling matter should need a complicated psychological mechanism to manifest itself. In the cases of this kind that I have had the opportunity of submitting to a detailed psycho-analysis, I have found that the unconscious associations often shed an unexpectedly instructive light on the full meaning of the occurrence. Unfortunately, however, the motives thus reached are usually of so intimate a nature that discretion forbids the publishing of them.

In still other cases no preconscious motive can be discerned, and the error appears to be quite meaningless until the truly unconscious sources are reached. In the following example’ the preconscious motive was not discovered until the resistance to the unconscious sources of it were broken down. It is further peculiarly instructive in illustrating what important and fundamental traits of character may be revealed by the analysis of an absolutely trivial occurrence.

p. 84 A doctor on rearranging his furniture in a new house came across an old-fashioned, straight, wooden stethoscope, and, after pausing to decide where he should put it, was impelled to place it on the side of his writing-desk in such a position that it stood exactly between his chair and the one reserved for his patients. The act in itself was certainly odd, for in the first place the straight stethoscope served no purpose, as he invariably used a binaural one; and in the second place all his medical apparatus and instruments were always kept in drawers, with the sole exception of this one. However, he gave no thought at all to the matter until one day it was brought to his notice by a patient, who had never seen a wooden stethoscope, asking him what it was. On being told, she asked why he kept it just there; he answered in an off-hand way that that place was as good as any other. This started him thinking, however, and he wondered whether there had been any unconscious motive in his action. Being interested in the psycho-analytic method he asked me to investigate the matter.

The first memory that occurred to him was the fact that when a medical student he had been struck by the habit his hospital interne had of always carrying in his hand a wooden stethoscope on his ward visits, although he never used it. He greatly admired this interne, and was much attached to him. Later on, when he himself became an interne, he contracted the same habit, and would feel very uncomfortable if by mistake he left his room without having the instrument to swing in his hand. The aimlessness of the habit was shewn,

_ not only by the fact that the only stethoscope he ever used was a binaural one, which he carried in his pocket, but also in that it was continued when he was a surgical interne and never needed any stethoscope at all.

From this it was evident that the idea of the instrument in question had in some way or other become invested with a greater psychical significance than normally belongs to it—in other words, that to the subject it stood for more than it does with other people. The idea must have got unconsciously associated with some other one, which it symbolised, and from which it derived its additional fulness of meaning. I will forestall the rest of the analysis by saying what this secondary idea was—namely, a phallic one; the way in which this curious association had been formed will presently be related. The discomfort he experienced in hospital on missing the instru- p. 85 notes ment, and the relief and reassurance the presence of it gave him, was related to what is known as a ‘castration-complex’— namely, a childhood fear, often continued in a disguised form into adult life, lest a private part of his body should be taken away from him, just as playthings so often were; the fear was due to paternal threats that it would be cut off if he were not a good boy, particularly in a certain direction. This is a very common complex, and accounts for a great deal of general nervousness and lack of confidence in later years.

Then came a number of childhood memories relating to his family doctor. He had been strongly attached to this doctor as a child, and during the analysis long-buried memories were recovered of a double phantasy he had in his fourth year concerning the birth of a younger sister—namely, that she was the child (1) of himself and his mother, the father being relegated to the background, and (2) of the doctor and himself; in this he thus played both a masculine and feminine part." At the time, when his curiosity was being aroused by the event, he could not help noticing the prominent share taken by the doctor in the proceedings, and the subordinate position occupied by the father; the significance of this for his later life will presently be Soimted out.

The stethoscope association was formed through many connections. In the first place, the physical appearance of the instrument—a straight, rigid, hollow tube, having a small bulbous summit at one extremity, and a broad base at the other—and the fact of its being the essential part of the medical paraphernalia, the instrument with which the doctor performed his magical and interesting feats, were matters that attracted his boyish attention. Hehad had his chest repeatedly examined by the doctor at the age of six, and distinctly recollected the voluptuous sensation of feeling the latter’s head near him pressing the wooden stethoscope into his chest, and of the rhythmic to-and-fro respiratory movement. He had been struck by the doctor’s habit of carrying his stethoscope inside his hat; he found it interesting that the doctor should carry his chief instrument concealed about his person, always handy when he went to see patients, and that he only had to take off his hat (1.e., a part of his clothing) and ‘pull it out.’ At the p. 86 notes age of eight he was impressed by being told by an older boy that it was the doctor’s custom to get into bed with his women patients. It is certain that the doctor, who was young and handsome, was extremely popular among the women of the neighbourhood, including the subject’s own mother. The doctor and his ‘instrument’ were therefore the objects of great interest throughout his boyhood.

It is probable that, as in many other cases, unconscious identification with the family doctor had been a main motive in determining the subject’s choice of profession. It was here doubly conditioned, (1) by the superiority of the doctor on certain interesting occasions to the father, of whom the subject was very jealous, and (2) by the doctor’s knowledge of forbidden topics! and his opportunities for illicit indulgence. The subject admitted that he had on several occasions experienced erotic temptations in regard to his women patients; he had twice fallen in love with one, and finally had married one.

The next memory was of a dream, plainly of a homosexualmasochistic nature; in it a man, who proved to be a replacement-figure of the family doctor, attacked the subject with a ‘sword.’ The idea of a sword, as is so frequently the case in dreams, represented the same idea that was mentioned above to be associated with that of a wooden stethoscope. The. thought of a sword reminded the subject of the passage in the ‘Nibelung Saga,’ where Sigurd sleeps with his naked sword (Gram) Deeween him and Brunhilda, an incident that had always greatly struck his imagination.

