History of Psychoanalysis

Papers on Psycho-Analysis · Part I: General papers

Freud’s Psychology

Ernest JonesChapter III of XLPrinted pages 16–39About 51 min

A survey of Freud’s emerging psychology, its methods, concepts, and applications as Jones understood them in 1910.

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Chapter III

p. 16 notes The difficulties inherent in the subject of an essay are frequently mentioned in the introductory sentences by way of excuse for the deficiencies of the exposition. In the present case they are of so peculiar a nature that to mention them here will also serve another purpose—namely, to indicate some of the general aspects of the subject.

The first difficulty—one that necessarily occurs in presenting the views of any progressive thinker—resides in the fact that Freud’s views have in the past twenty years undergone a continuous evolution. Most writers who have expounded them (Jung, Baroncini, Schultz, etc.) have therefore elected to describe them in terms of their historical development, a course which, while lending greater accuracy, has obvious disadvantages, particularly for readers not familiar with the subject. As, however, the later modifications in Freud’s views have mainly concerned clinical subjects, such as the zetiology of hysteria and the technique of the psycho-analytic method, with which we are not now concerned, it will here be p. 17 notes _ possible to choose the alternative course of attempting to give a more general review of his psychology as a whole.

The second and far weightier difficulty is that Freud’s psychology signifies a great deal more than the formulation of a series of new conclusions or the announcement of new discoveries, important as these may be; it involves a radical change in our attitude towards the questions of the structure and functioning of the mind. If, therefore, Freud’s views are substantiated by later investigations, they betoken an event of peculiar and far-reaching significance to psychology in general. It is notoriously harder to convey a new attitude or point of view than mere conclusions, or even facts; and yet in regard to our judgement it is a more important matter, for a given conclusion that may appear improbable enough from one point of view is seen in quite a different aspect from another. A corollary of this consideration is that Freud has not only dealt with previously discussed questions—e.g., dream interpretation and the psychology of wit—but has explained what previously had hardly been thought to be problems at all—e.g., the cause of infantile amnesia, the meaning of various absent-minded and other acts in everyday life, etc.

The third difficulty—one really implicit in the last—is that the applications of Freud’s psychology are exceedingly diverse, so that the range of subjects included is very extensive. He has, for instance, offered explanations for problems so remote from one another as the origin of myths, the choice of a profession, the sources of artistic creativeness, and the tendency to superstitious beliefs. Of only a few of the subjects, however, has he given any complete or systematic exposition, and the extent to which his principles can be applied refers more to deductions, usually fairly obvious, that follow from these. His expositions are thronged with suggestive hints—of which some are more, some less developed—that are at present being acted on and expanded by both himself and the members of his school. Again, the way in which these different subjects are intimately bound up with one another makes it~ very difficult to present some without the others. Much of the cogency of Freud’s arguments is derived from the astonishing confirmation and mutual support that the application of them receives from widely different fields of study, such as psycho-pathology, dreams, wit, mythology, and everyday life. Just as the true significance of Darwin’s suggestions became evident p. 18 notes only when their fruitfulness was realised in such different fields as paleontology, comparative morphology, and embryology, so do Freud’s hypotheses become irresistibly convincing when one appreciates their capacity to illuminate spheres of human activity that at first sight appear to be remote and unconnected. This third difficulty, the extensiveness of Freud’s principles, is one reason why the present exposition can be nothing but the roughest and crudest sketch of the subject indicated in the title of this paper.

Freud is primarily a man of science, rather than a philosopher. In philosophy he might perhaps most nearly be classified as accepting scientific sensationalistic idealism, as represented by Karl Pearson. This is well illustrated by his attitude to such a question as the psychophysical relations of consciousness, or of mental processes in general. He uses the term ‘conscious’ to denote all the mental processes of which a person is aware, distinctly or indistinctly, at a given moment. Not sharply marked off from these are the preconscious (vorbewusste) memories, of which a person is not at a given moment necessarily aware, but which can be fairly readily and spontaneously recalled. Unconscious memories are those that cannot be spontaneously recalled by the subject, but which can be evoked by the use of special methods (hypnosis, psycho-analysis, etc.) As we shall presently see, Freud holds that processes of the most complex kind may occur without ever becoming conscious. He is content with this practical finding, and leaves quite open the question as to whether they are ultimately of a mental or physical nature. Referring, for instance, to the unconscious occurrence of dissociation ° between an idea and its accompanying affect, he says: ‘Vielleicht ware es richtiger zu sagen: Dies sind itiberhaupt nicht Vorgange psychischer Natur, sondern physische Vorgange, deren psychische Folge sich so darstellt, als ware das durch die Redensarten: Trennung der Vorstellung von ihrem Affekt... Ausgedriickte wirklich geschehen.’ [‘It might perhaps be more correct to say: These processes are not of a psychical nature at all, but are physical processes, the p. 19 psychical consequences of which are so represented as if what is expressed in the phrase “separation of the idea from its affect ’’ had really occurred.’] Leaving, however, the philosophical aspects of the subject, he empirically accepts the obvious fact that it is impossible to describe the processes in question except in mental terms, and so continues to treat of them as if they were mental. Another justification for this he sees in the continuity that experience establishes between conscious and unconscious processes, which may be related to each other in every respect except in the one matter of awareness; the resemblances between them thus far outweigh in importance the differences.

It will be convenient shortly to consider some of Freud’s more general and fundamental principles before mentioning their applications. Of these the following seven will be selected, admittedly an arbitrary choice:

1. In the first place, Freud attributes to psychical events a rigorous determinism, the word being used in its scientific rather than in its philosophic sense. Psychical processes are never isolated or accidental phenomena, but are as precisely related to preceding ones as are successive physical events; there is no more room for ‘chance’ in the mental world than in the physical one. Freud is therefore never content with such explanations as would attribute various actions to ‘ habit,’

‘ absent-mindedness,’ and the like, but always searches for the motive force itself. As will presently be indicated, there are certain inhibitions that tend to prevent one from asking too ‘many questions about the concealed motives for conduct, and thus lead us to be satisfied with the more superficial factors or even with mere phrases, such as those just quoted; the result of this is that many of the answers and explanations given by Freud are apt at first sight to appear superfluous, if not even far-fetched.

