History of Psychoanalysis

Papers on Psycho-Analysis · Part I: General Papers

Introduction

Ernest JonesChapter I of XLPrinted pages 1–7About 12 minutes

Jones opens the volume with resistance to Freud’s discoveries, the unconscious, repression, and the tension between the pleasure principle and reality.

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Chapter I

p. 1 It is well known that Freud’s work, of which this book is a partial exposition, has from the beginning met with constant hostility, and that his conclusions have been combated with an acrimony scarcely equalled elsewhere in science in modern times. It would hardly be correct to attribute this state of affairs altogether, as some writers have done, to the mental stereotypy that is so grievous a characteristic of mankind, and which inevitably interposes a resistance to any revolution in thought.1 In the present case a greater measure of the resistance is inherent in the situation itself, in a way that it will be well to explain at the outset.

Freud’s main work has been carried out in the field of psychological medicine, and he is before everything a clinical psychologist. In his efforts to ascertain the significance, and therefore the genesis, of neurotic symptoms, he made the remarkable and quite unexpected discovery that these have a definite psychological meaning and purpose, one, however, that is totally unknown to the patient. He found, further, that even when this meaning was laid bare by appropriate p. 2 methods, which practically excluded the possibility of error, at least of gross error, the revelation of it was not simply surprising to the patient, but extremely distasteful; so much so that the patient always strove as long as possible against accepting it, even in the face of irrefragable evidence. In one way or another the conclusion was repugnant to the patient’s conscious ideal of himself, and was thus wounding to his amour propre. Largely on the basis of this empiric finding that the patient opposed a dynamic resistance to the revealing of his previously unconscious thoughts, Freud concluded that the force thus manifesting itself outwardly was the same one that had hitherto prevented the patient from becoming aware of these thoughts; to the force when operative in the latter (inward) direction he gives the name of ‘repression,’ using the word in a special sense slightly different from the usual one. On tracing the unconscious thoughts as far as possible—using a technique, known as psycho-analysis, specially devised for the purpose—he found himself in a strange mental world quite foreign to that of consciousness, and to this he refers under the name of ‘the unconscious.’ On then studying the characteristics of this buried stratum of the mind,1 he found that it was extremely primitive in nature, and closely akin to the mind both of the infant and of the savage. It was, however, not at all an isolated phenomenon in the neuroses. On turning his attention to other imaginative products of the mind, notably dream-life, many forms of wit, folk-lore, mythology, poetry, and so on, he was again able plainly to trace the action of the same characteristic type of thought as that with which he had become familiar in his study of the neuroses.

The subject of psycho-analysis, which may be defined as the study of unconscious mentation, was thus gradually extended as one field after another opened up, and with increasing knowledge it became more and more possible to trace the indirect operations of the unconscious even where at first sight their existence was hardly, or not at all, suspected. Or, to put the matter in another way, it has become more and more possible to detect the contribution made by the unconscious to various modes of mental activity that have hitherto been thought to be purely conscious in both appearance and origin. Having regard to the primitive nature of the unconscious, one cannot be surprised that the genetic aspects of the whole p. 3 subject have assumed a great importance, for evidence is constantly accumulating to shew that there is a detailed genetic continuity throughout the mind, so that the study of its ultimate sources, which in the nature of things can hardly be elsewhere than in the primitive unconscious tendencies, becomes of especial interest. In this way, bit by bit, a genetic theory of the mind as a whole has gradually been built up, some of the features of which will now be indicated.