The meaning of the symptomatic act now at last became clear. The subject had placed his wooden stethoscope between him and his patients, just as Sigurd had placed his sword (an equivalent symbol) between him and the maiden he was not to touch. The act was a compromise-formation; it served both to gratify in his imagination the repressed wish to enter into nearer relations with an attractive patient (interposition of phallus), and at the same time to remind him that this wish was not to become a reality (interposition of sword). It was, so to speak, a charm against yielding to temptation.

p. 87 notes

X. General Observations

1. Warrant for Interpretations.

The first criticism of the theses here maintained that naturally presents itself is the question as to the reliability of the individual interpretations. It is not likely, that anyone will reject them all as improbable, but, particularly with the more complex analyses, doubt must arise concerning the trustworthiness of the results. This is especially so in regard to the personal, subjective factor in the interpretations, although as a matter of fact the very constancy of the way in which similar conclusions are reached by different observers indicates that this factor is less potent than might be imagined. Experience shews that, when attention is carefully directed to the objective aspects of the analysis, the importance of the personal factor, which from the unavoidable nature of the circumstances can never be entirely eliminated, can be reduced to a degree where it is practically negligible. In most scientific work the personal factor has to be reckoned with, but appreciation of the way in which it acts, especially when this is based on psychological knowledge, as a rule enables it to be excluded to such an extent as not to interfere with conclusions being formulated that are valid enough to stand the objective test of verifiability. It is contended that this statement applies unrestrictedly to psycho-analytic interpretations. It is, of course, to be conceded that the probable accuracy of these interpretations varies considerably in different instances, as conclusions do elsewhere in science. Thus, in a chemical analysis, the conclusion as to whether a given substance is present or not varies in probability according to the quality and amount of evidence obtainable; in some cases the confirmatory tests are so unequivocal that the final decision is a practically certain one, in others it is very probable, in still others it is only a plausible possibility, andso on.

The view that the psycho-analytic interpretations of the class of occurrences under discussion are reliable is based on, among others, the following considerations:

1. The psychological correctness of the principles of the free association method. This is too complex a matter to be gone into here, and I will only refer the reader to Jung’s well-known works' on the subject.

p. 88 2. The constancy of the findings by different observers, and the harmony of the conclusions with those reached in the study of other fields—e.g., dreams, psychoneuroses, mythology, etc. It is extremely unlikely that this is due to coincidence, and still more so that it is due to identical prejudices on the part of the different workers, for in the first place this would be postulating a very remarkable uniformity in their individual mental constellations, and in the second place psycho-analytic research brings with it an eradication of personal prejudice, and an appreciation of personal complexes, that is rarely attained elsewhere in the same degree.

3. The increased intelligibility of the processes in question. An occurrence that previously was obscure and meaningless now becomes throughout comprehensible, and an integral part of the rest of the person’s mental operations. It is seen to be merely an irregular manifestation of a logical tendency that is an essential constituent of the personality, the unusual features having certain definite reasons for their occurrence. Moreover, the discovery of the underlying motive, and its connection with the manifestation being analysed, is a matter that commonly lends itself to external verification. When, in an analysis, one traces a given error in mental functioning, such as a lapsus lingue, to a thought that the person was desirous of keeping back, it is usually easy to confirm the truth of the conclusion. Very significant in this connection is the unmistakable evidence of the resulting affect in the person, which accurately corresponds with that characteristic of the revealed mental process. Often this is so pronounced that it is quite impossible to doubt the truth of the interpretation made; this especially is a matter where personal experience is more convincing than any possible amount of discussion.

4. The fact that in many fields the principles in question are generally recognised to be valid. Freud’s study is only a detailed working-out of laws that were already known to hold true over a limited area. When a man is hurt at finding his. name unfortunately forgotten, or at unexpectedly being passed by unrecognised in the street; when a lady is offended by some one who professes regard for her forgetting to carry out her behests or to keep a rendezvous—they are displaying an affect that accords perfectly with the inferences of the psycho-analyst, and with no others. In this correct intuition of mankind lies p. 89 notes already the essential nucleus of the conclusions maintained by Freud.

Indeed, it is quite impossible to go through life without constantly making interpretations of just this kind, though usually they are simpler and more evident than those needing a special psycho-analysis. Observation of a very few jokes is sufficient to illustrate this, and we ‘read between the lines’ of the people we have to do with, doubting the scientific justification of our right to do so as little as we do in the interpretations of jokes! This holds in the most manifold fields of mental activity. A few examples may be quoted of a kind that could be multiplied indefinitely: With Mr. C. R. Kennedy’s play, ‘The Servant in the House,’ no one can witness it intelligently and doubt that the Hindoo servant, who is the principal character, 1s a presentation of Jesus Christ, or that his name ‘Manson’ is a disguised form of the title ‘Son of Man.’ Yet we should find it difficult to ‘prove’ this to a carping critic who is bent on avoiding the obvious inference, and still more to ‘prove’ our assumption that the disguise was the product of definite motives in the author’s mind. In Mr. Bernard Shaw’s play ‘Press Cuttings,’ one of the characters, the Prime Minister of England, is called ‘Balsquith.’ When one infers that he compounded the word from the names of two Prime Ministers, Balfour and Asquith, the critic may accuse us of reading into Mr. Shaw’s mind views of our own that never existed there.” In Shelley’s ‘G:dipus Tyrannus’ what right have we to assume that, in his ridicule of the Ionian Minotaur,*? the author was satirising the Englishman of his time? When Edward Lear* speaks of Excelscue, how is it everyone recognises that he is referring to Fortescue (Excel=XL=Forty=Forte)? Our answer in all these cases is the same—namely, that we feel justified in making the inferences in question because they make something intelligible that otherwise would have no p. 90 notes meaning.. This answer is perfectly correct, for in the last analysis the justification of every scientific generalisation is that it enables us to comprehend something that is otherwise obscure—namely, the relations between apparently dissimilar phenomena.

To this it may be said that, in such cases as those just mentioned, a logical meaning is given to something that from previous experience we have every reason to expect has one, but that the point in dispute about the ‘psychopathological’ occurrences of everyday life is whether they have such a meaning or not. Here a priori argument can take us no further, and the question can only be referred for solution to actual investigation—a matter usually considered unnecessary, on the pure assumption that the occurrences have no logical meaning. Freud’s scepticism made him challenge the necessity of this assumption, and prefer to leave the question open until it was investigated. On doing so, he found as a matter

. of experience two things—namely, that the realm of psychical determinism is more extensive than is generally supposed, and that awareness of a motive at a given moment is not a necessary accompaniment of the external manifestation of this.