Starting from this point of view he develops his psycho-analytic method, on which are based practically all his conclusions. He maintains that, when a subject is asked to make free associations from a given theme to which he 1s attending, and wholly to suspend the active selective criticism that under such circumstances is instinctively exercised towards the incoming thoughts, the associations must be directly or indirectly related, in a causative manner, to the initial theme. The connection between this and the associations that occur p. 20 are often not at all realised by the subject; for this, however, there are special and definite reasons that will presently be indicated. Discussion of the psychological principles involved in the use of psycho-analysis, as well as of other allied topics, must be reserved for a further paper.

2. Freud’s views concerning affective processes shew certain important deviations from those currently accepted. He tentatively states as a working hypothesis that ‘there is to be distinguished in psychical functions something (amount of affect, sum of excitations) which has all the attributes of a quantity—although we have as yet no means of measuring it —something capable of being increased, diminished, displaced, or carried off, and which spreads itself over the memory traces of ideas, rather like an electric charge over the surface of the body.’ The two words in brackets (Affektbetrag, Erregungssumme) indicate that the property in question can be described in either psychological or physiological terms. Indeed, he regards it as something essentially centrifugal in nature, in that it constantly tends to discharge its psycho-motor energy —characteristically by means of bodily expression—in a manner analogous to motor and secretory processes. Most significant, however, is the assumption that it has a certain autonomy, so that it can become released from the idea to which it was primarily attached, thus entering into new psychical systems and producing wide-reaching effects. This movement of affect from one idea to another Freud denotes as ‘ displacement’ (Verschiebung), and says that the second idea may in a sense be termed a representative of the first. A simple illustration of the process is when a girl transfers the affective process properly belonging to the idea of a baby to that of a doll, and washes, clothes, fondles, and cares for the doll, and even takes it to bed with her or makes attempts to feed it, thus treating it im all possible respects as she would a baby. An equally familiar observation is the behaviour of a spinster towards a pet animal. In Browning’s ‘ The Last Ride Together,’ the same mechanism is beautifully seen: the hero, failing in his ambition to win his mistress, consoles himself with the enjoyment of their last ride, and gradually exalts the significance of this until in a final ecstasy he imagines not only that it is an adequate replacement of his former aim, but that. it represents the highest bliss that can. be attained on earth or in heaven.

p. 21 notes 3. Connected with his views on affective processes is the emphasis Freud lays on the dynamic nature of mental processes in general. This is best described in terms of the scheme by means of which he depicts the structure of the mind.! This scheme he proposes in the most tentative way as merely a working hypothesis, expressly disclaiming any likelihood of mistaking the scaffolding of a theory for the building that will later be erected. Taking the analogy of a microscope or telescope, the theory of which makes use of ideal localities in space, he develops the notion of psychical locality. The mind is a complex reflex apparatus or system, with a seat of entry at one extremity and of discharge at the other; the former is of course the sensorial extremity, the latter the motor. Every mental process tends to set up a movement from one end of the apparatus to the other. To begin with is the perception in its sensorial form; this is not fixed as such, but farther on in the system in the form of a ‘memory trace. The farther forward the process moves, the greater is the extent to which it becomes associated with others; at first the association is of a superficial kind (clang, etc.), later on it is of a higher order (similarity, co-ordination, etc.). A mental process is recalled not in its primary perceptive form, but as a ‘memory trace.’ Accompanying every mental process is a varying amount of psychical energy, which roughly corresponds with what we term the affect. Excessive accumulation of this energy results in a tension that is experienced as discomfort (Unlust), and there is a constant tendency towards the discharge of this energy (Abfihr). The discharge is experienced as pleasure, as relief, or gratification (Befriedigungserlebnis).

The way in which the relief is brought about differs in complexity in the young child and older persons. The infant finds by experience that satisfaction of a given need—e.g., hunger—is associated with a certain perception—e.g., the sight of food. The recurrence of this need therefore brings with it the desire to reproduce the perception associated with satisfaction of it. It is probable that at first this may occur by ‘ regression’ of mental processes so that a hallucinatory perception is produced. Experience, however, soon teaches that this method is inadequate permanently to still the need, and that in their capacity in this respect there is an important difference p. 22 between perceptions externally evoked and those internally evoked. Internal perceptions are adequate only when they are durable, as in the hallucinations of the psychoses. The psychical energy corresponding with the need therefore sets in action further groups of mental processes, the function of which is to modify the environment in such a way as to bring about an externally evoked perception of the kind desired; for instance, the child cries until it is fed. The regressive tendency to reproduce the primary perception by internal means Freud terms the primary process (Primdrvorgang). The secondary process, which inhibits this tendency and directs the energy into more complex paths, is the work of a second and quite different psychical system. All the complicated thought processes that occur, from the memory picture to the psycho-motor mechanisms that result in changing the environment so as to bring about the repetition of the desired perception, constitute merely a détour, which experience has shewn is necessary in order to produce the wish-fulfilment. These two systems, which are already present at an early age, form the nucleus for what later becomes the unconscious and preconscious respectively.; 4. The subject of ‘psychical repression’ (Verdrangung), which plays such an important part in all Freud’s writings, may be considered as a direct continuation of the previously mentioned one concerning the relation between the primary and secondary systems, though it is less hypothetical in nature. The fundamental regulating mechanisms of mental processes are the tendencies to seek pleasure by bringing about relief from psychical tension, and to avoid pain by preventing accumulation of psychical energy. These strivings, which have a more or less definite aim, constitute a Wish in the broad sense of the term. When, now, this wish cannot for various reasons be gratified, the tendency of the psychical energy to discharge itself is inhibited, a local damming up takes place, and the mental process in question loses its former power of making free associations. It in this way forms a circumscribed ‘complex,’ to use Jung’s term. Under these circumstances the secondary system cannot make use of the energy of that portion of the primary system, for to do so would only result in the evocation of discomfort (Umnlust) and it is a chief function of the secondary system to avoid this whenever possible. We have here, then, all the conditions p. 23 for an intrapsychical conflict, and Freud maintains that, when a mental process is the, seat of a competition of opposing affects, blocking (Sperrung) of the usual associative activities occurs and the mental process becomes shut off or dissociated. This ostrich-like function of the secondary system therefore results in exclusion of the pain-producing mental process from consciousness. In daily life this mechanism is extraordinarily frequent and shews itself in many ways, the simplest of which is the disinclination for being reminded of disagreeable occurrences we would rather forget. There are many motives for this disinclination, the painfulness of an external situation being the least important; more important are such mental attitudes as shame, disgust, horror, at the possibility of various internal thoughts and wishes. Emphasis should further be laid on the point, often not sufficiently appreciated, that the action of ‘repression’ in preventing mental processes from ever entering consciousness is much more important and extensive than that of merely driving out from consciousness those that have once been present there.

