History of Psychoanalysis

Papers on Psycho-Analysis · Part I: General papers

The Unconscious and Its Significance for Psychopathology

Ernest JonesChapter VI of XLPrinted pages 121–128About 16 min

An account of the unconscious as a central concept for interpreting symptoms and conflicts.

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Chapter VI

p. 121 notes BEFORE discussing the question of the importance of the un-conscious it is necessary to be clear in what sense one proposes to use this term, for it is one to which very different connotations have been attached. There are three principal current uses of the word ‘unconscious,’ and mention will be made of each of them in order.

The first of these, and probably the commonest, is where ‘unconscious’ is regarded as a synonym for ‘non-mental.’ This is the general sense in which it is employed in medicine; for instance, in reference to the ‘unconsciousness’ following a brain injury or the administration of an anesthetic. Many psychologists also, notably Miinsterberg, would adhere to this use of the word. It is plain that this attitude begs the whole question, by assuming that no mental processes can exist that are not accompanied by consciousness or awareness. The view held by most psychopathologists, on the contrary, is that processes certainly occur, as is shewn by the findings of hypnosis and psycho-analysis, which present all the attributes of mental ones except that the subject is not aware of them, and they therefore call them mental for the simple reason that it is impossible to describe them except in mental terms; according to this view, which is here adhered to, consciousness becomes merely one attribute of mentality, and not an indispensable one. The equating of ‘unconscious’ with ‘non-mental’ would remove the p. 122 notes whole subject from the field of psychopathology, or of any branch of psychology, for the other question then involved, that of the influencing of the mind by non-mental, physical processes, belongs rather to the field of psychophysics.

The second conception of the unconscious is difficult to describe in positive terms on account of its essential vagueness. It might well be called the ‘limbo’ conception, for in it the un-conscious is regarded as an obscure region of the mind, the content of which is largely characterised by neglect and oblivion. It is on the whole a philosophical conception, and has been developed chiefly by such writers as Hartmann, F. W. H. Myers, and most recently by Jung; with some of these writers a mystical element has been decidedly prominent. According to this view, the unconscious part of the mind is a sort of lumber-room to which various mental processes get relegated when they are in a state of inactivity. These processes are then usually considered to be of only quite secondary importance in comparison with conscious ones, and they are accorded no initiative of their own, or any primary dynamic functions, being purely of a passive nature. Curiously enough, the writers who hold this limbo conception of the unconscious think that it also contains another quite different group of mental processes— namely, the nascent form of various ideas for which the personality is not yet ripe. These ideas are supposed to be mostly either lofty ethical concepts or clever solutions of difficult problems, and do not seem to have any genetic relation to the other group that has been relegated to the unconscious in a state of decay.

The third conception of the unconscious is the psycho-. analytical one, developed by Freud. He divides those mental processes that are not accompanied by awareness into. two groups, the preconscious? and what he calls the unconscious proper, the latter being the sense in which the term is used in this paper. Freud’s conception of the unconscious? differs sharply from the preceding ones in that it is a purely inductive p. 123 notes one, being built up step by step on the basis of actual experience without the introduction of any a priori speculative hypothesis; it may therefore be called the scientific conception, in contradistinction to the philosophical one. Instead of starting with any notions, whether precise or nebulous, of what the un-conscious ought to be, he investigated the actual mental processes that were inaccessible to his patients’ direct introspection, and which were only to be reached by means of some technical procedure, such as the psycho-analytic one. As a result of these investigations, he acquired a gradually increasing ‘knowledge of the nature of unconscious processes, of their content, meaning, origin, and significance, and was therefore placed in a position of being able to formulate some general statements on these matters.

The statement of most fundamental importance, and the one on which I wish to lay the greatest stress here, concerns both the origin and the content of the unconscious. It is to the effect that the existence of the unconscious is the result of repression. By this is meant that unconscious processes are of such a kind as to be incompatible with the conscious ones of the given personality, and are therefore prevented from entering consciousness by the operation of certain actively inhibiting, ‘repressing’ forces! The incompatibility in question is most often of a moral order, the word ‘moral’ being taken in its widest possible sense. The processes concerned then conflict with the moral, social, ethical, modest, or esthetic standards that obtain in the person’s consciousness; their very existence would be intolerable to him, and he automatically refuses to acknowledge to himself their presence in his mind. In this action of repression only a very small part is played by the occurrence that may be described as a deliberate conscious pushing of certain thoughts out of the mind, though this is the one with which we are most familiar; much more extensive is the unconscious and automatic keeping apart of the two sets of incompatible mental processes.

The unconscious, then, consists of repressed mental material. A second characteristic of it is its dynamic nature. The un-conscious is not a depository for passive material, but a region where the most active functioning goes on. Unconscious processes are typically conative in kind, and may thus be p. 124 notes conveniently, and not inaccurately, described as wishes. ‘These wishes are constantly striving for gratification, Imaginary or real, and it is to this active striving that the external manifestations of the unconscious are to be ascribed.

