p. 8 notes ONE of the most important results of Professor Freud’s researches, and one of the cardinal points of his psychological theory, has been the demonstration that a number of conscious mental processes owe their origin to causes unknown to and unsuspected by the individual. This applies equally to the mentally normal and abnormal, between whom, here as elsewhere, it is so arbitrary to draw a distinction. In my opinion this apparently simple idea is one of the most far-reaching significance both to psychology and to the sciences, such as sociology, that must be founded on psychology. This conclusion is based on the view that inquiry, pursued with adequate scepticism, shews the number of such mental processes to be exceedingly great; in fact, I would maintain that the large majority of conscious mental processes in a normal person arise from sources unsuspected by him. We are as yet only on the threshold of important discoveries that will surely be made as soon as this principle finds a rigorous application; and the subject opened up is so vast that in these remarks I can do no more than sketch out a few of the directions along which it would seem that fruitful conclusions are readily to be attained.
Although the importance of feeling in the moulding of our judgements, beliefs, and conduct, has for centuries been recognised by poets and writers, academic psychology has usually allotted to it a very subordinate position in relation to what. may be called the ‘intellectual processes.’ Of late years, however, more and more recognition has been given to the importance of feeling; until now one may fairly question whether there exist any mental processes in the formation and direction p. 9 of which feeling does not play a part of the first rank, and the science of ‘ feeling psychology,’ to which Professor Freud has devoted himself, shews every sign of becoming the only scientific psychology of the future. He has shewn with convincing precision that a number of previously incomprehensible mental processes, such as dream formation and certain apparently meaningless and accidental happenings of daily life, are throughout to be explained by regarding them as problems of feeling. He has further shewn that the causes of these mental processes are usually not only unsuspected by the individual concerned, but are repudiated and denied by him when the very existence of them is suggested. In other words, there exist elaborate psychological mechanisms the effect of which is to conceal from the individual certain feeling processes, which are often of the highest significance to his whole mind. The complexity and subtlety of these mechanisms vary with what may be called the extent of the necessity for concealment, so that the greater the resistance the individual shews to the acceptance of the given feeling, the more elaborate is the mechanism whereby it is concealed from his consciousness.
The concealment mechanisms may be studied in two ways. The known feeling processes may be traced from their origin to the changed form in which they appear in consciousness, and their effect on associated mental processes thus observed; or a given mental process may be analysed, and its causes traced back to their elementary sources. Study along these lines shews that, although the mechanisms in question are both numerous and complex, they may from one point of view be grouped into two classes, according to whether the individual will offer an explanation as to the origin of the terminal mental process or not. In both classes inquiry into the source of the mental process is stopped and the individual regards any such inquiry as superfluous—in the one case because he already has an explanation, in the other case because he thinks one does not exist. As will presently be seen, there is no sharp line between the two classes, and in both of them instances may be found of all kinds of mental processes, actions, judgements, memories, beliefs, etc.
The prominent characteristic of the second class is the fact that the individual considers the given mental process to be self-explanatory, and regards any further inquiry into its p. 10 notes origin as being absurd, irrelevant, meaningless, unnecessary, and, above all, fruitless. This, broadly speaking, is the mechanism that prevents the individual from becoming conscious of the source of the mental process. His precise attitude towards the inquiry varies somewhat according to the kind of mental process concerned, and this enables us further to subdivide the class into two.
When a person is asked what was the cause of a given mental process belonging to this class, he may in the first place categorically assert that it was causeless. Such is the usual attitude adopted towards any of the large group of un-conscious and accidental occurrences described by Professor Freud in his ‘ Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens.’! If pressed, the individual may assert vaguely that they are due to ‘ chance ’ or ‘inattention’; but it is plain that what he means is that they have no effective cause, and that there is no reason whatever why that particular mistake should have been made rather than any other. Yet, as is well known, psycho-analysis always reveals a precise cause for the occurrence, shewing that only it and no other could have arisen, as, indeed, might have been- anticipated from the general principles of scientific determinism; and this cause is often associated with some of the most intimate of the individual’s feeling processes.
The person may in the second place not so much solemnly deny that the occurrence had a cause as regard the question as being foolish or meaningless. The key to the interpretation of this attitude lies in recollecting the popular illusion that a volitional process is a self-caused one—+1.e., has no cause—for it may be doubted whether any one is entirely free from the taint of voluntarism in feeling, although the heretical nature of the fallacy itself is, from a scientific standpoint, plain enough. The mental processes now under discussion are thus always volitional ones, though the volitional element may not always be evident at the time, but may be imported as an afterthought. A neat example of this class, in which the volitional element was prominent at the moment of occurrence, is the one given by Adler, in which an individual deliberately selected a number under the full impression that there was no mental process at work other than his free unfettered choice; psycho-analysis, however, revealed a complex series of causes which had determined precisely the number p. 11 notes chosen, causes reaching into the most intimate part of his mind! Careful consideration of this example shews further that there were two groups of mental processes concerned— first, a conscious determination to select a number, and, secondly, the actual selection itself. The former was a volitional process, caused by the reading of Professor Freud’s book; the second an automatic process, caused by the un-conscious feeling processes revealed in the psycho-analysis. Yet both groups appeared equally volitional to the individual, the feeling of volition having been extended*from the conscious mental process to the automatic one that was associated with it. The same mechanism may be seen in the other cases in which the volitional element is imported as an afterthought.