‘ Normal’ and ‘ abnormal’ conscious mental events differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively, both proceeding by the same mechanisms of the same psychical apparatus. In both cases the energy of the unconscious mental process (1.e., the Wish) is directed into the complex conscious paths according to the principle of.pleasure and pain, the chief difference between the two being that the discharge of energy in*the ‘abnormal’ case takes place by a more circuitous and unusual route than in the ‘normal’ case. In both cases consciousness exerts a ‘censor’ influence over the dynamic process, allowing it to find expression only in certain definite ways. The characteristic function of consciousness is the exercise of this selective censor influence. Consciousness may be compared with a sense organ, in that it allows the perception and differentiation of psychical qualities. Its action differs from that of a sense organ in that it is concerned with the perception not only of externally produced stimuli, but also of internal psychical processes. It is probable that between preconscious and conscious processes a censor action is also interposed, of the same kind as that between unconscious and preconscious processes.

- §. The manifestation of abnormally repressed mental processes is to be understood only by consideration of the action p. 24 notes of intrapsychical conflict. As has already been said, conflict between two tendencies or wishes results in a blocking and dissociation of the mental process concerned. The direct route into consciousness is impeded and the energy passes into a circuitous side-path. The direction thus taken is, however, rigorously determined by preceding psychological | and physiological factors. The energy may become linked elther with other mental processes or with physical ones. In the first case, the affect accompanying a given idea, which, being dissociated, is incapable of becoming conscious (bewusstseinsunfahig), becomes transferred to another one which is assimilable in consciousness (the process known as Uebertragung). ‘This is the typical mechanism underlying the production of obsessions and most phobias. An insistent impulse to think of a non-permitted subject shews itself by an obsessive thought about another, associated, but more acceptable one. The passage from the one idea to the other occurs through one of the well-known forms of mental association, usually a lower form, such as extrinsic, and particularly clang associations. Brillt narrates an instance in which a patient, possessed with licentious impulse relating to a dog, suffered from an apparently innocent obsessive thought concerning God.

In the second case the energy finds an outlet in some somatic manifestation, a process Freud terms ‘ conversion.’ This is the characteristic mechanism underlying hysterical troubles, where a given bodily symptom, such as a tremor or an aphonia, is the expression of a repressed mental complex. Here also, as in the purely mental field, the actual direction taken by the discharging energy is determined by the existence of performed associations, such as the usual physical accompaniments of emotion, and the occurrence is favoured by an unusual degree of readiness of the physical response (somatisches Entigegenkommen).

In both cases the formation of the unusual associations, which permit the circuitous discharge of psychical energy, takes place outside consciousness, and the subject quite fails to apprehend the significance of the end manifestation, or the connection between it and the primary mental process. Yet: the mental events that precede the manifestation may be of the most complex order, fully as much so as conscious ones.

p. 25 notes 6. Stress should be laid on the importance Freud attaches to infantile mental processes. He regards the mental processes, and particularly the wishes, of early childhood life as the permanent basis for all later development. Unconscious mental life is indestructible, and the intensity of its wishes does not fade. Wishes and interests of later acquirement are chiefly significant in so far as they ally themselves with those of childhood life, though the association is, of course, not a conscious one. A great number of the reactions of adult life owe their real force to the adjuvant impulse contributed by the unconscious. Freud, therefore, looks upon the whole of a subject’s mental life as a continuity, as a series of associated trends. The appearance of complete discontinuity which it so often presents is an illusion, due to the ignorance of the preceding unconscious influences. For instance, a person may at the age of twenty have his attention for the first time directed in a given line of interest, and may in consequence of this choose a profession and determine his life’s career; but the real reason why he reacts in this way to the external influence is that it corresponds with, and becomes associated to, deeper unconscious trends that arose in early childhood life. These views naturally have great importance in their bearing on education, for it is substantially maintained that the main traits of character are permanently determined for good or ill before the end of the fifth year of life. Freud holds in general that owing to our ignorance of the most important mental processes of early childhood, and our own personal amnesia for this period, the significance for later life of these early trends is vastly underestimated.