Freud further came to the conclusion that there was a definite cause for the popular belief that so many blunders in our mental functioning are meaningless, He holds that this belief is due to the same cause as the blunders themselves— namely, to repression. Various repressed thoughts are’ in every one of us constantly coming to expression in the shape of ‘meaningless’ blunders, the significance of which necessarily escapes us. Being thus accustomed to the occurrences of such matters in ourselves we naturally attach no significance to them in others; we ‘explain’ these as we do our own, or accept the ‘explanations’ proffered just as we expect others to accept the ‘explanations’ of our own blunders

As to these explanations, little more need be added. Where the factors they have recourse to are operative at all, they act only as predisposing conditions, not as the true cause. Freud’ gives the following apposite illustration of the actual state of p. 91 notes affairs: ‘Suppose I have been so incautious as to go for a stroll in a lonely part of the town, where I am attacked and robbed of my watch and money. At the next police-station I give information, with the words: I have been.in this and that street, where loneliness and darkness stole my watch and money. Although in these words I should have said nothing that was not correct, still, from the wording of my information, I run the danger of being thought not quite right in the head. The state of affairs can correctly be described only thus: That favoured by the loneliness of the spot, and umnrecognisable through the protection of the darkness, a thief has robbed me of my valuables. Now, the state of affairs in the forgetting of a name need not be otherwise; favoured by fatigue, circulatory disturbances, and poisoning, some unknown psychical agent robs me of the proper names that belong to my memory —the same agent that on other occasions can bring about the same failure of memory during perfect health and capacity.’ Similarly, such a mistake as a slip of the tongue is often attributed by psychologists (e.g., Wundt) to a momentary in-- attentiveness. It is certainly a question of conscious attention, but Freud?! has pointed out that the defect is more accurately described as a disturbance of attention than as a diminution, the true cause being the disturbing influence of a second train of thought. The same remarks apply to all the other explanations urged. Several examples were given above in which names and other words differing by only one letter were confounded or interchanged, and evidence was brought forward to shew that this external resemblance was merely a predisposing circumstance, and not the actual cause of the mistake. Many such circumstances certainly favour the occurrence of a blunder—that is, they permit a repressed thought to slip partly through. Alcoholic intoxication is notoriously one. Emotional excitement is another. Many blunders, forgettings, and other oversights, are attributed to the confusion of hurry. Thus, for instance, I have noticed that the using of the wrong key, in the examples quoted above, most often occurred when | I was in a great hurry (the same was true of the not recognising the assistant superintendent in his office); but if haste were the true cause, it would be curious that it should bring about a blunder of a kind that defeats its own object; strictly speaking, it is the emotional confusion or excitement engendered by p. 92 notes hurry that permits a second repressed impulse to manifest itself in what externally appears as a blunder.

As has been remarked above, there are certain occasions in everyday life when the normal person divines the motivation of unintentional errors, though these are rare in comparison with the occasions on which it escapeshim. Freud? has pointed out that there are two other groups of processes in which an unconscious, and therefore distorted, knowledge of this motivation is manifested—namely, in paranoia and in superstitions. In both these the subject reads a meaning into external happenings that have no such psychical meaning, and, in a very interesting discussion of the subject, Freud produces reasons to believe that this erroneous functioning is due to a projection on to the outside of motives that exist in the subject’s mind and are full of meaning there, but which he does not directly perceive.

A little may be said on a feature of some of the analyses quoted that may strike the reader as odd—namely, the remarkable play on words that is so often found. Whoever is surprised at this needs to be reminded of the almost boundless extent to which the same feature occurs in other fields of mental activity—in wit, dreams, insanity, and so on. Even in the serious affairs of everyday life it is far from unusual. Thus, to cite a few business announcements, we see the National Drug Company using as its trade motto ‘Nadru,’ the National Liquorice Company (N. L. Co.) that of ‘Enelco’; we find the Levy Jewellery Company reversing its first name into the more pretentious one of ‘Yvel,’ and advertisements of ‘Uneeda’ cigars and ‘Phiteezi’ boots are familiar to every one. This tendency to play on words, and to produce a more useful or pleasant result (mirror-writing, ciphers, and rhyming slang,’ also belong here), is evidently dictated in part by the same ‘unpleasantness’ motives—to avoid banal or otherwise unattractive words—that so much stress has been laid on above. It is one that has far-reaching roots in early childhood life. In preconscious and unconscious mental activities this play on words—clang associations—is much more extensive than in consciousness, and serves for the transference of a given affect from one mode of expression to a more suitable and convenient one p. 93 2. Bearing on Psycho-Analytic Method of Treatment.

Three brief remarks may be made on this matter: In the first place, investigation of the errors and slips of everyday life is perhaps the best mode of approach to the study of psycho-analysis, and affords a convenient preliminary to the more difficult, though more important, subject of dreams. The greatest value is to be attached to self-analysis, a fact to which attention cannot too often be called. In the second place, analysis of the occurrences in question is of considerable service in the treatment of neurotic patients. Their behaviour in this respect needs to be closely observed, and frequently a quite trivial occurrence will, when investigated, provide clues to the elucidation of the main problem. Thirdly, consideration of the mechanism of these erroneous functionings makes it easy to understand the way in which psycho-analysis brings about its therapeutic effects. Both the ‘ errors’ and the neurotic symptoms are the manifestations of dissociated conative trends which are less compatible with consciousness than the rest of the personality opposed to them, are consequently repressed, and can come to expression only in indirect ways and only under certain circumstances. An essential condition for this is non-awareness of the process. Psycho-analysis, by directing the dissociated trend into consciousness, abolishes this condition, and therefore brings the trend under the control of the conscious inhibiting forces. Conscious control is substituted for automatic expression, the significance of which was not realised. These considerations may be illustrated by the tritest of the examples given above—namely, my opening of a fresh tobaccotin although I wished first to finish the old one. Here it is quite obvious that the rule just stated holds that an essential condition of the erroneous functioning is non-awareness of the significance of the process; I knew that I was reaching for tobacco, but didn’t notice which tin it was. The moment I realised the situation, I of course checked the error, and controlled the wish that was taking advantage of my absentmindedness to come to expression. On a larger scale the same is true of neurotic symptoms; realisation of their significance checks the morbid expression of the underlying impulse. The cardinal proposition 1s that consciousness of an aberrant impulse means increased control of it. p. 94 3. Relation. to? Health and Disease.