Freud holds that a great part of mental life, perhaps the whole, can be summarised under two principles, which he terms the ‘pleasure-principle’ and the ‘ reality-principle ’ respectively. The former represents the primary, original form of mental activity and is characteristic of the earliest stages of human development, both in the individual and in the race; it is therefore typically found in the mental life of the infant and, to a less extent, in that of the savage. Its main attributes are a tendency, on the one hand, to avoid pain and disagreeableness of whatever kind, and, on the other, a never-ceasing demand for immediate gratification of various desires of a distinctly primitive and lowly order, and all this at literally any cost; it is, in other words, ruled entirely by the hedonic ‘ pleasure-pain’ (Lust-Unlust) principle. It is hard to distinguish the two tendencies just mentioned, even if they are—which is by no means certain—different in their nature, for it is likely that the organism treats the desires in question in very much the same way as it does painful stimuli—namely, as molesters of its peace whose disturbing influence has to be neutralised (stilled) by means of reactions appropriate to that end. The principle is thus exquisitely egocentric, selfish, personal, and non-social (which in actual practice often means anti-social). The thought-processes corresponding to it proceed by the use of analogies and superficial associations, treat resemblances between different ideas as equivalent to identities, ignore all the laws of logic, and make no distinction between a phantasy and an actual situation of life. Soon, however, this tendency comes into conflict with the ‘ reality-principle,’ which in all probability is genetically related to it. The function of the latter is to adapt the organism to the exigencies of reality, to subordinate the imperious demand for immediate gratification, and to replace this by a more distant but more permanently satisfactory one. It is thus influenced by social, ethical, and other external considerations that are ignored by p. 4 the earlier principle. It can, however, only guide and control the pleasure-principle, adapting this to the environment; it can never abrogate its activity.

The fate of the primary pleasure-principle, and the modifications it has to undergo before being allowed to manifest itself, is one of the central objects of psycho-analytic study, which is thus the study of the fundamental driving force behind the majority of human activities and interests. The fate of the pleasure-principle may briefly be indicated as follows: The primary tendencies comprising it are inhibited and even ‘repressed’ (i.e., kept from consciousness), so that they can neither reach their immediate aim nor even continue as conscious processes; henceforth they lead an underground life, their very existence unsuspected by the individual, and ever striving towards an unattainable goal. Being in discord with environmental and educational influences, and often repugnant to the moral or æsthetic feelings of the individual, they are subjected to a strong ‘repressing’ force, and any attempt to uncover them, to make him realise their existence by bringing them to the surface of consciousness, instinctively leads to a lively opposition and resentment on his part. A solution of the conflict between the repressing and repressed forces may be reached, however, whereby the energy of the latter is diverted to other aims, in much the same way as a conservation and transformation of energy takes place in the physical world. Upon the manner in which this is accomplished greatly depend the future development and mental harmony of the individual. When the transformation is in accord with the demands of external reality and conscious ideals, it represents an important gain for the progress of civilisation and culture, an amount of energy being set free that is devoted to carrying out the work and fulfilling the needs of society. A limited part of the original tendencies undergoes a relatively slight modification, and appears in the adult in the form of sexual and other activities; the purely mental processes that most markedly shew the characteristics of the primary type are those of the phantasy, such as reveries and dreams. Between these two extremes lie all possible gradations in the extent to which the transformation is effected, neurotic symptoms being an example of imperfect and unsatisfactory transformation. There is also a considerable variation from one time to another. When, for instance, the demands of reality are severe, when life is hard p. 5 to bear, there is a tendency for the person’s mental activities to revert to the primary type, with all the serious consequences of this. Indeed, the strain of approximating to the level of the reality-principle (actually this is seldom attained) is much greater than we have any idea of. The tendency to revert to a simpler level asserts itself not only in times of difficulty, of illness, of fatigue, but periodically almost every day, for this is probably the true meaning of sleep, that regular withdrawal from the world of external reality.