The amnesia for early mental processes is even greater than is generally supposed, for not only is much actually forgotten, but a selection takes place of such a kind that only the least significant part is remembered. Thus the actual memory for this period is even less valuable than it appears. Further than this, our childhood memories are also less trustworthy than they appear, for later falsifications, distortions, and inventions, arising particularly in the conscious and unconscious phantasies of puberty, impair the reliability of them to a much greater extent than is generally known; it should, however, be added that the technique of psycho-analysis usually enables one to differentiate between an accurate recollection p. 26 and a falsified one. This infantile amnesia is, according to Freud, not a natural, physiological process, needing no explanation. He considers that, were it not for our extreme familiarity with its happening, we should regard it as by no means so obvious and comprehensible as we at present do. For him it is a curious problem which calls as urgently for solution as that of other less familiar mental events. The cause of the amnesia he sees in the psychical repression that plays so large a part in early education. Children come to the world with potential trends and desires which are innocent enough at an early age, but which are of such a kind that the gratification of them is highly unacceptable to adult standards. Early training largely consists in weaning the child from these desires and directing his mind towards other interests; the chief of these processes Freud terms ‘ sublimation.’ The primitive trends themselves, such as egotistic enjoyment without regard for others, concern with certain bodily functions, and so on, have to be suppressed, and the mental processes representing them are repressed and become unconscious. This, however, is not effected without a certain cost to the individual, and amongst other penalties paid is the amnesia for infantile mental life. Asin other cases, such as, for instance, with hysteric post-traumatic retrograde amnesia, the memories lost are not only those that directly concern the thoughts and wishes now invested with painful and guilty feeling, but also those that are in any way—e.g., in time—associated with these. Further, as was above pointed out, although the desires in question have been repressed into the unconscious, they lose none of their dynamic functions, and, when the sublimation process is not sufficiently potent to provide an outlet for the accompanying psychical energy, other paths of discharge have to be forged, of a kind that for practical reasons are called ‘pathogenic.’ It is in this way that psychoneurotic symptoms arise, which thus represent in a disguised form the gratification of repressed wishes. One of the chief differences between the indirect expression of an unconscious wish by means of a neurotic symptom and that by means of a sublimated activity is that the latter is useful for social aims, whereas the former is harmful both socially and to the individual.

7. The part of Freud’s psychology that has aroused most opposition is his attitude regarding the significance of psychosexual trends. We are not here concerned with the nature of p. 27 this opposition, which arises partly from a misconception of Freud’s own views, and partly as a result of the peculiarly heavy social ban that is laid on certain aspects of the subject. It should in the first place be stated that he applies the term

‘ sexual ’ far more broadly than is customary, and thus includes under it functions that are not generally considered to be of a sexual nature. He does this, however, not in order to distort the usual connotation of the term, but because he finds by experience that many psychical manifestations not commonly thought to be derivatives of the sexual instinct are inffact so. He thus extends, not the connotation of the word

‘ sexual,’ but the conceptions denoted by it. His conception of the zdea ‘ sexuality ’ is certainly much wider than the general one, but it is not accurate to say that his use of the word is very different from the current usage. This important matter, the source of much misunderstanding of Freud’s views, must be dealt with at some little length, and it may be made plainer by the following illustration. It is taken from a criticism in which the passage occurs ‘ Contrary to ordinary usage, Freud speaks of a sexual impulse in childhood,’ implying that Freud’s departure consists merely in a novel and unjustifiable use of the word. But the departure is, in fact, more than a matter of words, it is a matter of things, of processes, of ideas; the heresy is not one that can be remedied by a dictionary. Freud says in effect: ‘Processes which I, in full agreement with the rest of the world, call sexual do actually occur in childhood life, though in the past the existence of them has, for certain definite reasons, been largely overlooked or misinterpreted.’ The point can be made clearer still by the following analogy, which in several respects is a fairly close one. Some time after the discovery of nitrogen, in the atmosphere, it was found that it also existed, in combination with other elements, in solid substances. When this finding was announced, critics might very well have said to the investigator: ‘ You are distorting scientific language, and are using the word ‘‘ nitrogen ”’ in a novel and unjustifiably wide sense by applying it to solid substances which are evidently not nitrogen; allow us to inform you that the word denotes, by common acceptation, a gas, which is to be found in the atmosphere.’ To which the investigator would have been right in replying: ‘ I was acquainted with the meaning of the word when I began my researches, but these have convinced me that the element which both you and I are agreed to call p. 28 notes nitrogen may exist not only in its easily observable gaseous form, but also, in certain circumstances, in other forms where its familiar attributes are not manifest, and where its very existence can be determined only by a careful chemical analysis.’ When Freud uses the term ‘ sexuality,’ he does so because it just expresses his meaning, and not from any desire to introduce any linguistic changes; whenever he uses a word in a special sense, such as in the case of Verdrdngung (‘ repression ’), he says so, and gives his reason for s. doing. In saying that the analysis of a neurotic symptom reveals as an invariable constituent the presence of a psychosexual process, the customary attributes of which are veiled through the interaction of other mental processes, Freud adopts a position identical with that of a chemist who says that analysis of saltpetre reveals the invariable presence of nitrogen. When he calls certain infantile processes ‘ sexual,’ he does so because he believes that they are intrinsically of the same nature as the processes that everyone calls sexual in the adult.

A little reflection makes it evident that, even if the term is by definition made to refer only to tendencies that have to do with the reproductive instinct, it is impossible to confine it to impulses that directly tend to bring about the reproductive act. For instance, no one with any experience of such a ‘perversion’ as fetishism would refuse to call this ‘sexual’ in the full meaning of the term, although from its very nature

it expresses a negation of the reproductive act; the same is true of ordinary masturbation. Even more normal manifestations, which anthropologists have shewn to be derivatives of the sexual instinct—such as shame, disgust, etc-—are by no means obviously tendencies that favour the consummation of this act, although it may be true that they are indirectly connected with reproduction. On precisely similar grounds Freud holds it justifiable to apply the term ‘sexual’? to mental processes which, like shame, derive their origin from the sexual instinct, and the only reason why his application p. 29 of the term is more extensive than that of other writers is that, by his psycho-analytic investigation of the unconscious, he has been able to trace to this origin a number of processes that at first sight do not appear to be connected with it. He has striven to free himself from the prejudice that refuses to recognise the sexual nature of a mental process until this is made so obvious as to be quite indisputable, and he points out how deeply rooted in the human mind is this prejudice.