This matter should be fairly evident from the preceding considerations, so that the two corollaries that follow in this respect need only to be stated. The first is that from a psychological point of view perfect mental normality does not exist. In other words, every one shews numerous defects in mental functioning that are manifestations of dissociated, repressed, psychical material, and which are brought about by the same psychological mechanisms as those.operative in the case of the psychoneuroses. A further matter not brought out in the preceding study is that this material is ultimately of the same nature as that from which neuroses are produced. The second corollary is that the border-line between mental health and disease is much less sharp even than is generally supposed. The distinction between the two is really a social one rather than a psychopathological one, just as the distinction between sanity and insanity is primarily a legal one. When the erroneous mental functioning happens to carry with it a social incapacity or disability, the condition is called a neurosis, and when it does not it is called absent-mindedness, eccentricity, personal mannerism, and so on. Further reflections on the significance of these conclusions will here be omitted, as they are not relevant to the main purpose of the paper.

4. Determinism and Free-Will.

One of the psychological arguments against the belief in a complete mental determinism is the intense feeling of conviction that we have a perfectly free choice in the performance of many acts. This feeling of conviction must be justified by something, but at the same time it is entirely compatible with a complete determinism. It is curious that it is not often prominent with important and weighty decisions. On these occasions one has much more the feeling of being irresistibly impelled in a given direction (compare Luther’s ‘Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders’). On the contrary, it is with trivial and indifferent resolutions that one is most sure that one could just as well have acted otherwise, that one has acted from non-motived free-will. From the psycho-analytical point of view, the right of this feeling of conviction is not contested. It only means that the person is not aware of any conscious motive. When, however, conscious motivation is distinguished p. 95 notes from unconscious motivation, this feeling of conviction teaches us that the former does not extend over all our motor resolutions. What is left free from the one side receives its motive from the other—from the unconscious—and so the psychical determinism is flawlessly carried through. A knowledge of unconscious motivation is indispensable, even for philosophical discussion of determinism. — That the relation between unconscious and conscious mental processes furnishes the key to the problem of psychological determinism has also been clearly pointed out by Kohnstamm, approaching the subject in quite a different way from Freud. He writes: ‘Die biologische Betrachtungswelse sieht in den Bewusstseinsdingen nur Bergspitzen, die iiber einem Nebelmeer sichtbar werden, wahrend das Bergganze—die Gesamtheit der Lebensphanomene—dem unmittelbaren Bewusstsein verborgen bleibt. Wenn man sich auf die Betrachtung von oben her beschrankt, ergibt sich kein natiirlicher Zusammenhang, keine Gesetzmassigkeit. Sieht man aber von dem Nebel ab, der die Griinde verhiillt, so erkennt man, wie die Berge aus der Ebene aufsteigen, sich von einem gemeinsamen Grunde abhebend. Man gelangt zu der naturwissenschaftlichen Einsicht von der Einheit dessen, was unter zufalligen Bedingungen teils sichtbar, teils unsichtbar war. Ahnlich sucht die biologische Betrachtungsweise die Bewusstseinsphanomene umzusetzen in raumzeitliche Geschehnisse und Gesetzmassigkeiten, wie sie auch sonst den Gegenstand naturwissenschaftlicher Biologie bilden. So zeigte die gegenwartige Untersuchung die Zielstrebigkeit unter dem Bilde eines Berges, welcher uns den allgemeinen Reizverwertungstypus des Lebens darstellt und in eine Spitze auslauft, welche die Willenshandlung bedeutet.’ [* The biological way of thinking sees in the facts of consciousness only mountain-peaks, which soar into sight over a sea of mist, while the mountain as a whole—the totality of vital phenomena—remains hidden from the immediate consciousness. If one confines oneself to the view from above, there appears to be no natural connection, no regularity. If, however, one disregards the mist that conceals the base, one recognises how the mountains rise from the plain, and have a common basis. One attains scientific Insight of the unity of what, under chance conditions, was partly visible, partly invisible. Similarly, the biological way p. 96 of thinking seeks to transpose the phenomena of consciousness into regular occurrences of time and space, just as these elsewhere constitute the subject of scientific biology. The present investigation of purposefulness discloses it thus under the metaphor of a mountain, which represents the general reaction of life to different stimuli, and which terminates as a peak that signifies the action of the will.’]

5. Social Significance.

It would be interesting to speculate as to the result of a general knowledge of the unconscious motives that underlie the failures of mental functioning in everyday life; but it is perhaps more profitable to review some of the present results of ignorance of them. e One of these is that both intellectual and moral dishonesty is facilitated to an extraordinary extent. There is no doubt that dishonesty of which the subject is not conscious is much commoner than deliberate dishonesty, a fact of considerable importance in, for instance, juristic matters. The hysteric who cannot move her leg because unconsciously she wishes it to be paralysed, the tourist who oversees a prohibiting notice because he finds such things annoying, and the impecunious man who forgets to pay a bill because he doesn’t really want to, are all instances of this. At the same time, the line between the two types of dishonesty 1s nowhere a sharp one, and in many cases one can only conclude that the subject could with a very little effort recognise the suppressed motive, which is more than half-conscious. In psycho-analytic treatment this is constantly to be observed. The following slight example of it may be quoted: A young American told me of a certain experience she had had in her childhood in company with a boy. I had every reason to believe that this was far from being an isolated one, and asked her whether it had occurred with any one else. She said, ‘Not any time that I can remember.’ Noticing the wording of her answer and a certain expression on her face, I asked, ‘What about the times that you can’t remember?’ She exclaimed, ‘Oh, shucks!’ and in such a disconcerted tone that I was sure my surmise had been well founded. She then made the remark, ‘Well, I really had forgotten the other times till this minute,’ the truth of which was probably only partial. The incident made me think of Nietzsche’s epigram: ‘Man liigt wohl mit dem Munde, aber p. 97 notes mit dem Maule, das man dabei macht, sagt man die Wahrheit.’ [‘One may indeed lie with the mouth, but with the accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells the truth.’] Half-amnesias of this kind are extremely common in daily life.