Closely allied to the preceding features of the unconscious is the third one of its relation to primary instincts. The un-conscious is the part of the mind that stands nearest to the crude instincts as they are inborn in us, and before they have been subjected to the refining influences of education. It is commonly not realised how extensive is the work performed by these influences, nor how violent is the internal conflict they provoke before they finally achieve their aim. Without them the individual would probably remain a selfish, jealous, impulsive, aggressive, dirty, immodest, cruel, egocentric, and conceited animal, inconsiderate of the needs of others, and unmindful of the complicated social and ethical standards that go to make a civilised society. Yet, according to the findings of psycho-analysis, the results of this refining process. are rarely so perfect as is generally supposed; behind the veneer of civilisation. there remains throughout life a buried mass of crude primitive tendencies, always struggling for expression, and towards which the person tends to relapse whenever suitable opportunity is offered.

In accord, again, with the features just described is the infantile nature and origin of the unconscious. The splitting of the mind into conscious and unconscious regions takes place in the earliest part of childhood life, probably in the first year, and, as was mentioned above, this splitting is the result of the conflict between the uncivilised and non-moral endowments with which we are born and the inhibiting forces? that make for adjustment to the standards of society. The primordial tendencies are repressed, and much of their energy is diverted to other, social aims; from them is derived the greater part of the energy that animates conscious activities. The fact that they are not allowed to find direct external expression, however, does not mean that they are abolished, but that they are compelled to lead an underground existence, manifesting themselves only by indirect and tortuous courses. The infantile character of the unconscious thus persists through- p. 125 notes out the whole of life, giving an added signification to the old saying that the child is father to the man.

To be correlated with the infantile nature of the unconscious is the circumstance that it ignores not only moral standards, but also logical ones. It has, it is true, a logic of its own, but this is one of the emotions and not of the reason; from the usual point of view, therefore, it would be called illogical. Just as the fantasy can overstep the bounds of time! and space, so does the unconscious ignore all reasonable and logical considerations.

The sixth attribute of the unconscious is its predominantly, though by no means exclusively, sexual character. This is only what might have been expected from the fact that the unconscious is in a state of moral conflict with the standards of consciousness, for none of the other primary instincts is subjected to anything like the intensity of repression that the sexual one invariably is. This attribute stands in apparent contradiction with the one previously mentioned concerning the infantile nature of the unconscious, but this contradiction is easily resolved when we remember the fallaciousness of the popular belief that would date the sexual instinct from the time of puberty. Freud and his co-workers have produced abundant evidence to shew that this instinct is actively operative long before this time, and. probably from early childhood, though what is called infantile sexuality widely differs from the adult form, being, like other childhood manifestations, much more diffuse, tentative, and preliminary in nature. Amongst other striking differences, two special ones may be briefly mentioned here: the close association between infantile sexuality and excretory functions, and the sexual colouring in the child’s relation to its near relatives (the so-called ‘incestcomplex’). None of Freud’s conclusions has met with more bitter opposition than the last named, regarding the normal occurrence of incestuous fantasies. It was at first met by a blank denial of the facts themselves. Of late, however, when the facts could no longer be ignored, more ingenious forms of opposition have been devised. Jung, for instance, who is familiar with the facts, has formulated the view that, though these incestuous fantasies unquestionably occur, they do not mean what they purport to, but constitute merely a symbol p. 126 for various ethical ideals, and have no ‘real,’ primary existence in themselves; according to him, therefore, these unconscious fantasies possess no dynamic initiative of their own, but are to be regarded as purely secondary products. The psycho-analytical view, as against this, is that Jung’s different formulation of the facts constitutes a distortion and manipulation of them that is dictated by moral repugnance to a distasteful conclusion.

The preceding description may be summarised in a single statement: according to psycho-analysis, the unconscious is a region of the mind, the content of which is characterised by the attributes of being repressed, conative, instinctive, infantile, unreasoning, and predominantly sexual. A typical example of an unconscious mental process, illustrating all of these, would be the wish of a little girl that her mother might die so that she could marry her father. The six attributes in question, together with others not here mentioned, make up -a consistent and clearly defined conception of the unconscious which is formulated on the basis of experience that may at any time be tested.

The significance of the unconscious, as defined above, for the science of psychopathology may be discussed under four headings. In the first place, a knowledge of the content and mode of operation of the unconscious furnishes us with a key for the understanding of numerous morbid manifestations that were previously incomprehensible; it has given us a consistent interpretation of them, and has revealed their coherent and intelligible structure. Without this knowledge no solution can be found to such problems as why a given patient has developed this or that particular delusion, phobia, or other symptom; with this knowledge the bizarrery and meaninglessness with which we are so familiar in psycho-pathology disappear or are replaced by quite other problems. The reason for this is that all psychopathological symptoms arise in the unconscious, which is the true seat of the disorder, so that the investigation of it is of cardinal importance for both pathology and therapeutics.