These preliminary considerations may be thus summarised: Freud lays stress on the dynamic aspects of mental processes, and sees in the tendency of the affects to seek discharge of their tension the motive force determining the flow of mental life; he expresses this in terms of Wishes. He holds that unconscious mental life is rich and complex, and by the interaction between it and consciousness explains the apparent discontinuity of conscious processes, thus adopting a rigorously deterministic attitude towards intuitive and apparently spontaneous mental events. Much of this interaction depends on the result of conflicts between various psychical trends, some of these undergoing repression, so that they can be manifested only along indirect channels. He attributes fundamental importance to the repressed wishes of early childhood life and to the psychosexual systems of activities.

We may now shortly consider some of the fields in which Freud has applied the foregoing principles, and it will be convenient to begin with the subject last mentioned—namely, Sexuality. In the first place, Freud holds that the adult mental processes commonly called ‘ sexual,’ which bear a relatively precise relation to reproduction, are the outcome of a development from a broader group of processes in earlier life, of which certain ones have become selected and intensified, while others have become suppressed. In the child are a number of sexual dispositions, the functioning of which notably differs from that of adult sexual processes, and the later development of which is subject to the greatest variability. A clearer view of these early dispositions is obtained by considering the different kinds of adult sexual perversions. Freud draws a distinction between the sexual object, the source of attraction, and the sexual aim, the activity in which the impulse manifests itself; the difference between these is evident when one dissociates such an impulse as the masochistic one p. 30 notes —i.e., the desire to obtain enjoyment through experiencing submission or pain—from its objective, which may be either a male or a female person. Looked at from this point of view, perversions fall into two groups. On the one hand are those that shew a deviation from the normal objective, such as homosexuality. Freud thinks that this inversion of the normal objective can only be explained by assuming that man has a bisexual predisposition psychically as well as anatomically, and that the normal is reached by the heterosexual component being developed at the expense of the homosexual one. On the other hand are those that shew a deviation from the normal aim. ‘These may be divided into two sub-groups. First, there are aims that pass beyond the normal anatomical regions, such as when kissing attains a higher sexual value than actual intercourse. The tendency to overestimate the attractive value of anything belonging to the loved person—her hair, hand, glove, etc.—may be localised to a given part, such as the foot, and thus constitute a fetishism. Secondly, there are the aims that differ from the normal in that they represent a fixation of the sexual impulse on what should be only a preliminary stage in the whole process. Perverts of this kind may, for instance, obtain full sexual gratification from a morbid fascination of merely looking at a member of the opposite sex under certain circumstances, and have no desire to do more than this.

Freud finds that the potentialities of all forms of perversion already exist in the child, which he therefore terms polymorph pervers. Under the pressure of educative influences, however, they normally become suppressed, and the psychical energy accompanying the impulses is ‘sublimated’ into other directions of greater social value. The influences that are specially operative in this respect are as follows: The tendency to display one’s own person or to seek pleasure in regarding that of others is opposed by the development of personal modesty and shame. The tendency to obtain enjoyment from various manipulations of and interest in excremental functions! is opposed by the development of disgust; and the finding of pleasure in acts that are painful to oneself or to others— masochism and sadism—is suppressed by the cultivation of p. 31 sympathy with others, with sensitiveness to and horror of suffering. Two other possibilities, however, are open, besides the normal one of sublimation. First, the tendency itself may acquire abnormal strength and may manifest itself in later life as an actual perversion, as indicated above. Secondly, when the conflict between the impulse and the repressing force is especially strong the impulse may find expression in the production of a psychoneurotic symptom, which, therefore, is a disguised form of gratification of the perverse impulse. Hysterical symptoms thus constitute the negative of perversions. These three outcomes are naturally not sharply marked off from one another. One and the same man may shew the results of sublimation of a given tendency, which may, for instance, be revealed in the form adopted by an artistic creation, at a time when he is suffering from both a perversion and a psychoneurosis. A correlative of the sublimation process is the development of abnormal traits of character, which have little or no social value; the morbid tendency of some ‘ Puritans’ to be shocked at the slightest pretext belongs to this group, and is to be regarded as an excessive reaction formation.

The psychosexual life of children differs from that of adults in three main characteristics—in the different nature of the pleasure experienced, in their relative independence of outside persons for this (auto-erotism), and in the fact that they obtain pleasure from much more manifold sources and yet in much less differentiated ways than do adults. At puberty important changes take place in all these respects. The excitations, mechanical and other, that gave satisfaction to the child’s desires, now come to contain a disagreeable component (Unlust) due to the feeling of tension experienced. They thus constitute merely a ‘ fore-pleasure’ (Vorlust), which impels to further activities destined to produce the

‘ end-pleasure ’’ (Endlust) that relief of tension brings about. The sexual objective, a member of the opposite sex, now wins greater definition and significance. Lastly, the sources of excitation become more localised, particularly anatomically; this is brought about by repression of the more accessory pleasures in the way indicated above. The greater proneness of women to suffer from psychoneuroses is explained by two characters that their sexual development shews in contrast with that of men. In the first place, the sexual activities of p. 32 notes children pertain rather to the masculine type, so that at the time of puberty the augmentation of repression that then takes place has in the woman more to accomplish in suppressing the homosexual component than it has with men. In the second place, a shifting of the primary erotogenic! zone takes place with them, from the clitoris to the vagina, whereas this does not occur with men. The changes at puberty being thus more complex in the case of women, the possibilities of erroneous development are much greater.