In spite of the constant endeavour to keep back disagreeable or unacceptable thoughts, these very thoughts betray themselves in blunders of the type under discussion. By the world this self-betrayal is often passed by unnoticed, but it does not escape any one who has made a study of unconscious functioning. Freud! in no way exaggerates when he says: ‘Wer Augen hat, zu sehen, und Ohren, zu héren, tiberzeugt sich, dass die Sterblichen kein Geheimnis verbergen kénnen. Wessen Lippen schweigen, der schwaétzt mit den Fingerspitzen; aus allen Poren dringt ihm der Verrat.’ [‘He who has eyes to see, and ears to hear, becomes convinced that mortals can hide no secret. When lips are silent, the fingertips tattle; betrayal oozes out of every pore.’] Moreover, even with a direct lie, careful observation of the undue emphasis here and the distortion there will usually disclose what the person is trying to conceal, for the le is a creation of the same mind that at the moment is cognisant of the truth. It is very rare, especially on emotional occasions, for self-control to be so complete as to inhibit all unconscious manifestations, which to an attentive observer will indicate the truth. Strictly speaking, one cannot lie to another, only to oneself, and skilled introspection makes even this increasingly difficult.

An important consequence of this is that every one is apt to know more about the inner motives of those near to him than they themselves know, inasmuch as every one is continually performing, at all events, some simple kind of psychical analysis on those around him. This is a fertile source of misunderstandings and friction,’ especially in family and married life, where contact is much nearer. One person intuitively recognises an intention or tendency in the other that the latter refuses to admit even to himself. When the unavoidable inferences are presented to him, he is indignant, rebuts them as being groundless, and complains that he is misunderstood. Strictly speaking, such misunderstanding is really a too fine understanding. The more nervous two people are, the more p. 98 notes often does it give rise to schisms, the reasons for which are as categorically denied by the one as they are obvious to the other. This is the punishment for the inner improbity: that, under the pretext of forgetting, absent-mindedness, and so on, people allow tendencies to come to expression which they would do better to admit to themselves and others, unless they can control them.

Most important, however, is the extension of these principles to the sphere of human judgement, for it is probable that repressed complexes play as prominent a part in distortion here as they do in the minor errors of memory mentioned above. On a large scale this is shewn in two ways—in the minimum of evidence often necessary to secure the acceptance of an idea that is in harmony with existing mental constellations, or to reject one that is incompatible with these. In both cases it is often affective influences rather than intellectual operations that decide the question. The same evidence is construed quite differently when viewed in the light of one affective constellation from the way it is when viewed in the light of another. Further, when the general attitude towards; a question changes in the course of time, this is often due at least as much to modification of the prevailing affective influences as to the accumulation of external evidence; for instance, the average man of to-day does not hesitate to reject the same evidence of witchcraft that was so convincing to the man of three centuries ago, though he usually knows no more abotit)the true explanation of it than the latter did.

Ignorance of the importance of affective factors in this respect, combined with the ineradicable popular belief.in the rationality of the individual mind, has the interesting result. that strong. differences of opinion are attributed by each side to a defect in reasoning capacity on the part of the other. In an exposition of this matter, Trotter! writes: ‘The religious man accuses the atheist of being shallow and irrational, and is met with a similar reply; to the Conservative, the amazing thing about the Liberal is his incapacity to see reason and accept the only possible solution of public problems. Examination reveals the fact that the differences are not due to the commission of the mere mechanical fallacies of logic, since these are easily avoided, even by the politician, and since p. 99 there is no reason to suppose that one party in such controversies is less logical than the other. The difference is due rather to the fundamental assumptions of the antagonists being hostile, and these Sars are derived from herd suggestion.’

There is a certain amount of truth in this imputation of stupidity to a person on the opposite side, for in his blind refusal to appreciate or even to perceive the evidence adduced by his opponent he may give an unavoidable appearance of marked stupidity. A further reason for this is that some one under the sway of strongly affective influences thinks not only that any one differing from him must be deficient in reasoning power, but also that the views of the latter are themselves stupid. In attempting to controvert these, therefore, he unconsciously distorts them until they really are foolish, and he then finds it easy to demolish them. Any man of the period who read only the account of Darwin’s views that was promulgated by his theological and scientific opponents must have wondered why it was worth while to attack such obvious nonsense, while our wonder, on the other hand, is that reputable and otherwise intelligent men could have managed so to pervert and misunderstand statements that to us are lucidity itself. Similarly at the present time, if some of the remarkable accounts of Freud’s views that are given by his opponents represented anything like what he really holds, the fact would need much explanation that so many scientific men can accept them and yet remain sane.

Yet this astonishing stupidity in apprehending the arguments of opponents, and in defending preconceived views, is only apparent. The men who so grossly misinterpreted Darwin were often men of high intellectual power, and the same is true of many of Freud’s opponents; similarly no one can read closely the ‘Malleus Maleficarum’ without admiration for the amazing intellectual ingenuity with which the most fantastic propositions are there defended. The process is akin to one that psychiatrists call ‘emotional stupidity,’ symptom seen in patients who have no real defect of reasoning power, but who through various affective influences are in a condition that at first sight gives rise to a strong suspicion of some organic defect of the brain.