Now, not only does the individual immediately concerned display a resistance against the tracing out of the roots of various transformed activities, but any of the conclusions reached by so doing necessarily offend both the æsthetic and the rational senses in general, so that they are unacceptable to the world at large—the æsthetic (using the word in its widest sense) because the discovery of the hidden root can only refer to one that is hidden on account of its unpleasantness, the rational because the inhibiting forces have erected barriers against the illogical and symbolic mode of thought that characterises unconscious mental processes. When, therefore, critics decry Freud’s conclusions as unæsthetic and illogical—one critic neatly embodied his opposition in the remark that the conclusions are ‘contrary to both good taste and common sense ’—they are displaying a perfectly intelligible reaction, although they defensively ascribe to his ratiocination the presence of attributes that properly belong to those phenomena the existence of which they are striving not to recognise. On both grounds an instinctive aversion is necessarily felt from the translation of any surface activity into more primary terms, and this expresses itself in a whole series of denials, incredulities, pretexts, rationalisations, and so on. Against this current of prejudice it is the duty of the sceptical investigator to maintain a purely critical attitude, and to endeavour to overcome the influence of both internal and external bias in his efforts to reach objective conclusions. On the medical profession the responsibility in this question is especially weighty, because of the immediate practical importance that the new knowledge has for the field of curative psychological medicine: to the race it may be a small matter whether a series of new discoveries is made in one century or the next; to the suffering individual it is often of vital importance. Very few have any conception, for instance, what an appalling p. 6 mass of misery could have been obviated in this country alone had the care of ‘ shell shock ’ and other cases of war neurosis been in the hands of physicians with some knowledge of psycho-analysis.

To those who have studied the various aspects of the psycho-analytical theory, only some of which are presented in this book, the relation it bears to the theory of organic evolution becomes very striking. Freud’s recent demonstration of the truth—long suspected, but now proved in a far deeper sense than had been anticipated—that ontogeny epitomises phylogeny in the mental sphere just as definitely as in the physical, would alone be of remarkable interest in this connection. He has shewn that the conflict between the primary and secondary systems of mental activity—a conflict on which not merely the growth, but the very existence of civilisation depends—recapitulates on a modified scale in the individual the history of its course in the race, producing strikingly similar manifestations in the two cases. In general, Freud’s thorough-going application of the principle of determinism in the mental sphere, his shifting of the emphasis in psychology away from the intellectual to the instinctive, and his derivation of the higher and more complex mental activities from lowlier forms more nearly akin to those present in other animals than man, represent a momentous progress in scientific thought; for the reduction of the mental to psycho-biological terms—instead of the ignoring of it, which the cruder forms of the materialist doctrine current in science are tantamount to—seems the only satisfactory way of bringing psychology into line with the organic sciences, and of establishing, for instance, a harmonious relationship between it and physiology. Hardly any serious endeavour has hitherto been made to fertilise psychology with the ideas of organic evolution, and half a century had to pass before the advent of a Darwin of the mind; now, thanks to Freud, we have for the first time a purely naturalistic theory of mental evolution, one free from any admixture of metaphysical, ethical, or supernatural mysticism.

The great criterion of the importance of a scientific generalisation is its fertility. The true significance of the theory of organic evolution was appreciated only when its fructifying power became apparent in the fields of embryology, paleontology, and comparative morphology, as well as in that of biology proper. In like manner the psycho-analytical theory p. 7 has at the same time received extensive confirmation from, and supplied fruitful stimuli to, the mental sciences cognate with psychology—anthropology, philology, folk-lore, mythology, criminology, jurisprudence, and sociology. With both, the sap of new thought penetrating along the parent stem—in the one case of biology, in the other of psychology—has flowed through to all the branches that arise from it.

Original footnotes

  1. Davenport’s remarks in this connection, made seventy years ago, could be paralleled by numerous similar quotations from other observers: ‘It is the fate of all useful discoveries and improvements to meet with bigoted or interested opposition from those who would willingly remain in the beaten path of habit, rather than acknowledge any change to be profitable. That most important discovery of the circulation of the blood, by Harvey, was at first furiously opposed, and was proved, according to the laws of dynamics, to be both impossible and absurd; yet when it was vain to dispute the fact, it was undervalued, as one almost known long before.’ One has only to think, amidst a cloud of others, of the names of Elliotson, Darwin, Lister, in our profession in England alone. ↩

  2. For a description of these see Chapter VI., and for their genetic aspects Chapter XXXVI. ↩

About this reading edition

Transcribed from Jones’s 1920 London reprint of the revised and enlarged edition. Original spelling, punctuation, footnotes, and printed page positions are retained; clear scanning errors and line-wrap hyphenation have been corrected. Page markers link to stable places in this chapter.

Jones, E. (1920). Introduction. In Papers on psycho-analysis (Rev. & enl. ed., reprint, pp. 1–7). Baillière, Tindall and Cox.