The sexual thoughts of children are much more extensive and important than is generally believed. Usually in the third and fourth years of life questions begin to occur to them, the parents’ answers to which are less satisfying and less often believed by them than is commonly thought. At this time, and shortly after, they begin to withdraw from their parents, and in their own world weave explanations and theories that are more satisfactory to them. These theories frequently contain more of the truth than might be imagined, and are of great significance in later life. Coincidently with the repression mentioned above there occurs repression of, and subsequent amnesia for, these early thoughts. A period of greater or less latency follows, usually from the fifth to the tenth years, when the process of sublimation is at its highest activity. Most adult memories for sexual thoughts seem to have begun in the latter part of this period, the earlier ones having been quite forgotten. In the earlier period sexual phantasies relating to the parents or other members of the family are very frequent, and often determine important reactions and choices in later p. 33 of highly significant underlying psychical processes. He contrasts the ‘ manifest content,’ which is the dream as directly related, with the ‘ latent content,’ which is the group of thoughts reached by psycho-analysis of the dream. In the young child the manifest and latent contents are identical, and the dream plainly represents the imaginary fulfilment of an ungratified wish; the egocentric nature of the wish is equally evident. Freud maintains that every dream repre- © sents the fulfilment of an egocentric wish, and that the chief difference between the dreams of adults and those of young children is that in the former case the wish is a repressed one, the presentation of which is disguised so much as to make it unrecognisable until it has been submitted to psycho-analysis.

The mechanisms by means of which is brought about the distortion between the latent and the manifest content are quite precise. The thoughts of the latent content are un-conscious, being repressed by the censor of. consciousness. In the waking state they cannot penetrate to consciousness, but during sleep, when the activity of the censor is relaxed, they can do so, provided, however, they are distorted so that their true meaning is not recognised. The formation of the dream, or dream-making, is purely concerned with translating the latent thoughts into the distorted shape of the manifest content; it performs no intellectual work whatever. Apparently intellectual processes in dreams have been taken bodily from the latent content. The extent to which a given dream is incomprehensible, illogical, confused, and contradictory, exactly depends on the degree of distortion that has taken place, and is proportional to the amount of resistance offered by the subject to disclosing the underlying thoughts.

The four mechanisms of the dream-making are:

1. Condensation —Every element in the manifest content represents the fusion of several in the latent thoughts, and vice versa. The latent content is condensed to a tenth or a twentieth of its original extent. The condensation is shewn in several ways. For instance, a figure in a dream may be constituted by the fusion of the memories of several different actual persons, either by fusing some traits of one with others of another, or by making prominent the traits common to different persons and neglecting the ones not common to them. The same process frequently affects names, so that neologisms may be formed exactly analogous to those found in the psychoses.

p. 34 2. Displacemeni.—The psychical intensity of a given element in the manifest content shews no correspondence with that of the associated elements in the latent content; an element that stands in the foreground of interest in the former may represent the least significant of the latent thoughts, and an apparently unessential feature in the dream may represent the very core of the dream thoughts. Further, the most prominent affect in the dream frequently accompanies elements that represent the least important of the latent thoughts, and vice versa.; 3. Dramatisation—The manifest content depicts a situation or action, a fact which exercises a selecting influence on the mental processes to be presented. Logical relations between the latent thoughts are as such not represented, but they may be indicated by means of certain special devices. Thus, similarity may be represented by identification, causal relationship by making the one representing group of elements follow on the other, as in the gradual transformation of one scene into another, opposition and contradiction by inverting the two corresponding elements of the already formed dream, and so on. The characteristic that most dreams shew of presenting the manifest content predominantly in a visual form Freud terms ‘ regression,’ and explains it by a very interesting theory in which he also discusses the production of psychotic hallucinations.

4. Secondary Elaboration.—tThis is the product of consciousness, and is brought about by the alteration undergone by the dream processes during their apprehension in consciousness. To it is due. whatever degree of ordering and consistency there may be found in a dream. It particularly affects parts of the dream that have been insufficiently distorted during the dream-making; its action continues after waking, so that the memory of a dream becomes more altered the greater is the period that has elapsed since it was experienced.

The affect in the manifest content is invariably less intense than that in the latent content; this inhibition is due partly to the tendency to psychical regression during sleep, and partly to the suppressing effect of the censor. The affect is, as was mentioned above, displaced in the manifest content, but the apparent incongruity in its occurrence and association is solely due to this displacement; in the dream thoughts it is quite congruous and logically justified. The affect itself p. 35 undergoes no distortion in the dream-making, as does the conceptual content, so that it is of the same nature in the manifest as in the latent content. The forgetting of dreams is, like the distortion of the latent content, a manifestation of the activity of the censor. The most important part is first forgotten, and often is recalled only during the analysis.

The sources and material from which dreams are composed differ as regards the manifest and latent contents. In every dream appears some incident of the preceding day. Indifferent incidents—1.e., those of little interest to the subject—frequently appear. These may be of the preceding day, or of older date; in every case they have obtained psychical significance by becoming, on the day of their occurrence, associated with significant experiences or memories. Somatic stimuli— é.g., palin—may sometimes provide material. These, however, are treated like other psychical material, and are woven into the dream under the same conditions; under no circumstances can they alone account for a dream, except in the sense of occasionally being an instigation. » Hypermnesia for previously forgotten infantile events is sometimes seen in the manifest content, and much more frequently in the latent content. The groundwork of every dream is of infantile origin. A recent or conscious wish is inadequate to cause a dream unless it is associated with a repressed, unconscious one; this latter is always the real cause, and the superficial one is merely the ‘instigator.’ The latent thoughts are always of high personal significance to the subject, and are in direct continuity with the rest of his mental life. Dream analysis is the most valuable means at our disposal for penetrating into the unconscious.

The function of a dream is to protect sleep by stilling the activity of unconscious mental processes that otherwise would disturb it. When, however, the activity of the endopsychic censor, which is diminished during sleep, is insufficient to keep from consciousness the latent thoughts, or to compel such distortion of them as to render them unrecognisable, recourse has to be had to the accession of energy that the censor can exert in the waking state, and the sleeper awakes, usually in terror.