A further psychological problem of interest in this connection is how to account for the intensity of annoyance, p. 100 anger, and even hate, that may be engendered by controversial opposition of the particular type discussed above. How irritating it can be to try vainly to get some one to see a point that is perfectly simple and obvious to oneself most people know from ample experience. There would even seem to be a correlation between the amount of heat in this way engendered and the slightness of the difference dividing two people, just as the most bitter wars are between races of similar stock (truer still of civil wars) or between religious sections whose doctrinal differences are apparently of only academic importance, The history of the Balkans shews, for instance, that the races professing the Orthodox creed preferred to be ruled by the infidel Turk rather than by Roman Catholics (e.g., Venetians), and heretics have always been persecuted with a venom that finds no counterpart in the attitude towards heathen countries. It is as though we are willing to understand that people widely different from ourselves cannot grasp arguments that seem convincing enough to us, but what we find hard to tolerate is that those akin to us, and who ‘ought to know better,’ should behave in this way. The feeling it gives us, in the case of either individuals or nations, is that since the matter in dispute is so very obvious there must be an element of sheer obstinacy on the other side that makes them refuse to see the point. The reaction this calls forth is, on the one hand, the belief that they are intellectually inferior and stupid, as explained above, and, on the other hand, the emotions of irritation and anger. I should interpret the latter reaction as an unconscious intuition that the opposition on the other side is really of emotional origin, denoting hostility to our own emotional attitude, as, indeed, it so usually is. In other words, our unconscious correctly interprets the meaning of the situation and appropriately responds with anger, while our conscious mind erroneously rationalises it as one due to the other person’s stupidity. The next thing that happens is that we feel increasingly impotent, for, as is well known, the weapon of argument is powerless in the face of ‘emotional stupidity ’; as Goethe said, ‘Against stupidity the Gods themselves fight in vain.’ The impotence is due to the fact that the weapon is not being directed against the true source of opposition—namely, the unconscious emotional complexes of the other person. (The failure is exactly the same as the physician experiences who tries to dispel neurotic p. 101 symptoms by means of rational argument; he is not really attacking the cause, which lies in the unconscious.) The feeling of impotence in the face of irrational opposition, of being thwarted for no good reason, still further increases our anger, sometimes to an extreme degree; this reaction is probably of infantile origin, the resentment and ‘tantrums’ at first discovering that the world dares to thwart some of our wishes, a world which originally had gratified them all to the full.

On observing the general attitude towards people whose ‘emotional stupidity’ has in the course of time become apparent, two things are noticeable: In the first place, as was remarked above, the fault is attributed much more to intellectual inferiority than to the more important affective causes. Hence the present-day supercilious pity for the scholastics of the ‘dark ages,’ an attitude considerably modified by an objective comparison of the reasoning powers characteristic of the two civilisations. In the second place, far greater leniency is shewn towards a stupidity that expresses itself in the form of blind adherence to accepted errors than that which expresses itself in the form of blind rejection of a novel truth; in other words, incredulousness is always more harshly judged than credulousness, though they are both merely different aspects of the same fundamental failing—namely, lack of true scepticism. Yet the one is hardly more characteristic of human weakness than the other—as Nietzsche put it: ‘Mankind has a bad ear for new music’—and it would be hard to convince a student of human progress that the first manifestation has a greater retarding influence on this than the second. In any case, these considerations go to shew the fallacy of the popular belief that the will is the servant of reason, the truth being that reason has always been, and probably always must be, to a very large extent the handmaid of the will.

XI. Summary

Only a part of the subject-matter dealt with by Freud has been covered in the present paper. Those interested in it are referred to his book for richer and more numerous examples, and for the lucid discussion there given of the theoretical aspects of the subject. It is perhaps desirable, however, to summarise here the main conclusions on the topics discussed above.

p. 102 notes The occurrences that form the subject-matter of this study, the general characteristics of which were defined in the introductory section} may be divided into motor and sensory.* The defects of the former class that enter into consideration are two: (1) The erroneous carrying out of an intended purpose (slips of the tongue and pen, erroneously-carried-out actions); and (2) the carrying out of an unintended purpose (symptomatic acts). The defects of the latter class are also two: (1) Simple failure of perception (forgetting, not seeing); and (2) erroneous perception (false recollection, false visual perception). In each class the distinction between the two kinds of defects is not sharp; thus, in the latter one, for instance, a failure to remember is always accompanied by an overprominent remembrance of some associated memory, a false recollection. Further, the distinction between the two classes themselves is not a sharp one, both motor and sensory processes playing a part in many instances; thus, in the mislaying of objects, the object is first misplaced, and then the memory of the act is forgotten.

Common to all forms is the fact that the subject, and most observers, either give an obviously inadequate explanation of the particular occurrence—such as that it was due to ‘inattention,’ ‘absent-mindedness,’ ‘chance,’ and so on—or frankly maintain that it has no explanation at all. On the contrary, psycho-analysis shews that there is not only a definite psychical cause for the occurrence, but that this has always a logical meaning, and may strictly be called a motive. This motive is some secondary tendency or train of thought, of which the subject is not aware at the time. Usually it is preconscious, or, in popular language, unconscious; in many cases it is un-conscious in the strict sense, and is then correspondingly more difficult to reveal. In most cases there are both a preconscious and unconscious motive, which are associated with each other. The motive is repressed by the subject, the repression being a defence-mechanism that subserves the function of keeping from consciousness undesirable or painful thoughts. The motive may be one of two kinds—either it is a counter-impulse (Gegen- p. 103 wile) directed immediately against the mental operation that is intended, or it is an impulse directed against some mental tendency that stands in associative connection with this operation; that is to say, the association between the two mental processes may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. As a result of the repression, any direct manifestation of the tendency is inhibited, and it can come to expression only as a parasitic process engrafted on another conscious one. The disturbance thus caused constitutes a temporary failure or error of normal mental functioning.

This error can psychologically be compared with a psychoneurotic symptom; the mechanisms by which the two are brought about are almost the same, and the psychical material that is the source of them is closely similar in the two cases. It is maintained that appreciation of the significance of these everyday errors is important for both the practice and theory of psychology; this is especially so in the contribution it furnishes to the problem of psychical determinism, and in the understanding it gives to the deeper, non-conscious motives of conduct. It further throws a valuable light on certain social problems, notably the question of mutual misunderstandings in everyday life, and on the importance of affective influences in forming decisions and judgements

Notes from the 1920 edition

Original notes are grouped by printed page. The text was extracted from the historical scan; some characters and note markers may contain recognition errors.

Printed page 40 ↩

  1. 1 Elaborated from an address delivered before the Detroit Academy of parse May 16, 1911. Published in the American Journal of Psychology,
  2. VOl. XX11.
  3. 2 Freud, ‘Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens,’ 3° Auflage, IgIo0. — Another of his books deals with the same topic, ‘ Vorlesungen zur Einfihrung in die Psychoanalyse,’ 1916.