If, for example, a person decides to take a stroll, the actual direction of his stroll may well be determined by various minor influences that pass unnoticed. If later he is asked why he walked down such-and-such a street, the probability is that he will simply answer, ‘ Because I decided to.’ Here also the slightest trace of conscious volitional feeling is utilised to cover other associated mental processes. In a large number of routine acts, performed automatically, the individual adopts the same attitude when questioned as to their cause. Many acts, the cause of which is a reflex obedience to the custom prevailing in his circle, he will regard when questioned as being volitional, the true cause being thus concealed from him. If, for instance, he is asked why he wears a stiff collar or a tie, he will certainly regard the question as being extremely foolish, though if he is in an indulgent mood he may humour one to the extent of giving some imaginary explanation, such as ‘to keep warm,’ ‘to look respectable,’ etc. It is quite plain that he does so only to please the inquirer, and to his mind the real and final explanation of the act lies in its obviousness. The fact that he regards the question as to the origin of the mental process as essentially absurd is evidently because he considers there is no need to search for a cause in an action that he likes to think is volitional—+.e., self-caused. | We thus soon come to a full stop in the case of the ordinary man, but in the case of an observer who has trained himself to introspective analysis we can get this further clue. Such an observer may quite well recognise that there is something p. 12 behind the volitional process, though he cannot directly detect | what it is. If, for instance, he essays spontaneously to choose
a number, he discovers that he is not free to choose any number; one number alone comes, and not as one of many alternatives; it comes with a certain impulsive force, and he has no option but to ‘choose’ this one number. In other words, he can recognise that it comes to him apparently from without, — and it is clear to him that it must have been determined by some hidden influence to which he has no direct access. A striking illustration of this mechanism, together with an analysis of the source of the mental process, is described by Professor Freud in relation to his own ‘choice’ of the name ‘Dora’ to designate the heroine of his ‘Bruchstiick-Analyse.’
Summing up this class of mental processes, therefore, we may say that whenever an individual considers a given process. as being too obvious to permit of any investigation into its. origin, and shews resistance to such an investigation, we are right in suspecting that the actual origin is concealed from him —almost certainly on account of its unacceptable associations. Reflection shews that this criterion applies to an enormous number of our fixed beliefs—religious, ethical, political, and hygienic—as well as to a great part of our daily conduct; in other words, the principle above quoted refers to a large sphere of mental processes where we least suspect it. Yet if such beliefs and conduct are to be brought into scientific harmony, it is of the highest importance that the mechanisms controlling them should be made the subject of precise study in a way that is as yet only just begun.
_We return now to the first class of mental processes, in regard to which the individual proffers indeed an explanation, but a false one. It is not sharply divided from the other class we have considered, for there we saw examples in which the individual casually gave an obviously inadequate explanation for an act which to his mind really needed none. Indeed, all possible grades may be observed in what may be called the feeling of a necessity to provide an explanation. On inquiring into the source of this necessity, we see that it Is. only another aspect of the necessity every one feels to have what may be called a theory of life, and particularly a theory of himself. Every one feels that, as a rational creature, he must be able to give a connected, logical, and continuous account of himself, his conduct, and opinions, and all his p. 13 mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and revised to that end. No one will admit that he ever deliberately performed an irrational act, and any act that might appear so is immediately justified by distorting the mental processes concerned and providing a false explanation that has a plausible ring of rationality. This justification bears a special relation to the prevailing opinion of the circle of people who are most significant to the individual concerned, and two different groups of false explanations can be distinguished, according as they are formed essentially for the individual himself or for him in special reference to the opinions of his circle; or, roughly speaking, according as they are formed mainly for private or mainly for public consumption. The former of these I would term ‘evasions,’ the latter ‘rationalisations’; there is, however, no sharp line dividing the two, and perhaps it would be better to employ the latter term for both processes.