In his book on Wit Freud has given a valuable contribution to the psychology of this subject and to that of humour; it is extraordinarily rich in new psychological points of view: The pleasure-bringing effect of wit depends partly on the p. 36 technique and partly on the tendencies of this. Freud has analysed in great detail the various classes of witty jokes, and finds that the technique of their production shews the closest resemblance to that employed in dreams: different forms of condensation, displacement, indirect presentation, reversal into the opposite, failures in thought, production of neologisms, fusion into a unity, etc. According to their aim he divides witty jokes into harmless ones, the aim of which is purely to bring pleasure, and those that have a pronounced tendency; the latter are subdivided into four classes—the obscene, the aggressive or hostile, the cynical, and the sceptical respectively.

The pleasure of wit arises in an economy of psychical expenditure (Ersparung an psychischem Aufwande). Four stages in the development of wit may be distinguished. The psychogenesis of wit leads back to the play with words so characteristic of early childhood life. The suppression of this activity, brought about by the development of logical thought and the knowledge of intrinsic relations between the different conceptions represented by words, is under certain circumstances relaxed in later life, and so arises the simple joke (Scherz) in which enjoyment of the old play is again made possible. In the harmless witty jest (Witz) the abrogation of the suppressing criticism allows the expression of a given thought of some value; the difference between joking and wit lies solely in the value of the thought communicated in the latter process. Finally, in wit that has a pronounced tendency, a form that has a more complex mechanism, there is allowed to come to expression a thought that, owing to the force of repression, could not reach expression in a direct way. In the lastnamed form of wit a certain fore-pleasure (Vorlust) is obtained through the technique of the jest itself, but instead of this being all, as in the harmless jest, it serves to release further inhibitions, so that a deeper source of pleasure (Endlust) is reached.

Wit has a great deal in common with dreams beyond the fact of their both employing the same technical devices. A witty joke suddenly occurs to one; it is the product, not of the conscious mental processes, but of the unconscious. The source of the pleasure is also an unconscious one; in wit, strictly speaking, we do not know what we laugh at, and constantly deceive ourselves over the excellence of a joke and the value p. 37 notes of the conveyed thought according to the varying part played in the production of our pleasure, on the one hand by the technique of the joke, and on the other hand by its tendency. The most important difference between wit and dreams is that the latter represent an asocial process, the former a social one. Further, dreams serve to guard from pain, wit represents a search for pleasure. Freud makes a number of penetrating remarks on the significance of wit as a social process, its function, and the precise relations between the speaker and hearer, that cannot here be discussed.

Freud further extensively deals with the relation of wit to the comic. The production of the latter and the source of pleasure are, in contradistinction from those of wit, quite conscious. Of the kinds of processes described as comical, ingenuousness stands nearest to wit. It differs from this in being produced free from inhibiting influences and without the application of technical devices; the pleasure it gives is due to the sight of another setting himself without effort beyond the action of influences that would inhibit the onlooker. Comic processes proper arise from a comparison between our own person and that of the person at whom we laugh, especially when the latter shews an over-expenditure of physical output or a lack of mental. Humour is a defence against the painful or disagreeable; the energy that would otherwise have produced pain is transformed into a source of pleasure. For humour only one person is necessary, for comicality two, for wit three (the producer of the joke, the imaginary person against whom it 1s directed, and the person who listens to it).

With wit there is effected an economy of expenditure in inhibition, with comic in thought, with humour in feeling. All three transport us into a state of our childhood, ‘in which we did not know the comic, were not capable of wit, and did not need humour in order to make us feel happy in life.’

In another volume -Freud has developed a number of interesting and suggestive investigations into the Psycho-pathology of Everyday Life+ The principle underlying this work was his discovery that certain inefficiencies in our mental activities and certain apparently purposeless performances, both of which groups seem to have no psychical meaning, shew themselves on analysis to have been determined by un-conscious motives. These unconscious motives concern un- p. 38 acceptable processes that have been inadequately suppressed, and which come to expression by interfering with the accomplishment of conscious mental activities.

Of the first group may be mentioned the following: Certain acts of forgetting are due to a half-conscious desire to forget, an extension of our general tendency not to recall the disagreeable. The memory that cannot be recalled may itself be of a painful nature, or may be associated with another of this nature. Difficulty in recalling well-known proper names 1s particularly often to be explained in this way. The actual source of unpleasantness is usually by no means obvious, and often can be discovered only by a little psycho-analysis. It frequently happens during the effort to recall a given name that another one presents itself, sometimes in such a compelling way that it is hard to put it aside. Analysis then shews that the second name is a disguised replacement of the first, being

a compromise between the effort to recall the name searched for and the unconscious inhibiting impulse. This concealingmemory or ‘ cover-memory’ (Deckerinnerung), in which one memory appears as a cover for another associated one, may refer to whole episodes, particularly those of childhood life; it is one of the ways in which falsification of memory is brought about. Allied to these defects in recollection are certain mistakes in action (Vergreifen) in which the error principally consists in omission. Thus many misplacements of objects, with subsequent inability to find them again, apparently accidental destroying of objects, and so on, are determined by unconscious motives.

To the second group belong many instances of mistakes in speech (lapsus lingu@), in reading, in writing, and in apprehending what is said to one (Versprechen, Verlesen, Verschretben, Missverstehen). As in the former cases the mistake made is, like an hysterical symptom, a compromise between the conscious intention and the unconscious one. Such mistakes, particularly often slips of the tongue or pen, betray hidden thoughts or wishes against the person’s will. More complicated mistakes of the same nature are various symptomatic movements, general mistakes in knowledge, when the person knows well the actual fact that he has incorrectly described, and elaborately incorrect performances of simple tasks. With all these errors, as of the ones mentioned above, Freud has given the analysis of a great number of pretty and instructive examples, the study p. 39 notes of which is invaluable for practical psychology. He adds in this volume a chapter on the subject of superstition and its psychological significance, making many interesting contributions to the subject of false beliefs and the tendency to read significance into accidental coincidences. Many personal occurrences that seem to be chance are really determined by unconscious motives, and superstitions arise by the inner conviction of meaning in apparently chance events, which is projected by the individual on to external phenomena.