Printed page 41 ↩

  1. * Adler, ‘ Drei Psycho-Analysen von Zahleneinfallen und obsedierenden Zahlen,’ Psychiaty.-Neurol, Woch., 1905, Jahrg. VII., S. 263.

Printed page 42 ↩

  1. * It will be noticed that the word ‘repression’ is here used in a rathes special sense, to be are, distinguished from that of ‘suppression.’ It means in psycho-analysis ‘the keeping of certain mental processes from consciousness,’

Printed page 43 ↩

  1. 1 * Life of Charles Darwin,’ edited by Francis Darwin, 1902, p. 42.
  2. 2 Pick, ‘ Zur Psychologie des Vergessen bei Geistes- und Nervenkranken,’ Arch. f. Kriminal-Anthropologie u. Kriminalistik, 1905, Bd. xvili., S. 251.

Printed page 44 ↩

  1. 1 Maeder, ‘ Contributions 4 la psychopathologie’de la vie quotidienne, Arch. de Psychol., 1907, t. vi., p. 150.

Printed page 47 ↩

  1. 1 For other examples see Otto Rank, ‘ Fehlleistungen aus dem Alltagsleben,’ Zentralblatt fir Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. II., S. 265.
  2. 2 Maeder, ‘ Une voie nouvelle en psychologie; Freud et son école,’ Cenobium, Gennaio, 1909, Anno. III., p. 100.

Printed page 49 ↩

  1. 1 A. A. Brill, ‘ A Contribution*to the Psychopathology of Everyday Life,’ Psychotherapy, 1909, Pp. 9.
  2. : 4

Printed page 52 ↩

  1. Third Citizen. Your name, sir, truly. Cinna. Truly, my name is Cinna. Second Citizen. Tear him to pieces; he’s a conspirator. Cinna. I am Cinna the poet; I am not Cinna the conspirator. Second Citizen. It is no matter; his name’s Cinna; pluck but his name out of his heart, and turn him going.
  2. 1 An interesting confirmation of the correctness of the analysis occurred some months later when the baby in question was born. The lady, on mentioning the news to various friends, repeatedly made the slip of referring to her friend as Mrs. M., her own name. She thus expresses her wish that the happy event had happened to her instead of to her friend. M. had also been the friend’s maiden name, so that by the mistake the lady further expresses the wish that the friend was still single—7.e., her jealousy at her marriage.;

Printed page 53 ↩

  1. 1 This reminds me of an incident in our own times, which, though not turning on the question of names, is worth recording in illustration of another psycho-analytical thesis—namely, that, as in the last two examples, a strong affect will get transferred on quite illogical grounds and by means of superficial associations; in general it may be said that a strong affect always tends to enforce identification at the expense of discrimination. During the stirring days of the militant suffragettes Lord Weardale was attacked and assaulted at Euston Station by ladies who were under the impression that he was the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith. A few days later one of the most distinguished suffragettes, speaking at a meeting at South Kensington, said that ‘it was very awkward for Lord Weardale that he should be so like Mr. Asquith. Anybody resembling a Cabinet Minister was not safe in these days. She advised those who resembled members of the Government to make some alteration in their appearance by growing a beard or moustache. Women could not waste their time worrying over whether it was the right man or not (!).’ Coming to later times still, we see the same affect radiating over whole nations, so that ai] Germans are supposed tobe brutal on the one hand and aij Englishmen hypocritical on the other.

Printed page 54 ↩

  1. 1 In literature disparagement is often indicated by the forgetting of other matters besides names. Thus, in Bernard Shaw’s ‘ Cesar and Cleopatra,’ Cesar’s indifference to Cleopatra is depicted by his being vexed on leaving Egypt at having forgotten something he has to do. Finally he recollects what it is—to say good-bye to Cleopatra.

Printed page 55 ↩

  1. 1 Stekel, ‘ Warum sie den eigenen Namen hassen,’ Zentralbl. fiir Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. I., Heft 3, S. 109. See also his interesting article, ‘ Die Verpflichtung des Namens,’ Zeitschr. ftir Psychother. u. med. Psychol., February, rgrt, Bd. iii., S. 110.;

Printed page 56 ↩

  1. 1 T trust that Mr. Robson and Professor Titchener will pardon my sacrificing the personal privacy of their names in the cause of science. I have purposely selected, from a large number of similar instances, two in which the contrast between a rare individual disparagement and an otherwise universal respect is specially striking.:

Printed page 57 ↩

  1. 1 Riklin, ‘ Eine Lige,’ Zentralbl. fiir Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. I., S. 193.

Printed page 58 ↩

  1. i Freud, op. cit.,.S. 83.

Printed page 60 ↩

  1. 1 Related by Freud, op. cit., S. 48.

Printed page 61 ↩

  1. 1 This replacing of the initial letter of a word by that of another word, ‘typically from the same sentence, is known in Oxford as a Spoonerism, on account of a distinguished professor who had the habit of committing the ‘particular slip. As he is still alive, I will refrain from commenting on the spsychological significance of the habit..

Printed page 63 ↩

  1. ‘ There is something tells me (but it is not love), I would not lose you; and you know yourself Hate counsels not in such a quality. But lest you should not understand me well, (And yet a maiden hath no tongue but thought) I would detain you here some month or two, Before you venture forme. I could teach you How to choose right, but then I am forsworn; So will I never be; so may you miss me; But if you do, you’ll make me wish a sin, That I had been forsworn. Beshrew your eyes, They have o’erlooked me, and divided me: One half of me is yours, the other half yours— Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours,— And so all yours.’
  2. Rank? comments on this passage: ‘Gerade das, was sie ihm also bloss leise andeuten méchte, weil sie es eigentlich ihm iiberhaupt verschweigen sollte, dass sie naémlich schon vor der Wahl ganz die seine sei und ihn liebe, das lasst der Dichter mit bewundernswertem psychologischen Feingefiihl in dem Versprechen sich offen durchdrangen und weiss durch
  3. 1 Freud, op. cit., S. 50, 58.
  4. 2 Otto Rank, Zentralbl. fiiy Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. I., Heft 3, S. 110.