We may now consider a couple of examples of these. One of the best instances of evasion is the form of religious belief chosen by an individual. Religious belief itself rests of course on psychological principles very different from those now under discussion, but the form of doctrine accepted is another matter. There are a number of arguments used by each sect to support its special view of religion, and as a rule these are as convincing to the members of the given sect as they are unconvincing to the members of other sects. Let us take the case of a man brought up in a close circle, family and otherwise, of Baptists. At the age of puberty he may become a Baptist without thinking twice about the matter, but it often occurs to such a man that it is an irrational and therefore a distasteful thing to hold a belief merely because all his friends do so. He therefore embarks with a great shew of reason upon what seems to him to be a critical and dispassionate examination of the evidence for and against Baptism. It need hardly be said that in most cases such an individual is strongly prejudiced in favour of Baptism, and is so deeply persuaded in his preconscious mind of its truth that he is only seeking for the slightest pretext to become an open convert. The matter once settled, he then maintains that he has become convinced of the truth of his doctrine by the overwhelming force of the evidence in its favour, is highly offended if one bluntly says that he believes in Baptism simply because his father did, and passionately denies this true but unacceptable explanation. p. 14 notes The origin of his belief is thus concealed from him by the mechanism of evasion. How different with an individual brought up in a Catholic environment! The same arguments that with the one man proved so efficacious may here be repeated with the most persuasive eloquence, and are rejected with scorn as being obviously fallacious. We see here that environmental influence may inculcate a given belief by the indirect way of raising the standard of acceptability of the arguments used in its favour; in other words, by making them appear more obviously sensible and reasonable to the individual. It will be an interesting question for the future to determine how many of our most firmly held opinions on the value of universal suffrage, of representative government, of marriage institutions, etc., are not similar examples of blind acceptance of the suggestive influence of our environment, fortified by the most elaborate evasions and rationalisations. As an example of the allied mechanism of rationalisation,! I will take the current use of valerian as a specific antidote for hysteria. It will be remembered that for a great many centuries asafcetida and valerian were administered on the grounds that hysteria was due to the wandering of the uterus about the body, and that evil-smelling drugs tended to drive it down to its proper position and thus cure the complaint. Although these assumptions have not been upheld by experience, nevertheless at the present day most cases of hysteria are still treated by these drugs. Evidently the operating influence that leads to their administration is the blind response to a prevailing tradition, the origin of which is largely forgotten. But the necessity of teachers of neurology to provide reasons to students for their treatment has led to the explanation being invented that the drugs act as ‘ antispasmodics ’—whatever that may mean—and they are often given in the following refined form: One of the constituents of valerian—valerianic acid—is given the name of ‘active principle,’?.and is administered, usually as the zinc salt, sugar-coated so as to disguise its unpleasant | taste. Some modern authorities, aware of the origin of the treatment, have even remarked how curious it is that the ancients, in spite of their false views about hysteria, should have discovered a valuable line of treatment and yet given such an absurd explanation of its action. This continuous p. 15 rationalisation, in the face of the knowledge that the process in the past was irrational, is often seen, a well-known example being the Last Supper explanation of the Mass and Communion, in spite of the recognised theophagic origin of the rite—that is to say, present-day exponents often plume themselves on their superior rational behaviour while performing the identical acts that they deride as irrational in their forbears. It is difficult to see to what further lengths self-deception can go once the beaten path of experience and the scientific standard of verifiability are departed from; and yet I hold it probable that many of our beliefs now thought to be beyond suspicion will prove to be just as bizarre as soon as the searchlight of scepticism is turned on them.
My aim in these few remarks has been to illustrate from what diverse sides Professor Freud’s principle may be supported, and to indicate what a vast field there yet remains for it to be applied over. We are beginning to see man not as the smooth, self-acting agent he pretends to be, but as he really is—a creature only dimly conscious of the various influences that mould his thought and action, and blindly resisting with all the means at his command the forces that are making for a higher and fuller consciousness. In conclusion I would point out that future studies in this direction must give us the secret to the formation of opinion and belief, and the methods whereby these can be controlled. The essential problem here is how to deal with the subjective influences that obscure vision, so that as a result objective truth may carry its due weight. This will yield practical help in the knowledge of how best to promulgate ideas that are in themselves unacceptable, for the day is past when psychologists are justified in still sharing the common illusion of mankind that the best way to spread an opinion is simply to state and restate the evidence in its favour, under the pious belief that sooner or later it will surely be accepted if only itis true. We now know that that method is not only tedious, but often permanently unsuccessful. There are unquestionably true ideas that mankind has had the opportunity of accepting for two or three thousand years, but which will never be accepted until they are promulgated with the aid of the knowledge now being gleaned by the new school of psychology.
Notes from the 1920 edition
Original notes are grouped by printed page. The text was extracted from the historical scan; some characters and note markers may contain recognition errors.
Printed page 8 ↩
- 1 Read at the First International Psycho-Analytical Congress, at Salzburg, April 27, 1908. Published in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, vol. iii., Nov2:
Printed page 10 ↩
- 1 See Chapter IV.
Printed page 11 ↩
- 1 A similar instance is detailed in Chapter IV., p. 41.] -
Printed page 14 ↩
- 1 A good literary example is quoted in Chapter IV., p. 47.
- 2 The latest refinement of this is valeryl-diethylamide (C,H,;,ON)!