In the second place, a knowledge of the unconscious makes clear not only the meaning of these symptoms, but also the causation of them. They are, namely, compromise-formations produced through the conflict between unconscious and conscious tendencies, and are brought about in the following way. It was pointed out above that normally a great part p. 127 of the energy pertaining to the repressed trends of the un-conscious is diverted to permissible, social aims, a process known as ‘sublimation.’ This denotes a partial renunciation of the crude pleasures obtained by indulging in the primitive tendencies that are kept from consciousness, and a replacement of them by other, more or less satisfactory, refined ones. Now, a great number of people find it by no means an easy matter to achieve this renunciation, and are in constant danger of relapsing into the old indulgences and gratifications under various circumstances, particularly when the attractions of the more refined aims flag, as they must do whenever the mental environment becomes more painful, difficult, or disagreeable. Then the mental interests and energies are apt to regress towards older and more primitive modes of functioning. This regression, however, is checked by the repressing forces on which the original sublimation depended. In the resulting conflict neither set of forces is entirely successful: on the one hand the repressing ones manage to prevent a complete return to the primitive modes of gratification, while on the other they fail in transforming the energies in question into sublimated activities. A compromise is reached whereby both sets of forces come to expression, though only in a partial and disguised way; these compromise-formations are clinically called symptoms, and constitute the various psychopathological maladies.

As was hinted above, the actual symptoms do not carry their meaning on the surface, but have to be interpreted and translated into the language of the unconscious before that can be reached. To do this, a knowledge is necessary of the different mechanisms by means of which the distortion is brought about that changes the underlying repressed trend into the manifest symptom; it is impossible, however, here to discuss the nature of these mechanisms, such as;displacement of the affect, inversion, projection, introjection, transposition, and so on. It can only be said that the distortion is brought about in perfectly definite ways, and through the operation of specific factors, which vary in their exact nature according to the past experiences and mental development of the individual concerned.

In the third place, the knowledge gained by investigation of the unconscious bridges over the gap between the normal and the abnormal by demonstrating that the same processes p. 128 go on in both, though the control of the unconscious ones by consciousness is greater in the case of the former. Roughly speaking, insanity presents a picture of the normal unconscious. This matter, important as it is for normal psychology, does not, however, pertain to the theme of the present symposium.

Last, but not least, is the remarkable aid that this knowledge has yielded for the treatment of psychopathological maladies. Up to the present this has, it is true, been far greater in the case of the psychoneuroses than in that of the psychoses, such as dementia preecox, but there it has already proved so valuable that one is justified in entertaining the hope that further researches may be profitable from this point of view in the case of the latter group also. The mode of action of the treatment, in a word, is that the overcoming, by means of psycho-analysis, of the resistances that are interposed against the making conscious of the repressed unconscious material gives the patient a much greater control over this pathogenic material by establishing a free flow of feeling from the deeper to the more superficial layers of the mind, so that the energy investing the repressed tendencies can be diverted from the production of symptoms into useful, social channels.

I would conclude these highly incomplete remarks with the statement that a knowledge of the unconscious furnishes an indispensable key to the understanding and treatment of psychopathological manifestations.

Notes from the 1920 edition

Original notes are grouped by printed page. The text was extracted from the historical scan; some characters and note markers may contain recognition errors.

Printed page 121 ↩

  1. 1 Read as part of the Symposium at the Section of Neurology and Psychological Medicine, British Medical Association, July 26,1914. Published in the Review of Neurology and Psychiatry, vol. xii.
  2. 2 Morton Prince also prefers to use the word ‘ unconscious ’ in this sense, not, however, because he holds that there are no mental. processes except those in consciousness, but because he uses other terms for these—namely, subconscious and co-conscious.
  3. I2I

Printed page 122 ↩

  1. 1 The difficulty that will be experienced in trying to reconcile the description of the unconscious presently to be given with that given by many other writers will greatly diminish if the reader will bear in mind that they are usually referring to what the psycho-analyst terms the preconscious, the unconscious proper being a much deeper region of the mind.
  2. 2 The best account of this is given in his papers entitled ‘Das Unbewusste,’ Internat. Zeitschr. f. dvetl. Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. iii., S. 189, 257.

Printed page 123 ↩

  1. 1 For the relation of repression to the pleasure-pain principle see Chapter V., p. 118.

Printed page 124 ↩

  1. 1 These also are probably in part inborn, though most of them are acquired.

Printed page 125 ↩

  1. 1 Timelessness, 7.e., complete absence of any relation to the idea of time, is a highly characteristic attribute of the unconscious.

About this reading edition

This page is an OCR-assisted transcription of Jones’s 1920 London reprint of the revised and enlarged edition. Paragraphs, section headings, original page locations, and page-grouped notes are presented for reading. The text has not yet received a complete line-by-line proofread against the scan, so occasional recognition errors may remain. Jones’s arguments are historical material, not current clinical guidance.

Jones, E. (1920). The Unconscious and Its Significance for Psychopathology. In Papers on psycho-analysis (Rev. & enl. ed., reprint, pp. 121–128). Baillière, Tindall and Cox.