In conclusion, a few of the other fields to which Freud has applied his methods of investigation may be briefly mentioned. The problem of artistic creativeness, its nature and sources, has occupied him in an article and two books he has published on the subject... Explanations are given on the basis of the principles mentioned above, particularly that of the conscious working out of unconscious wishes of childhood origin that are striving for expression and gratification. Abraham, Rank, Riklin, and others, have published volumes developing in detail suggestions of Freud’s concerning the _ socio-psychological significance of myths, legends, and fairy-tales. These are the expression of perennial wishes, of the same kind as those operative in dreams and in the psychoneuroses; the mechanisms of repression and distortion, of the same nature as in those mental activities, are in them plainly to be traced, becoming more elaborate when the social censor gained in force and complexity as civilisation developed. In a more recent work he has dealt with the complex subject of religion from similar points of view, and has shewn how the fundamental longings of mankind that are fulfilled in the various religious beliefs and emotional states originate in intrapsychical conflicts that are among the oldest in us, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. Last, but not least, should be mentioned the brilliant application of Freud’s principles to the elucidation of the psychoses made by himself, Ferenczi, Abraham, Jung, and others. The perspectives opened by Freud’s investigations are thus seen to be as vast in their extent as they are momentous in their nature.

Notes from the 1920 edition

Original notes are grouped by printed page. The text was extracted from the historical scan; some characters and note markers may contain recognition errors.

Printed page 16 ↩

  1. 1 Published in the Psychological Bulletin, April, 1910, vol. vii. Most of Freud’s psychological writings are included in the following list, the two marked with an asterisk being in the present connection the most important:
  2. * Studien iber Hysterie’ (with Breuer), 1895. * ‘ Die Traumdeutung,’ Igoo.
  3. * Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens,’ 1901. ‘ Uber den Traum,’ rgot. * “Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie,’ 1905. ‘Der Witz und seine Beziehungen zum Unbewussten,’ 1905. ‘Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre,’ Erste Folge, 1906; Zweite Folge, 1909; Dritte Folge, 1913. ‘Der Wahn und die Traume in W. Jensen’s “ Gradiva,’’’ 1907. ‘ Uber Psychoanalyse,’ 1909. ‘ Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci,’ 1910. ‘Totem und Tabu,’ 1913. ‘ Vorlesungen zuriEinfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse,’ Erster Tiel, 1916; Zweiter Teil, 1917; Dritter Teil, 1918. (Only the dates of the first editions are given.) Further, a number of articles in the special psycho-analytical journals:? Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse; Imago; Zentralblatt fiv Psychoanalyse; Internationale Zeitschrift fir aratliche Psychoanalyse; Diskussionen des Wiener Psychoanalytischen Verewns.

Printed page 17 ↩

  1. | ~ 2

Printed page 18 ↩

  1. 1 It will be noticed that by definition these resemble Myers’ subliminal process, Prince’s co-conscious, and Janet’s subconscient. There exist, however, fundamental differences between Freud’s views on the subject and those of other writers; these have been discussed in a striking article by Hart in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, February-March, 1910.

Printed page 21 ↩

  1. 1 See Chapter XXXVI. for a fuller exposition of this.

Printed page 24 ↩

  1. 1 A. A. Brill, ‘ Freud’s Conception of the Psychoneuroses,’ Medicat Record, December 25, 1909.

Printed page 25 ↩

  1. 1 See Chapters XXXIV.-XXXVII.

Printed page 28 ↩

  1. 1 Freud uses the term Libido to indicate sexual desires and longings in all their aspects; this corresponds in its connotation with that possessed by the word ‘hunger’ in relation to the nutritional instinct. Obviously the word, for linguistic and other reasons, is hardly suitable in English. Dr. Putnam, in his recent luminous essay on Freud’s work (Journal of Abnoymal Psychology, vol. iv., Nos. 5 and 6), considers that the nearest English equivalent to it is ‘craving’; perhaps a more exact translation would be
  2. _ © sexual hunger,’ which is the one used throughout by the present writer.

Printed page 30 ↩

  1. 1 One such tendency, to which Freud has given the name ‘ anal erotism,” has been shewn to have an unexpected importance for general psychology, especially in regard to the development of character. Some illustrations of this are given in Chapters XXX., XXXI., and XL.

Printed page 32 ↩

  1. life.?
  2. The next great field that Freud has investigated is that of Dreams. I have elsewhere’ given an account of Freud’s work and conclusions on this subject, and so need here mention only the outstanding features of his theory. Dreams are generally thought to be a meaningless conglomeration of psychical processes evoked by chance somatic stimuli. Freud, on the contrary, finds that they are the disguised expression
  3. 1 In previous writings I have thoughtlessly used the word ‘ erogenous,’ which seems to be the generally accepted translation of the German ‘ erogene.’ A moment’s reflection, however, shews that the correct form is
  4. * erotogenic.’
  5. ? An account of Freud’s incest theory will be found in the American Journal of Psychology, January, 1910. 3 See Chapter VIII.

Printed page 37 ↩

  1. 1 See Chapter IV. for a fuller exposition of this.

Printed page 39 ↩

  1. i IT have indicated some of Freud’s views on this subject in an essay developing his explanation of the Hamlet mystery, published in the American Journal of Psychology, January, 1910.

About this reading edition

This page is an OCR-assisted transcription of Jones’s 1920 London reprint of the revised and enlarged edition. Paragraphs, section headings, original page locations, and page-grouped notes are presented for reading. The text has not yet received a complete line-by-line proofread against the scan, so occasional recognition errors may remain. Jones’s arguments are historical material, not current clinical guidance.

Jones, E. (1920). Freud’s Psychology. In Papers on psycho-analysis (Rev. & enl. ed., reprint, pp. 16–39). Baillière, Tindall and Cox.