Printed page 65 ↩

  1. 1 The nature of the change of the subject here accurately betrays the content of the underlying affect, indignation at Patterne’s disparagement of Whitford, just as a mediate association reaction indicates the nature of the complex stimulated. | 5

Printed page 66 ↩

  1. 1 Naturally I excused this to myself on the ground that pedantic accuracy is uncalled for in conversation, but the facts remain.

Printed page 68 ↩

  1. 1 Meaning in the money-market.

Printed page 69 ↩

  1. ! See Chapter VIII, p i191

Printed page 70 ↩

  1. 1 Ethyl alcohol is, of course, the chemical name for ordinary alcohol.
  2. 2 In writing my manuscript, I made the slip of replacing the word ‘ Brill ’ by that of ‘ Bree,’ the name of another medical friend. The mistake is evidently a contamination derived from the word-picture of ‘ Brill on the spree,’ and is determined by the memory of tenuous jests relating to Berlin ~ on the (River) Spree; both the vowel and the consonants of Brill are contained in the word ‘ Berlin.’ It is only right to add, however, that the thoughts of both Dr. Brill and Dr. Bree are intimately connected in my mind with Berlin in ways that discretion prevents me from describing.

Printed page 71 ↩

  1. “gh aed

Printed page 72 ↩

  1. 1S. 66, etc. 2 Jahrg. I., 5. 197.

Printed page 73 ↩

  1. 1 Dattner, ‘ Eine historische Fehlleistung,’ Zentralbl. fiir Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. I., S. 550.

Printed page 74 ↩

  1. 1 Bleuler, ‘ Affektivitat, Suggestibilitat, Paranoia,’ 1906, S. 121.

Printed page 75 ↩

  1. 1 Freud, op. cit., S. 64.
  2. 2 One might invert the familiar proverb and say, ‘ What the heart doesn’t grieve over, the eye doesn’t see.’

Printed page 76 ↩

  1. 1 Freud, op. cit., S. 130.;

Printed page 77 ↩

  1. 1 Brill, Psychanalysis, 1914, p. 230.

Printed page 79 ↩

  1. i For an example of how complex may be the mental processes behind such a simple occurrence, the reader is referred to a striking analysis by Otto Rank, ‘ Das Verlieren als Symptomhandlung,’ Zentralbl. ftiy Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. I., S. 450.
  2. 2 Freud, op. cit., S. 73.

Printed page 82 ↩

  1. 1 Maeder, ‘ Nouvelles Contributions 4 la psychopathologie de la vie ‘quotodienne,’ Arch. de Psychol., 1908, vol. vii., p. 296.

Printed page 83 ↩

  1. 1 For the explanation of this and allied terms, see Chapter III., p. 18.
  2. _? In the Zentralbl. fir Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. I., S. 96, I have published a fuller account of this example.

Printed page 85 ↩

  1. 1 Psycho-analytic research, with the penetration of infantile amnesia, has shewn that this apparent precocity is a less abnormal occurrence than was previously supposed.

Printed page 86 ↩

  1. 1 The term ‘medical questions’ is a common periphrasis for ‘ sexual questions.’

Printed page 87 ↩

  1. i Jung, ‘ Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien,’ Bd. i., 1906; Bd. ii., 1910.

Printed page 89 ↩

  1. 1 In ‘ Der Witz und seine Beziehungen zum Unbewussten’ Freud has made a detailed study of this subject. As with the occurrences studied in the present paper, he has shewn that the insight consciously obtained is often only a partial one, and that the true significance is often related to unconscious sources.
  2. 2 The Royal Censor refused to let the play be acted until the name was replaced by one less open to this personal interpretation—namely, Johnson; the name of the Commander-in-Chief, Mitchener (from Milner and Kitchener) had to be altered to Bones. * = john Bull.
  3. * See Lady Strachey’s ‘ Later Letters of Edward Lear.’

Printed page 90 ↩

  1. 1 If one wished to be epigrammatic, one might say: ‘In the future, reason will be used to explain things; at present, it has to be used to explain them away.’ This would be true of a good many matters besides the slips of everyday life.
  2. 2 Freud, ‘ Zur Psychopathologie,’ S. 22.

Printed page 91 ↩

  1. 1 Freud, op. cit., S. 68.

Printed page 92 ↩

  1. 1 Freud, op. cit., 5. 131 et seq.: oLAUS following are instances from the Cockney type of this: ‘ Aristotle’
  2. . =bottle; ‘Cain and Abel’ =table; ‘ Harry Nichols ’=pickles. Mediate forms are: ‘ Christmas ’ (card) =guard; ‘ Bull’ (and cow) =row; “Malcolm ’ (Scott) =hot; ‘Stockton’ (on-Tees) =cheese; ‘ Rosie’ (Loader) =soda, and so on.

Printed page 95 ↩

  1. 1 Kohnstamm, Journ. f. Psychol. u. Neurol., Bd, xviii., S. ror.

Printed page 97 ↩

  1. 1 Freud, ‘Sammlung kleiner Schriften,’ Zweite Folge, S. 69.
  2. 2 Freud, ‘ Zur Psychopathologie,’ S. 114.

Printed page 98 ↩

  1. 1 Wilfred Trotter, ‘ Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man,’ Sociological Review, July, 1908, p. 19 of reprint.

Printed page 102 ↩

  1. 1 In German the erroneousness of the process is conveniently indicated by the preface ‘ ver ’—thus, Verdrucken, vergessen, vergreifen, verhéren, verlegen, verlesen, verschreiben, versehen, versprechen, etc.
  2. 2 This term is here used in its neuro-biological sense, ata hence includes both perceptive and apperceptive processes.

About this reading edition

This page is an OCR-assisted transcription of Jones’s 1920 London reprint of the revised and enlarged edition. Paragraphs, section headings, original page locations, and page-grouped notes are presented for reading. The text has not yet received a complete line-by-line proofread against the scan, so occasional recognition errors may remain. Jones’s arguments are historical material, not current clinical guidance.

Jones, E. (1920). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. In Papers on psycho-analysis (Rev. & enl. ed., reprint, pp. 40–103). Baillière, Tindall and Cox.